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Introduction
Program and policy evaluation constitute a crucial component of evidence-based policy,
now a standard approach to policy-making in many developed and developing countries.
Evidence-based policy makes decisions informed by ﬁndings from credible research and
uses systematic monitoring and evaluation to track implementation and measure outcomes,
thus ensuring the continuous improvement of program performance. Therefore, it becomes
critically important that research provides rigorous evidence for causal eﬀects of policy
interventions. The program evaluation literature is a very dynamic ﬁeld that has ﬂourished
over the past two decades, adding new developments and modiﬁcations to the pre-existing
set of econometric tools. One inﬂuential strand of relatively new theoretical and applied
literature is focused on ﬂexible non-parametric methods for estimating treatment eﬀects
that are based on the less restrictive functional form and distributional assumptions. The
most recent trend revolutionizing the econometric ﬁeld is machine learning, a new approach
that has emerged as a tool to manipulate and analyze massive amounts of data collected
by modern computers, that record vast amounts of information about human transactions.
Analytic methods based on machine learning are rapidly gaining popularity in the ﬁeld of
applied econometrics.
This PhD thesis, organized as a collection of four independent essays, combines
traditional and more innovative methods of program evaluation to identify and
estimate causal eﬀects in settings not previously considered in literature. The ﬁrst
two chapters examine randomized information campaigns, combining straightforward
impact evaluation, built upon the notion of randomization with ﬂexible adjustments for
diﬀerences in covariates (in Chapter 1), and machine-learning algorithms, primarily to
investigate heterogeneity of treatment eﬀects (Chapter 2). The two subsequent chapters
present a novel model of mediation analysis that allows estimating direct and indirect
treatment eﬀects when outcomes are only observed for some units (Chapter 3) and
compare several mediation/decomposition methods in the estimation of gender-wage gap
in the United States (US). In what follows, a non-technical summary of each chapter is
laid out.
Chapter 1 written in collaboration with Martin Huber, Ana Kotevska, and Aleksandra
Martinovska Stojcheska explores the impact of an information campaign about a rural
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development program (RDP) targeting farmers in the former Yugoslav Republic (FYR)
of Macedonia. Rural areas of Macedonia are stricken by poverty, ineﬃcient use of
agricultural land, undiversiﬁed economic activities, and limited access to markets and
ﬁnance. In an eﬀort to strengthen rural economic growth and increase agricultural
competitiveness, the Government of FYR Macedonia introduced a support program
comprised of various measures, including ﬁnancing and training. Despite the availability
of governmental means for rural development, the RDP uptake by farmers is low.
The present study investigates whether in-person provision of information about RDP
increases farmers' awareness and interest in program participation. The information
campaign was planned to be randomized within selected villages, such that every
other farmer household would receive an information brochure about RDP measures.
However, the actual implementation of the campaign deviated from the initial plan, as
data collectors did not fully follow the protocol due to low levels of trust from farmers.
Instead of delivering the brochure to every second house, ﬁeld personnel handed them
out in public places, collecting contact information of recipients to survey them 1-2
weeks later. As reported by the local staﬀ and reﬂected in the data, younger smaller
scale farmers, without previous experience with RDP, were more likely to receive the
brochure. These violations of the experimental design necessitated restriction of the
evaluation sample to a speciﬁc subset of observations, for which observed background
characteristics are well-balanced, and the application of estimation methods that account
for the potential remaining diﬀerences between the treatment and control group. Towards
this end, we invoke the conditional independence assumption and utilize propensity score
matching and entropy balancing, in addition to standard OLS, to recover the causal
eﬀect of the information brochure on outcomes of interest. Our results suggest that
while the intervention succeeded in informing farmers about RDP measures, it had a
negative, albeit only marginally signiﬁcant, eﬀect on the reported possibility of using
RDP support in the future. The latter impact is likely driven by an increased awareness
of administrative burden associated with RDP participation, which is also reﬂected in
our ﬁndings. As revealed by an additional heterogeneity analysis, the negative eﬀect on
the possibility of participation appears to be driven largely by a group of unproﬁtable
farmers who are particularly sensitive to additional administrative burden related to
RDP, and for whom the requirement of upfront co-ﬁnancing of RDP projects may be
untenable. Our recommendation to Macedonian policy makers is to consider ways of
easing administrative hurdles associated with RDP participation.
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Similar to Chapter 1, Chapter 2, a collaborative work with Elena Denisova-Schmidt,
Martin Huber, and Elvira Leontyeva, considers a randomized information campaign, but
in a diﬀerent setting and applies diﬀerent econometric tools for additional analysis. In
this study, the impact of various information materials on university students' attitudes
towards dishonest academic practices and corruption is investigated. Corruption in Russia
is a rather understudied but hot topic, especially considering recent anti-corruption
protest rallies have been attracting a growing number of young supporters. In our
experiment, about 2,000 university student survey participants were randomly assigned
to one of four diﬀerent information treatments (brochures or videos) about the negative
consequences of corruption or to a control group. Randomization of the treatment
assignment was successful, such that students were on average comparable across the
treatment groups. As a methodological advancement over previous research, we use
several supervised machine-learning techniques for robustness checks, revealing eﬀect
heterogeneities, and for multiple hypothesis testing. The common task of supervised
machine-learning methods is to ﬁnd functions that produce good out-of-sample
predictions. This is attained by randomly partitioning data into subsamples. One part
of the data (training data) is ﬁrst used to ﬁnd a function that best predicts in-sample;
next, another piece of data (validation data) is used to reﬁne the coeﬃcients obtained in
the ﬁrst step to obtain best prediction in the validation subsample; ﬁnally, the remaining
data (test data) are used to obtain out-of-sample predictions using the model built
and ﬁne-tuned in the previous two steps. Our analysis suggests that dishonest academic
practices are quite common among surveyed students, while corruption is perceived
negatively as a crime and evil, yet students are not particularly interested to take
part in corruption-awareness activities. No pronounced treatment eﬀects are detected in
the total sample. However, when inspecting a subsample of students who frequently
plagiarize, we ﬁnd them to develop stronger negative attitudes towards corruption in the
aftermath of our intervention. Unexpectedly, some information materials lead to more
tolerant views on corruption among those who plagiarize less frequently and in male
students, while female students appear nearly non-responsive to provided information.
Based on these ﬁndings, we recommend policy makers to scrutinize the possibility
of (undesired) heterogeneous eﬀects when designing an anti-corruption educational
intervention.
Chapter 3 co-authored with Martin Huber presents a novel model of ﬂexible mediation
analysis that identiﬁes and estimates average natural direct and indirect treatment eﬀects
in situations when outcome is observed only for some units in the population. The aim of
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the mediation analysis is to investigate the black box of total treatment eﬀect and to
separate the direct eﬀect of a treatment from the indirect component operating through
intermediate variables called mediators. This study extends existing nonparametric
mediation models, resting on a sequential conditional independence assumption on
the assignment of the treatment and the mediator, by allowing the outcome variable
to be missing for some observations. Two sets of assumptions about the patterns of
missing outcome values are considered: ﬁrst, that outcome values (after conditioning on
observed variables) are missing at random (MAR); and by the second less restrictive
set of assumptions, outcomes are not missing at random, i.e. they can be related to
unobservable characteristics. In the ﬁrst case, direct and indirect eﬀects in the total
population are obtained through reweighting observations by the inverse of the selection
propensity given observed characteristics. For the latter case, identiﬁcation relies on
the use of a control function, a nonparametric analog of the inverse Mill's ratio in
Heckman-type selection models; observations are then reweighted by the control function,
in addition to the inverse of the selection propensity given the observed characteristics,
to identify eﬀects in the selected and total populations. We conduct a brief simulation
study investigating ﬁnite-sample properties of the presented mediation models based on
semiparametric IPW estimation with probit-based propensity scores. Furthermore, we
provide an empirical illustration using data from the Program STAR, an educational
experiment that randomly assigned kindergarten and primary school pupils to small
classes in the United States. We evaluate the average natural direct and indirect eﬀects
of the program on standardized math test scores in the ﬁrst grade of primary school
mediated by absenteeism in kindergarten. Due to attrition, the outcome of interest is
unobserved for a non-negligible share of the sample. We compare the eﬀects estimated
with our newly introduced MAR estimator with those estimated using several other
mediation techniques. The MAR estimator for the total population yields the largest
estimate of the indirect eﬀect of absenteeism compared to other estimators. Yet, overall,
the estimated indirect eﬀects are small compared to the dominating direct eﬀects and are
not statistically signiﬁcant. It appears that other causal mechanisms, unobserved in the
data and entering the direct eﬀect, are more important for explaining the positive eﬀect
of small kindergarten classes on math test scores.
Finally, Chapter 4, joint work with Martin Huber, investigates the sensitivity of
average wage gap decomposition to methods resting on diﬀerent assumptions regarding
endogeneity of observed characteristics, sample selection into employment and estimators'
functional form, to gain insight on the robustness of decomposition across identifying
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assumptions. Literature on decomposition of wage gaps is concerned with splitting
the diﬀerence in average wages between two groups into an explained part, attributed
to diﬀerences in observed characteristics, and a remaining unexplained part linked to
various unobserved factors; the latter is often interpreted as discrimination. Since the
seminal contributions by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) on the linear decomposition
method, the ﬁeld has developed, and new non-parametric approaches have been proposed
(see for instance DiNardo et al., 1996; Barsky et al., 2002, among others). However,
nearly all these methods fail to consider potential endogeneity that arises due to both
(1) observed confounders that are deﬁned prior to birth (e.g., parent's socio-economic
status, religious aﬃliation), and (2) sample selection, as wages are only observed for
the working population. There are only a few studies that control for both endogeneity
and sample selection; one of them builds on the ﬂexible causal mediation methods
presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The current study compares the following
estimators: Oaxaca-Blinder linear decomposition; semiparametric inverse probability
weighting (IPW, see Hirano et al., 2003), which eases linearity but ignores endogeneity
and sample selection, just as the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition; IPW controlling for
potential confounders at birth to mitigate endogeneity as in Huber (2015), but ignoring
sample selection; and the approaches discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis to tackle both
endogeneity and sample selection. We decompose gender wage gap using data from the
US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. Our ﬁndings suggest the wage gap
components are not stable across methods. Even the estimate of the total wage gap
varies depending on whether we account for sample selection or not. Furthermore, we
also compare our preferred extensive speciﬁcation, that includes not only the levels
but also histories of mediator variables, to a more concise speciﬁcation typically used
in previous literature. To no surprise, the explained part of the wage gap decreases,
and the unexplained component increases, when fewer mediator variable are included.
Given the sensitivity of the wage gap components to methods and variable deﬁnitions,
we recommend policy makers to be cautious when basing policies on the results of wage
decompositions.
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Chapter 1
Evaluating an Information Campaign
about Rural Development Policies in
FYR Macedonia
1.1 Introduction1
The agricultural sector plays an important role in the rural economy of the Western
Balkans. In this paper, we focus on the former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia,
where agriculture, together with forestry and ﬁshing, accounts for about 15 percent of
GDP and 17 percent of total employment (State Statistical Oﬃce of the Republic of
Macedonia, 2015). While the agricultural sector is of importance and has naturally
high development potential, it suﬀers from a problem common to many post-socialist
countries  low productivity. To combat negative factors hindering rural growth and to
increase agricultural competitiveness, environmental protection, and quality of life in
rural areas, the National Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development was adopted
in 2007. The new strategy deﬁnes the country's long-term goals aligning Macedonian
rural development policy with the common agricultural policy (CAP) of the European
Union (EU), in particular with its second pillar, rural development programmes (RDPs)
(Dimitrievski et al., 2014). RDPs are seven-year programs comprising various support
measures such as ﬁnancing of planning, training, and advice; annual management
payments; and investment aid (European Commission, 2005; Dwyer and Powell, 2016).
While EU member states must follow common strategic goals for rural development and
agriculture, they adjust the design and implementation of RDPs to their country-speciﬁc
contexts (Dwyer et al., 2012).
1This essay was written in co-authorship with Martin Huber, Ana Kotevska, and Aleksandra
Martinovska Stojcheska. It was published as Huber et al. (2018).
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Our study examines how a local campaign informing farmers about RDP measures
aﬀects their knowledge and interest in taking part in the program in FYR Macedonia. In
the course of the campaign, a (randomly) selected group of farmers received a brochure
describing the RDP measures and the application process. Based on evidence reported
in previous literature (European Commission, 2013; IPARD II, 2015) and informal
exchanges with agricultural specialists in FYR Macedonia (Prof. D.Dimitrievski, June 16,
2015, personal communication), we presume that providing information about existing
RDP measures in person can increase farmers' awareness about the program and,
hence, interest in participating. Dwyer and Powell (2016) emphasize the relevance of
information-search cost, among other transaction costs, for RDP performance, pointing to
a lack of research on the costs arising from asymmetries in perception and understanding
of programmes (Dwyer and Powell, 2016, 548). Such asymmetries are possibly present
in FYR Macedonia where RDP uptake is low, despite the availability of governmental
means for rural development. Our interest lies in determining if providing farmers with
information (hence lowering information-search cost and improving the understanding
of procedures) aﬀects their intention to participate in the program. According to policy
recommendations drafted in Dwyer and Powell (2016), providing support and advice
helping beneﬁciaries prepare and submit applications is crucial for eﬀective use of funding.
Previous studies in development and agricultural economics focus on several aspects
of information provision to farmers, including the role of media and extension services in
agricultural information access (Hassan et al., 2010; Galadima, 2014), farmers' information
needs (Lwoga et al., 2011), and their perceptions of the eﬀectiveness of various information
sources (Achuonjei et al., 2003). The majority of these investigations are descriptive and
do not aim at estimating the size of information provision eﬀects, while a (nonrandomized)
survey is the most commonly employed method. While they collect useful information
on farmers' attitudes and behavior, such surveys do not permit a causal interpretation
of information provision eﬀects on policy perception and participation. Another issue is
limited generalizability, because all cited studies are conducted in developing countries of
Africa and Asia, where political and economic background, agricultural practices, rural
situations, and information provision might diﬀer substantially from those in transition
economies such as FYR Macedonia.
In its research design, our paper is related to a growing body of experimental literature
on the eﬀectiveness of randomized information campaigns in various ﬁelds of economics,
e.g., public economics (Duﬂo and Saez, 2003; Chetty and Saez, 2013), labor economics
(Altmann et al., 2015; Liebman and Luttmer, 2015), and environmental economics
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(Ferraro and Miranda, 2013; Benders et al., 2006). Most of these investigations ﬁnd small
to moderate eﬀects of information provision on the outcomes of interest (see, for instance,
Chetty and Saez, 2013; Altmann et al., 2015). However, the eﬀectiveness of randomized
information campaigns depends ultimately on the ﬁeld of study, the context, the exact
implementation of an intervention, quality and quantity of provided information, and
subjects' motivation (Saez, 2009; Feld et al., 2013; Altmann and Traxler, 2014).
This paper contributes to the literature in that it evaluates how information provision
aﬀects farmers' intention to participate in the RDP. To the best of our knowledge, no such
study has yet been done in the context of transition economies, in the Western Balkans
in particular. From a policy perspective, the paper is interesting as it could shed light
on how to enhance RDP participation by lowering farmers' information acquisition costs
and improving agricultural policy implementation in FYR Macedonia. If information
provision does indeed increase farmers' intention to apply for the RDP, this provides
policy makers with a relatively inexpensive tool to increase participation rates. Our study
also hints at further potential reasons for nonparticipation that appear interesting from a
policy perspective, namely: (1) the administrative burden of RDP projects as perceived
by farmers, and (2) a speciﬁc ﬁnancing scheme of some RDP measures requiring farmers
to provide up to 50 percent of the total investment up front, to be reimbursed upon
realized costs.
1.2 Institutional context
1.2.1 Challenges in rural areas of FYR Macedonia
FYR Macedonia is a small, landlocked, transitional economy in the Western Balkans
region. The country experienced a sharp economic decline after the breakup of Yugoslavia
in 1990 that aﬀected all sectors, including agriculture, the main economic activity in
rural areas. A number of socioeconomic issues still persist in rural Macedonia a quarter
of century later, presenting a challenge for the successful implementation of rural
development policies. These problems include farm fragmentation and small-scale private
farming, leading to ineﬃcient use of agricultural land (Dimitrievski et al., 2014), poor
diversiﬁcation of economic activities, insuﬃcient investments in infrastructure, and limited
access to markets and sources of ﬁnance (Kotevska et al., 2015). On the demographic
side, the ongoing trend of out-migration from rural areas has led to a situation where
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villages are left with a larger population of older and less-educated residents (European
Commission, 2013). Unfavorable education structure, poor qualiﬁcations, and insuﬃcient
professional skills of the economically active population are considered to be among the
factors limiting the potential of rural development (Kotevska et al., 2015). This further
deepens the gap between urban and rural standards of living. Today, almost half of the
country's poor population resides in rural areas (European Commission, 2013). Thus, the
crucial question is of how the government can eﬀectively use policy instruments, including
the RDP, to address the problems of rural development and reverse the persistent
negative trends.
1.2.2 Agricultural policy and RDP
After its independence from Yugoslavia, FYR Macedonia experienced turbulent
agricultural policies with many reforms and ad hoc policy decisions. In 2005, the
country received the status of an EU candidate. This new trend of European integration
brought about changes in the national agricultural policy which had to be adjusted to
the CAP. Therefore, FYR Macedonia focused on harmonization of the national policy
for development of agriculture and rural areas. The rural development policy is to a
large extent aligned with (the second pillar of) the CAP. It has four priority areas and
instruments to support them: (1) increasing the competitiveness of the agricultural
and forest holdings, (2) protecting and improving the environment and rural areas, (3)
improving the quality of life and encouraging diversiﬁcation of economic activities in rural
areas, and (4) supporting local development (Dimitrievski et al., 2014, 128). In addition,
rural development is ﬁnanced by the EU via the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
for Rural Development (IPARD) (Dimitrievski et al., 2014), which is not investigated in
this study.
After the 2007 introduction of the National Strategy for Agriculture and Rural
Development, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Economy has been
preparing and announcing annual programs for rural development. The rural development
budget is planned on an annual basis and realized through up to eight calls per year.
However, because investments require time to be organized and implemented, and due to
limited institutional capacity, budget transfers planned for one year are often conducted
only in successive years.
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In the period from 2008 to 2014, projects of about EUR 31.4 million were funded
under the national program for rural development (see Table 1.1). In the ﬁrst few years
of implementation, the budget was mainly used to increase competitiveness of agricultural
holdings, mostly through farm modernization of primary producers. In 2014, a substantial
increase in the budget was devoted to the agrifood processing sectors and for improving the
quality of life and infrastructural improvement of rural areas. According to information
provided by the Agency for Financial Support in Agriculture and Rural Development,
in 2014, funds for increasing competitiveness were allocated to 700 applicants (farmers
and companies) of relatively small investments averaging EUR 4,460, whereas funds for
improving quality of life in rural areas were used by 80 municipalities, averaging EUR
64,470 (APM Database, 2015).
Table 1.1: Annual payments for structural and rural development in FYR Macedonia
per priority area (2008-2014, million EUR)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Sum
Increasing the competitiveness of the 2.2 1 6.2 0 3.2 0.9 6.2 19.6
agricultural and forest holdings:
Farm modernization 1.5 0.9 5.2 0 2.5 0 3 13.1
Agri-food support (processing, marketing) 0.6 0.1 0.9 - 0.7 0.9 3.2 6.5
Protecting and improving the environment 0.4 0 0.2 - - - 0.8 1.4
and rural areas
Improving the quality of life and - 0 0.6 0.1 0.2 1 8.5 10.4
encouraging diversiﬁcation of econ.
activities in rural areas
Structural and Rural Development 2.6 1 6.9 0.1 3.4 2 15.5 31.4
measures (Total)
Source: Own calculation based on data in the Macedonian APM database (APM Database, 2015).
1.3 Study design
Our study is based on an information campaign experiment conducted in the Southeast
of FYR Macedonia in May  June 2015. A brochure was prepared for this purpose in
cooperation with the Agency for Financial Support of Agriculture and Rural Development
of the Republic of Macedonia. The assessment of the campaign's eﬀectiveness to promote
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interest in the RDP is motivated by the relatively low number of applications, despite the
government's willingness to support the agricultural sector and the availability of funding.
The causal eﬀect of information provision was intended to be evaluated by means of an
experiment. We planned to randomly select 600 farmer households in the largest villages
in the chosen region. Every second household on a list of households per village would be
treated, while the remaining households would comprise the control group. The treatment
probability would thus be asymptotically independent of farmers' characteristics. The
treatment group would receive an information brochure on selected RDPmeasures delivered
in person, whereas the control group would receive no such brochure. A survey would be
conducted for the entire sample about two weeks later, collecting information on personal
and farm characteristics, previous experiences with the RDP application and participation,
awareness about the RDP and its potential beneﬁts for the community and the farm, and,
importantly, on the farmers' intention to apply for RDP measures and to coﬁnance RDP
projects.
The actual implementation of the campaign deviated from the initial plan. Due to an
unstable political situation and generally low levels of trust in the country, data collectors
did not manage to fully follow the protocol. Reportedly, farmers were reluctant to
communicate with strangers and accept brochures when the surveyors tried to approach
the farmers at their homes. Therefore, instead of going to every second house when
delivering the brochure, and going house to house to conduct the survey in preselected
villages, the surveyors distributed them in several villages in public places, such as local
shops, markets, pharmacies, ﬁelds, gardens, and water supply stations. They distributed
the brochures in person and collected farmers' contact information to survey them 1  2
weeks later. Reportedly, the brochures were more likely to be given to younger farmers,
owners of small farms, and those who had not had experience with RDP participation,
who were supposedly the types of farmers one predominantly meets in public places in
rural areas. The face-to-face survey for the control group took place while the brochures
were still being distributed to the treatment group. Once brochure dissemination was
completed, the treatment group was surveyed. All treated individuals were interviewed,
so there was no unit nonresponse. In the control group, an interviewer would go to the
next available household in case of a refusal. The violations of the experimental design
required the restriction of the evaluation sample to a speciﬁc subset of observations and
the application of estimation methods that account for the fact that the intervention was
not properly randomized.
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The distributed brochure contains information about four selected RDP measures.
The face-side of the brochure presents the title and the logo of the Agency for Financial
Support in Agriculture and Rural Development, the phrase Every year the Government
of the Republic of Macedonia prepares ﬁnancial support programs for rural development,
and three major goals of the program: modernization and structural adjustment of
the agrifood sector, support of economic activities related to nature protection and
development of rural areas, and transition of national agricultural policy towards
the EU CAP. The rest of the brochure describes selected RDP measures along with
eligibility criteria, application processes, required documents, and contact details for the
responsible authorities. The selected RDP measures include (1) Support of young farmers
(Measure 112), (2) Investments in farm modernization (Measure 121), (3) Investments
in increasing the economic value of forestry (Measure 122), and ﬁnally (4) Support of
economic associations of farms for joint agricultural activity (Measure 131). Three of the
four listed measures require coﬁnancing from the farmers' side. Measures 121 and 122
require 50 percent coﬁnancing by the farmer, whereas measure 131 requires up to 20
percent, depending on the submeasure (Zakon za Zemjodelstvo i Ruralen Razvoj [Law of
Agriculture and Rural Development], 2010, 17  20). Importantly, the farmer must ﬁrst
personally ﬁnance the full amount of investment while actual RDP support is received
upon the realized costs, if previously approved to be eligible. Measure 112 represents a
grant of up to 600,000 Macedonian denars (EUR 9,760)2 paid to a successful application
in three installments over a three-year period (hence, coﬁnancing is not required). The
brochure targets various groups of farmers and provides the most relevant information
regarding RDP measures and the application process. If farmers wanted to obtain more
details on the program, the contact information of the responsible authorities could be
found on the back of the brochure.
1.4 Data and balancing tests
In our survey, cross-sectional data on 597 farmer households (represented by a household
head), including 292 treated and 305 nontreated farmers, were collected. The dataset
contains observations from 34 villages of the Southeastern region.
Respondents were asked about their attitudes and opinions about the RDP measured
on a Likert scale ranging from 1 strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree. The variables
2Based on the year-end 2014 exchange rate (National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, 2017).
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generated from these questions are used as outcomes in our analysis. One group of questions
relates to farmers' willingness to apply and participate in the program in the near future
(3  5 years): How do you assess the possibility to use RDP support for your household
(e.g., for mechanization, equipment purchases) in the next 3  5 years? and How do
you assess your intention to use RDP support for your household in the next 3  5 years?
Another group of statements covers awareness and opinions about RDP application process
and participation: I have enough information to independently prepare the application
(procedure and documents), I have enough knowledge and experience to independently
prepare the application (procedure and documents), The RDP application (procedure
and documents) is easy, and The RDP increases the administrative work. Information
on farmers' previous experiences with RDP was collected, including application for the
program in the last three years, use of support in the last three years, and received value
of support (in denars).
Background characteristics were also gathered, describing household size; household
head's age, sex, educational attainment (primary education, high school, or college/university
and higher), and experiences with farming activities, including number of years spent
working on a farm, and the primary occupation (whether in agriculture or other
industries). Information related to farming activities was available from the survey: farm
proﬁtability in the last three years (measured on a scale from 1 to 5: very unproﬁtable,
moderately unproﬁtable, break-even, moderately proﬁtable, very proﬁtable), ease
of getting a loan (1 to 5: very diﬃcult, diﬃcult, medium, easy, very easy),
dependence on subsidies to break even ﬁnancially (1 to 3: not dependent, slightly
dependent, very dependent), frequency of cooperation with other agricultural producers
(1 to 5: never, rarely, not sure, sometimes, always), share of agricultural
production sold on a market, share of household income from farming, whether or not
there are additional workers besides family members working on the farm, total farmed
area (in hectares), and total livestock (in heads). Finally, the data contain binary
indicators for receiving the brochure, reading it, and learning new facts about RDP
measures.
Balancing t-tests comparing the mean values of the characteristics between the
treatment and control groups revealed statistically signiﬁcant (at the 5 percent level)
diﬀerences in age, education, years in farming, having additional workers on the farm,
the share of agricultural production sold on a market, farm proﬁtability, farm capacity
(in hectares), and some missing indicators, which points to a failure of randomization.
For this reason, we use a restricted sample for our evaluation based on the information
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about the brochure assignment process (i.e., brochures were more likely distributed to
younger farmers, owners of small farms, and those who had not participated in the RDP
previously) provided by the ﬁeld personnel and reﬂected in the data. Speciﬁcally, we
disregard observations from older age groups and only keep prime-age household heads
that are up to 55 years old. Furthermore, we only include households that have not
previously received RDP support and do not have any employees working on their farm.
As demonstrated in Table 1.2, which provides descriptive statistics and balancing t-tests
for the covariates, the subsample is relatively well balanced in terms of mean values of a
range of selected characteristics. Apart from primary education, farm proﬁtability and
a missing indicator for the share of agricultural production sold on a market, no mean
is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across treatment states at the 5-percent level. We
consider this subsample in our analysis of the brochure's eﬀect outlined further below.
Table 1.2: Mean covariate values by treatment status in the selected subsample
Variables Total Control Treatment Diﬀerence p-
subsample (C) (T) (T-C) value
Age 44.611 45.703 43.904 -1.799 0.058
(7.413) (7.467) (7.316) [0.946]
Male (binary) 0.755 0.723 0.776 0.053 0.345
(0.431) (0.450) (0.419) [0.056]
Education: primary (binary) 0.078 0.139 0.038 -0.100 0.009
(0.268) (0.347) (0.193) [0.038]
Education: high school (binary) 0.708 0.673 0.731 0.058 0.330
(0.455) (0.471) (0.445) [0.059]
Education: college/ university 0.132 0.139 0.128 -0.010 0.812
(binary) (0.339) (0.347) (0.335) [0.044]
Education missing (binary) 0.082 0.050 0.103 0.053 0.105
(0.274) (0.218) (0.304) [0.033]
Household head's occupation: 0.514 0.535 0.500 -0.035 0.589
agriculture (binary) (0.501) (0.501) (0.502) [0.064]
Household head's occupation 0.016 0.020 0.013 -0.007 0.674
missing (binary) (0.124) (0.140) (0.113) [0.017]
Years in farming 22.006 22.356 21.779 -0.578 0.611
(8.517) (9.485) (7.851) [1.133]
Household size 4.121 4.040 4.173 0.133 0.398
(1.158) (1.363) (1.004) [0.158]
Continued on next page
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Table 1.2  continued from previous page
Variables Total Control Treatment Diﬀerence p-
subsample (C) (T) (T-C) value
Proﬁtable farma 3.549 3.426 3.628 0.202 0.008
(0.572) (0.638) (0.511) [0.075]
Subsidy dependentb 2.078 2.168 2.019 -0.149 0.154
(0.806) (0.837) (0.783) [0.104]
Subsidy dependent 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.006 0.319
missing (binary) (0.062) (0.000) (0.080) [0.006]
Frequency of cooperationc 3.700 3.594 3.769 0.175 0.370
(1.526) (1.531) (1.523) [0.195]
Frequency of cooperation 0.004 0.010 0.000 -0.010 0.318
missing (binary) (0.062) (0.100) (0.000) [0.010]
Share of agricultural production 87.008 87.891 86.436 -1.445 0.488
sold on a market (16.853) (15.537) (17.678) [2.095]
Share of agricult. production 0.016 0.000 0.026 0.026 0.045
sold missing (binary) (0.124) (0.000) (0.159) [0.013]
Share of income from farming 51.490 53.297 50.321 -2.977 0.312
(23.166) (22.725) (23.445) [2.938]
Share of income from farming 0.008 0.000 0.013 0.013 0.157
missing (binary) (0.088) (0.000) (0.113) [0.009]
Capacity: farmed area (ha) 1.638 1.695 1.601 -0.094 0.508
(1.097) (1.129) (1.078) [0.142]
Capacity: total livestock 1.115 1.184 1.071 -0.113 0.750
(number of heads) (2.762) (2.786) (2.754) [0.354]
Number of observations 257 101 156 - -
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are in brackets. aProﬁtable
farm: 1=very unproﬁtable; 2=moderately unproﬁtable; 3=break-even; 4=moderately
proﬁtable; 5=very proﬁtable. bSubsidy dependent : 1=not dependent; 2=slightly dependent;
3=very dependent. cFrequency of cooperation: 1=never; 2=rarely; 3=not sure; 4=sometimes;
5=always.
The evaluation sample includes 257 observations, out of which 156 are treated and 101
comprise the control group. As can be seen from Table 1.2, farmers are, on average, about
45 years old, predominantly males, with a high school degree, who have spent almost
half of their life working in farming. For half of the farmers, agriculture is the main
occupation. They sell most of what they produce on the market, and more than half of their
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income comes from farming. Farms in the sample are, on average, moderately proﬁtable
or break-even and somewhat dependent on subsidies. Table 1.3 provides additional insight
into how our evaluation sample compares to the average farm household in the Southeast
region and in the entire FYR Macedonia, in terms of characteristics available from the 2013
Farm Structure Survey. Household heads in the selected sample are typically younger, more
educated, more likely to be female, and their household size tends to be larger, compared
to the respective averages in the region and country. The average farm size in the sample
is comparable to the regional and national averages but smaller in terms of total livestock.
Table 1.3: Mean values of characteristics at sample, regional, and national levels
Variables Evaluation Southeast FYR
sample region Macedonia
Average age 44.6 55.5 57.4
Male 75% 88% 89%
Education: no or incomplete primary - 22% 12%
Education: primary 8% 34% 35%
Education: high school 71% 38% 47%
Education: college/ university 13% 6% 6%
Household size (number of members) 4.1 3.4 3.6
Average farm size (total ha/farm) 1.6 1.5 1.8
Capacity: total livestock (units/farm) 1.1 2.0 2.0
Number of individual farms 257 25,779 170,580
Source: Own 2015 survey and Farm Structure Survey 2013.
Item nonresponse was moderate. In 21 cases (8.2 percent) the educational level was
not reported in the selected sample. The number of missing values in other covariates is
even smaller. For the purpose of our analysis, we introduce binary indicators for missing
values in covariates while replacing actual missing values with zeros.
1.5 Estimation methods
To evaluate the impact of the information brochure on farmers' willingness to apply and
participate in the RDP, as well as on other outcome variables, four econometric methods
are used: the simple diﬀerence in means, OLS, and two non-/semiparametric estimation
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techniques, namely, propensity score matching and nonparametric multivariate reweighting
(entropy balancing). Formally, we estimate regression speciﬁcations of the following kind:
Yi = β0 + β1Ti + β2Xi + i, (1.1)
where the variable Yi measures various outcomes, e.g., farmers' intention to apply for the
RDP, for individual i. Ti is a binary indicator that takes a value of 1 if individual is
treated, i.e., received the information brochure, while β1 is the coeﬃcient of interest, as
it captures the treatment eﬀect. Xi is the vector of covariates used in the OLS regression,
propensity score estimation, and entropy balancing.
First, we consider the simple diﬀerences in mean outcomes between treatment and
control groups. If randomization had been successful, both groups would have been
comparable in all their background characteristics (both observed and unobserved), and
the diﬀerences in mean outcomes across treatment groups would have been unbiased
estimates of the average casual eﬀects of the intervention. However, the randomization
was not successful, and even after restricting the original sample, some characteristics
are not fully balanced across treatment states. For this reason, the simple diﬀerence is
unlikely to provide an unbiased estimate of the average casual treatment eﬀect.
As an alternative strategy, we control for a range of observed characteristics Xi in the
estimation. We rely on the conditional independence assumption (CIA), which states that
after conditioning on observed characteristics that jointly aﬀect the treatment probability
and the outcome, the independence of the treatment and the potential outcomes hold, such
that there are no unobservables jointly aﬀecting the treatment and the outcome (Imbens,
2004):
(Y (0), Y (1)) ⊥ T |X, (1.2)
where Y (0) and Y (1) are potential outcomes under, respectively, nontreatment and
treatment, T is a binary treatment indicator and X is the covariate set.3
The probability of receiving the brochure was reportedly negatively associated with
farmers' age, farm capacity, and previous participation in the RDP. This is why it is
important to control for these and related characteristics. Our dataset contains information
3The observed outcome is then deﬁned as Yi = (1 − Ti) · Yi(0) + Ti · Yi(1), which can be rewritten in
the form of equation (1.1). Unconfoundness is equivalent to i ⊥ Ti|Xi (see Imbens, 2004).
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about farmers' age. Farm capacity can be controlled by including variables such as farmed
area and total livestock. Farmers who previously participated in the program are excluded
from the evaluation sample.
However, we believe it is critical to account for additional characteristics that can
be simultaneously related to the outcome variables and the treatment probability,
because the brochures were more often distributed to relatively poorly informed farmers.
Educational level is likely to aﬀect farmers' awareness about the RDP and, hence,
their potential interest in applying for agricultural support. As mentioned in a recent
version of The National Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development, Macedonian
small-scale farmers appear to have low educational levels (European Commission, 2013,
27). Because the brochure was more often distributed to the owners of smaller farms, it is
possible that those who received it had lower educational levels. We also suspect that the
relative importance of farming and farm proﬁtability might have aﬀected the probability
of receiving the brochure and, at the same time, intention to participate. Individuals for
whom farming is the main occupation and whose income is mostly generated by farming
should be more interested in obtaining information about the RDP. For this reason,
household's head occupation, the share of agricultural production sold on the market,
and the share of income from farming are included in the regressions. Furthermore, farm
proﬁtability and subsidy dependence should be controlled, because some RDP measures
require coﬁnancing. Given that it is easier for proﬁtable and subsidy-independent farmers
to coﬁnance a project, they might be more interested in learning about RDP measures
and obtaining the brochure. Table 1.2 provides supporting evidence for this, because
treated farmers are, on average, more likely to have proﬁtable farms and be less subsidy
dependent. Finally, we include an indicator for the frequency of cooperation with other
farmers as a control variable. More cooperative farmers might be more socially open and
active, which increases their chances of receiving the brochure and being interested in the
RDP.
Our ﬁrst approach to control for the observed confounders is a standard OLS regression
of the outcome on a constant, the treatment indicator, and the covariates. However, an
important drawback of OLS is that it assumes a linear relationship between regressors and
the outcome variable, which may be violated in practice. Hence, we also apply more ﬂexible
semi- and nonparametric estimators, relying on less rigid functional form assumptions.
One of the most well-known approaches for the evaluation of treatment eﬀects in
nonrandomized studies is propensity score matching. The idea is to ﬁnd for each treated
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observation one or more nontreated units with a similar conditional treatment probability,
i.e., propensity score. In a general form, the treatment eﬀect (∆ˆmatch) is deﬁned as the
average diﬀerence in the outcomes of the treated and the weighted nontreated matched
units (see, for instance, Smith and Todd, 2005):
∆ˆmatch =
1
N1
∑
{i:Ti=1}
(Yi −
∑
{i:Tj=0}
Wi,jYj) (1.3)
where Wi,j is the weight given to the outcome of a nontreated observation j, when j is
matched to a treated unit i, and N1 is the number of treated observations. In this study, we
conduct semiparametric kernel matching. First, the propensity score: p(X) = Pr(T = 1|X)
is estimated in a probit regression (see Table A1.1 in Appendix 1 for the propensity score
speciﬁcation). Then, kernel regression of the outcome on the estimated propensity score
among the nontreated is conducted to estimate the conditional mean outcome given the
propensity score without treatment, E(Y |T = 0, p(X)) =: m(0, p(X)) (Huber et al., 2013).
Formally,
mˆ(0, pˆ(Xi)) =
∑
{j:Tj=0}K(pˆ(Xi)− pˆ(Xj)/h)Yj∑
{j:Tj=0}K(pˆ(Xi)− pˆ(Xj)/h)
, (1.4)
where mˆ(0, pˆ(Xi)) is an estimate ofm(0, pˆ(Xi)), K is a kernel function and h is a bandwidth
operator. In the estimations, the Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 0.6 is used.4
Thereafter, the treatment eﬀect for the treated is estimated by averaging the estimated
function by the empirical distribution of p(X) for the treated:
∆ˆkernelmatch =
1
N1
∑
{i:Ti=1}
(Yi − mˆ(0, pˆ(Xi))). (1.5)
Matching estimators rely on a common support assumption that ensures units with
comparable characteristics exist in both treatment states. Figure 1.1 provides the
distribution of the estimated propensity score before and after matching. The upper
panel shows some non-overlapping areas in the distribution of the propensity score in the
treated and nontreated groups prior to matching. Matching achieves a decent overlap in
the propensity score distributions, as illustrated by the lower panel of Figure 1.1. Only
four observations in the treatment group lie outside the common support and therefore
4These are the default options of the STATA command psmatch2 for the kernel type and bandwidth.
27
need to be excluded from propensity score matching. Additionally, Table 1.4 presents
post-matching mean covariate values by treatment status, standardized diﬀerences, and
percentage-reduction in standardized diﬀerences compared to the original (unmatched)
sample, and balancing t-tests on the matched sample. Based on standardized diﬀerences
and the percentage-reduction in standardized diﬀerences, we conclude that matching
considerably improved balance in all characteristics (the average reduction in standardized
diﬀerences was 75 percent), except for farm size.
Figure 1.1: Density estimates of the estimated propensity score Pr(T = 1|X)
Notes: The density estimations are based on pstest command in STATA. The bounds of the support of
the propensity score are set to be 0 and 1.
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Table 1.4: Covariate balance after propensity score matching
Variables Treatment Control Std.diﬀ. % t- p-
% reduction value value
Age 44.05 43.97 1.2 95.2 0.10 0.92
Male (binary) 0.78 0.78 0.1 99.5 0.01 0.99
Education: high school (binary) 0.75 0.75 -0.4 96.8 -0.04 0.97
Education: college/ university 0.12 0.13 -2.6 14.9 -0.23 0.82
(binary)
Education missing (binary) 0.09 0.08 0.2 98.8 0.02 0.98
Household head's occupation: 0.50 0.52 -3.9 43.9 -0.34 0.74
agriculture (binary)
Household head's occupation 0.01 0.01 0.4 92.4 0.04 0.97
missing (binary)
Years in farming 21.69 21.38 3.6 46.2 0.32 0.75
Household size 4.16 4.15 1.1 89.7 0.10 0.92
Proﬁtable farma 3.62 3.58 7.2 79.6 0.67 0.50
Subsidy dependentb 2.03 2.03 0.2 99.1 0.01 0.99
Frequency of cooperationc 3.76 3.72 2.2 81.1 0.19 0.85
Share of agricult. production 87.59 87.82 -1.4 84.3 -0.13 0.90
sold on a market
Share of income from farming 50.26 51.34 -4.7 63.9 -0.42 0.67
Capacity: farmed area (ha) 1.60 1.50 9.5 -11.2 0.85 0.40
Capacity: total livestock 1.06 1.11 -1.9 52.6 -0.17 0.86
(number of heads)
Notes: Std.diﬀ.% stands for standardized diﬀerence 100(x¯T−x¯C)√
(var(xT )+var(xC))/2
(Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1985). % reduction is percentage reduction in the absolute value of standardized diﬀerence after
matching as compared to before matching. t-value and p-value refer to two-sample t-tests for equality
of means. aProﬁtable farm: 1=very unproﬁtable; 2=moderately unproﬁtable; 3=break-even;
4=moderately proﬁtable; 5=very proﬁtable. bSubsidy dependent : 1=not dependent; 2=slightly
dependent; 3=very dependent. cFrequency of cooperation: 1=never; 2=rarely; 3=not sure;
4=sometimes; 5=always.
The next estimation technique employed in our analysis is entropy balancing,5 a fully
nonparametric multivariate reweighting method proposed by Hainmueller (2012). It does
not rest on any propensity score model, but on user-speciﬁed initial base weights for
nontreated observations. Reweighting is based on computing new weights in a way that
5The analysis is run in STATA using package ebalance developed by Hainmueller and Xu (2013).
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the Kullback-Leibler divergence from the baseline weights is minimized, subject to the
balancing constraints. Weights of the nontreated are deﬁned in such a way that exact
balance in prespeciﬁed covariate moments like the mean is attained for the reweighted
nontreated group and the treated. Formally, the weights are chosen by minimizing the
following loss function, while balancing the (multidimensional) vector of covariates Xi:
min
∑
{i:Ti=0}
h(ωi). (1.6)
∑
{i:Ti=0}
ωiXi =
1
N1
∑
{i:Ti=1}
Xi (1.7)
and the normalizing constraints
∑
{i:Ti=0}
ωi = 1 (1.8)
ωi ≥ 0 ∀ i with Ti = 0, (1.9)
where ωi is a weight estimated for each nontreated observation i, and h(·) is a distance
metric. Hainmueller (2012) uses the directed Kullback (1959) entropy divergence: h(ωi) =
ωi log(ωi/qi), where qi is the initial base weight. The loss function
∑
{i:Ti=0} h(ωi) measures
the distance between the distribution of the estimated weights ω1, . . . , ωN0 and the initial
base weights q1, . . . , qN0 , where N0 is the number of nontreated units. The distribution of
the base weights is usually set to be uniform with qi = 1/N0. The constraint 1.7 balances
the distribution of Xi between the treatment and the reweighted nontreated groups, so that
the latter resembles the former in its covariate distribution. The normalizing constraints
1.8 and 1.9 force the weights to sum up to 1 and be nonnegative. The treatment eﬀect on
the treated can be estimated as the diﬀerence in mean outcomes between the treatment
and the reweighted control groups:
∆ˆebalance =
1
N1
∑
{i:Ti=1}
(Yi −
∑
{i:Ti=0} Yiωi∑
{i:Ti=0} ωi
). (1.10)
Finally, it needs to be pointed out that our analysis relies implicitly on the stable unit
treatment value assumption (SUTVA) that precludes any interaction, spillover, and general
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equilibrium eﬀects related to individual treatment assignment. However, it is possible that
some study participants in the treated group spread information about the brochure in
their villages, which would result in the contamination of the control group. In the event
this happened, we estimate the lower bound of the absolute value of the treatment eﬀect.
1.6 Results
This section summarizes our results by presenting the eﬀect estimates for the subsample of
farmers up to 55 years of age who do not employ additional workers and have not applied
for the RDP in the last three years. The background characteristics are comparably well
balanced for this group. A binary indicator for whether farmers have read the brochure or
not suggests that only 5.8 percent of those who had received the information brochure did
not read it, so that treatment noncompliance is low.
1.6.1 Main results
Table 1.5 presents the eﬀects for the outcomes of interest. Column 2 reports the mean
diﬀerences in outcomes across the treatment and control groups. The estimates based on
OLS, kernel matching, and entropy balancing are provided in columns 3, 4, and 5.
Table 1.5: Treatment eﬀects for the outcomes of interest
Outcome variables Mean diﬀ. OLS Match ebalance
Panel A: Intention to apply for and use RDP support
1) Farmer intends to apply for RDP in 0.087 0.005 0.041 0.017
one of the next calls (0.093) (0.087) (0.095) (0.114)
2) Possibility to use RDP in the next 3-5 years -0.097 -0.204* -0.148 -0.250*
(0.107) (0.106) (0.116) (0.142)
3) Intention to use RDP in the next 3-5 years -0.071 -0.155 -0.113 -0.166
(0.098) (0.095) (0.098) (0.116)
Panel B: Judgements on information and application procedures
4) Farmer has enough information to independently 0.215** 0.194** 0.210** 0.187*
prepare application (0.091) (0.092) (0.099) (0.106)
5) Farmer has enough knowledge and experience 0.153* 0.142* 0.150* 0.155*
to independently prepare application (0.084) (0.076) (0.089) (0.091)
6) RDP application (procedure and documents) 0.203** 0.156* 0.128 0.115
Continued on next page
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Table 1.5  continued from previous page
Outcome variables Mean diﬀ. OLS Match ebalance
is easy (0.094) (0.093) (0.099) (0.097)
7) RDP increases administrative work 0.195*** 0.153*** 0.180*** 0.177**
for household owners (0.065) (0.053) (0.069) (0.077)
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity for the mean diﬀerences,
OLS, and entropy balancing. Standard errors are based on 1999 bootstrap replications for the kernel matching
estimation. Signiﬁcance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Ebalance: means are balanced. Sample sizes: for
outcome variables 1-6 is 257 obs., for outcome variable 7 is 256 obs. All the outcome variables (except for
Possibility to use RDP. . . and Intention to use RDP. . . ) are measured on a ﬁve-point scale: 1=strongly
disagree; 2=disagree; 3=don't know; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree. Possibility to use RDP. . . and
Intention to use RDP. . . are measured as: 1= very low, 2= low, 3= average, 4= strong, 5= very strong.
We ﬁnd no statistical evidence that the brochure aﬀected the farmers' intended uptake
in the near future. For the outcome Farmer intends to apply for the RDP in one of the next
calls, the point estimates are close to zero and nonsigniﬁcant. Regarding the Possibility
to use the RDP in the next 3  5 years, the OLS and entropy balancing estimates are
negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level. Finally, the eﬀect on the
Intention to use the RDP in the next 3  5 years is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The treatment eﬀects for the outcome variables presented in Panel B of Table 1.5
might shed some light on why the brochure had mostly insigniﬁcant eﬀects on the main
outcomes of interest. We notice that the intervention had a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on claiming to have suﬃcient information, as well as suﬃcient knowledge
and experience to independently prepare the RDP application. Similarly, although with
lower statistical signiﬁcance, we ﬁnd a positive treatment eﬀect on the assessment of
the application procedure as easy. The eﬀect on associating the RDP with increasing
administrative work for household owners is positive, relatively strong, and highly
statically signiﬁcant. This could be one reason why the intervention did not boost
farmers' intention to use RDP support.
The brochure contained a brief description of bureaucratic procedures related to the
application and the selection process. From this, treated farmers could have inferred high
administrative costs of being involved in RDP projects. Local experts (namely National
Extension Agency advisors) explained that farmers had often believed RDP participation
required substantial administrative work, and only those farmers who had no other
opportunities to ﬁnance their investments would turn to governmental aid. Similarly,
a recent study by Dwyer and Powell (2016) reports that potential RDP applicants,
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especially in new EU member states, are often discouraged by what they perceive as
costly application, negotiation or management processes (Dwyer and Powell, 2016, 551).
Taken together, this evidence suggests that information in the brochure might have
reaﬃrmed pre-existing beliefs among farmers about the high administrative cost of RDP
projects, and thus possibly discouraged their intention to participate.
1.6.2 Heterogeneity of treatment eﬀects by farm proﬁtability
In the next step, we consider the heterogeneity of treatment eﬀects by farm proﬁtability.
As mentioned in the Study design section, most measures presented in the information
brochure require coﬁnancing. Given that farmers must initially coﬁnance the project
investment from their own means, and RDP support happens only after the costs are
realized, it is likely that coﬁnancing is more feasible for proﬁtable farmers compared to
unproﬁtable ones. Proﬁtable farmers have the opportunity to coﬁnance an RDP project,
either from their own proﬁts and savings or have an easier access to bank loans than
unproﬁtable farmers. Figure A1.1 in Appendix 1 shows that although the majority of
farmers in both groups ﬁnd getting a loan diﬃcult, a greater number of proﬁtable farmers
think obtaining a loan is easy compared to unproﬁtable ones. Thus, we would expect the
brochure might have had diﬀerential eﬀects by farm proﬁtability.
The heterogeneity analysis is based on the evaluation sample, which contains 106
unproﬁtable and 151 proﬁtable farms6. Table 1.6 presents the eﬀects by farm proﬁtability.
Concerning Panel A, for unproﬁtable farmers, the eﬀects on the reported possibility and
intention to use the RDP in the household are negative and statistically signiﬁcant in
several cases, despite the small sample size. For proﬁtable farmers, the impacts are never
statistically signiﬁcant. Turning to Panel B, we ﬁnd that the brochure increased the
proﬁtable farmers' judgment about having enough information, as well as knowledge and
experience to independently prepare the application. Both eﬀects are highly signiﬁcant
and relatively strong. At the same time, the brochure had no statically signiﬁcant eﬀect
on these outcome variables for unproﬁtable farmers. Another ﬁnding is that among
unproﬁtable farmers, the intervention (statistically signiﬁcantly) increased the perception
that the RDP brings additional administrative work for the household; at the same time
the impact is close to zero among proﬁtable farmers.
6Farms that are reported to break even ﬁnancially are included in the unproﬁtable group. In the group
of unproﬁtable farmers, 56 received the brochure, and 50 did not; in the group of proﬁtable farmers, 100
were treated, and 51 were not.
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Table 1.6: Heterogeneity of treatment eﬀects by farm proﬁtability
Outcome variables Mean diﬀ. OLS Match ebalance
Proﬁt Unproﬁt. Proﬁt Unproﬁt. Proﬁt Unproﬁt. Proﬁt Unproﬁt.
Panel A: Intention to apply for and use RDP support
1) Farmer intends to apply for RDP in -0.007 0.045 0.116 -0.128 -0.062 -0.121 -0.105 -0.041
one of the next calls (0.129) (0.118) (0.132) (0.125) (0.163) (0.128) (0.179) (0.136)
2) Possibility to use RDP in the next 3-5 years -0.067 -0.215 -0.034 -0.459*** -0.096 -0.667*** -0.137 -0.382*
(0.141) (0.163) (0.143) (0.167) (0.158) (0.237) (0.208) (0.202)
3) Intention to use RDP in the next 3-5 years -0.077 -0.123 -0.041 -0.263* -0.176 -0.309 -0.124 -0.222
(0.132) (0.149) (0.135) (0.151) (0.153) (0.196) (0.214) (0.159)
Panel B: Judgements on information and application procedures
4) Farmer has enough information to independently 0.387*** 0.032 0.400*** 0.074 0.406*** -0.162 0.382** 0.010
prepare application (0.117) (0.140) (0.121) (0.140) (0.144) (0.181) (0.158) (0.174)
5) Farmer has enough knowledge and experience 0.352*** -0.026 0.293*** -0.019 0.313*** -0.167 0.387*** -0.104
to independently prepare application (0.093) (0.140) (0.093) (0.123) (0.115) (0.183) (0.086) (0.167)
6) RDP application (procedure and documents) 0.196 0.243* 0.145 0.153 0.167 0.113 0.329* 0.151
is easy (0.122) (0.146) (0.133) (0.146) (0.114) (0.203) (0.173) (0.194)
7) RDP increases administrative work 0.100 0.349*** 0.031 0.297*** 0.040 0.181 0.101 0.277**
for household owners (0.065) (0.115) (0.058) (0.095) (0.102) (0.131) (0.097) (0.129)
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity for the mean diﬀerences, OLS, and entropy balancing. Standard errors are based on 1,999 bootstrap
replications for the kernel matching estimation. Signiﬁcance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Ebalance: means are balanced. Sample sizes: for outcome variables 1-6 is 257 obs., for outcome
variable 7 is 256 obs. All the outcome variables (except for Possibility to use RDP. . . and Intention to use RDP. . . ) are measured on a ﬁve-point scale: 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree;
3=don't know; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree. Possibility to use RDP. . . and Intention to use RDP. . . are measured as: 1= very low, 2= low, 3= average, 4= strong, 5= very
strong.
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1.7 Conclusion
The present study was designed to determine the eﬀects of a randomized information
campaign on farmers' knowledge and intention to participate in the RDP in FYR
Macedonia. Based on several reports and prior studies, the hypothesis was that a paucity
of comprehensible information contributed to low application rates. We examined if by
providing in-person information to farmers, thus lowering farmers' cost of information
search, their interest in program participation could be piqued.
The results of our investigation indicate that although the information campaign
raised farmers' knowledge about the Macedonian RDP, it did not increase their
intention to participate in the program. Instead, it enhanced the perception that the
RDP involvement required substantial administrative work from household owners.
Furthermore, we found some heterogeneity in the eﬀects by farm proﬁtability. Whereas
the information campaign appeared to increase knowledge among proﬁtable farmers,
it negatively aﬀected the intention to use RDP support and increased perceived
administrative burden among unproﬁtable farmers.
A caveat of the current study is that the intended randomization of the information
brochure could not be properly implemented by the interviewers. We tackled this issue by
controlling for observed covariates both in linear regression and nonparametric estimation.
Notwithstanding potential limitations, the study's results suggest that the government
should consider ways to improve RDP implementation and make it more accessible
for Macedonian farmers, possibly by easing the administrative hurdle associated with
program participation. Future research could investigate costs and beneﬁts of modifying
the ﬁnancing mode of RDP measures to make them more aﬀordable for break-even and
unproﬁtable farmers.
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Chapter 2
Combining Experimental Evidence with
Machine Learning to Assess Anti-Corruption
Educational Campaigns among Russian
University Students
2.1 Introduction1
Young people, particularly students, are frequently observed to be the driving forces
pushing for reforms that promote justice and ﬁght corruption. The Rose Revolution in
Georgia (2003), the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005), the Arab Spring in Egypt
(2011) and the student movements in Taiwan (2014), as well as the protests against
corruption in Bulgaria (2013), Ukraine (2014), and Romania (2017), are just a few
recent examples of student activism that resulted in social change (Altbach, 2016;
Denisova-Schmidt et al., 2015; Klemencic, 2014). In Russia, where the Putin generation
is often viewed as infantile and apolitical (Kasamara and Sorokina, 2017; Volkov, 2017),
the recently increased participation of youth in anti-corruption rallies is particularly
interesting and controversial.
Corruption2 has received substantial attention in Russia over the last decade, not only
because of its detrimental eﬀects on the national economy and society in general, but
also because it became increasingly politicized. The Russian opposition movement has
built an agenda around it, attracting a growing number of supporters, among them many
high school and university students. Public anti-corruption rallies in March 2017 were
1This essay was written in co-authorship with Elena Denisova-Schmidt, Martin Huber, and Elvira
Leontyeva. It was released as a SES Working paper, University of Fribourg (Huber et al., 2017). The
descriptive ﬁndings were published in Solovyeva (2018).
2Corruption can be deﬁned as both the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency
International) and the lack of academic integrity; see recent discussions with examples in
Denisova-Schmidt (2017, 2019), Denisova-Schmidt and de Wit (2017).
36
even described as angry pupils' walks in the media (Korostelev et al., 2017). On the
other hand, opinion polls suggest that active participants in anti-corruption rallies are not
representative of Russian youth. Less than 8% of people ages 18  24 have an interest in
political issues and discuss them with friends or relatives, while only about 10% are ready
to protest (Volkov, 2017). Overall, the stance of the Russian youth towards corruption
issues is not clear, as no comprehensive study has yet scrutinized this problem on a grand
scale.
This paper (a.) investigates the views of public university students in the Russian
region of Khabarovsk on corruption and academic dishonesty during their studies and (b.)
examines the eﬀects of an educational campaign exposing students to various informational
materials about corruption and its negative consequences. To this end, we surveyed a large
sample of about 2,000 students and examined four diﬀerent anti-corruption materials,
namely, two videos produced by Transparency International Russia about the negative
consequences of bribery and reiderstvo (a hostile corporate takeover) and two brochures,
one a general anti-corruption brochure developed by the local authorities and the other a
brochure addressing local corruption cases developed for students by the authors.
The results of our study suggest that, while various forms of dishonesty are prevalent
among the surveyed students, corruption itself is predominantly viewed as something bad 
crime and evil are the strongest associations expressed in the survey. The perception of
corruption at the national level is more negative than at the individual level, which points
to the possibility that some respondents have adapted to the situation and might use it
for their own beneﬁt. Interest in a roundtable discussion about corruption  a proxy for
inclination towards anti-corruption activities  is strikingly low: only 5% of students agreed
to join this event. This might be suggestive for young participants in anti-corruption rallies
not being representative for the majority of Russian students, which would also be in line
with national statistics showing low political activism among the youth (Volkov, 2017).
Concerning the eﬀectiveness of the interventions, we ﬁnd that although the eﬀects of
information exposure were not pronounced in the total sample, there were systematic
patterns across subsamples deﬁned by students' inclination to plagiarize when writing
papers. One interesting result is that, while (some components of) our intervention
promoted awareness of the negative consequences of corruption among students who
frequently plagiarize, it led to more tolerant views on the impact of corruption on the
Russian education and health systems among students who plagiarize less often. We
also consider gender diﬀerences in attitudes towards informal academic practices and
37
corruption. Female students appeared to have stronger negative views on corruption,3
but to be generally less responsive to interventions and more reluctant to participate in
anti-corruption activities than males.
The fact that the interventions aﬀect the participant groups diﬀerently has policy
implications, as the same information might promote desired attitudes and behavior
among some individuals while yielding unwanted results among others. Therefore, policy
makers aiming to conduct large-scale anti-corruption campaigns should scrutinize the
possibility of eﬀect heterogeneity and target subgroups accordingly. In particular, our
study suggests that anti-corruption information campaigns should be focused primarily
on individuals who are more likely to be involved in wrongdoing, but not those who are
distant from corrupt activities.
Our paper is related to a growing number of corruption studies using lab or ﬁeld
experiments for causal inference (see, for example, discussions in Armantier and
Boly, 2011, 2013; Barr and Serra, 2010; Findley et al., 2014; Holmes, 2015; Serra and
Wantchekon, 2012). One study that is particularly interesting in our context is that
of John et al. (2014), whose ﬁndings in an experiment involving US students suggest
that awareness about widespread dishonesty increases personal cheating activities while
monetary incentives are rather unimportant. Also, Corbacho et al. (2016) ﬁnd for
an information experiment in Costa Rica that individuals who believe that everyone
around them is corrupt and/or who have personal experience with corruption are more
prone to corruption. Finally, our paper is related to Denisova-Schmidt et al. (2015) and
Denisova-Schmidt et al. (2016), which investigate the eﬀectiveness of an anti-corruption
folder developed by Transparency International among students in Lviv, Ukraine
and Khabarovsk, Russia, respectively. Similar to our comparison of plagiarist and
non-plagiarists, Denisova-Schmidt et al. (2015) separately consider students with and
without experience in corrupt activities and also ﬁnd that the intervention might increase
tolerance for corrupt behavior. We improve upon these previous studies by considering
more and diﬀerent interventions (both brochures and videos), using a larger sample, and
more thoroughly investigating eﬀect heterogeneity. As a methodological advancement
compared to other empirical studies in the ﬁeld, we use machine learning approaches by
Belloni et al. (2014), Athey and Imbens (2016), and Ludwig et al. (2017) for conducting
robustness checks, ﬁnding eﬀect heterogeneities, and conducting mutiple hypothesis
testing, respectively.
3A large body of empirical literature suggests that women tend to be less corrupt; see Dimant and
Tosato (2018); Dollar et al. (2001); Frank et al. (2011); Rivas (2013); Swamy et al. (2001).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 explains the research
design and presents the data along with descriptive statistics. Section 2.3 discusses
the estimation methods applied in the study. The results are reported in Section 2.4.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Research design and data
Our study is based on a large-scale randomized information campaign conducted
among university students in the two cities of the Khabarovsk region  Khabarovsk
and Komsomolsk-on-Amur. With populations of about 611,000 and 251,000 people (as
of January 1, 2016; Federal State Statistics Service, 2016), respectively, both cities are
among the largest urban centres in the Russian Far East. There are twelve universities in
Khabarovsk and two in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, with a total of around 68,700 students in
the Khabarovsk region in 2015 (Obrazovanie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2014).
The sample of students was drawn from four large public universities in Khabarovsk
and two in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, whose total student population accounted for over
70% of all students in the region in 2016 (according to our own calculations based on the
online enrolment data from the participating universities). The survey was conducted in
November and early December 2016 by a group of students previously instructed by our
research team. The following research design was utilized: the interviewers approached
students on campuses asking questions about their major, year and education scheme
(full- or part-time, on-site or distance education). Only full-time, on-site students with
majors in social, technical, and natural sciences or humanities were selected for the
study. First-semester bachelor and diploma students were excluded, as they could lack
suﬃcient experience and knowledge about university life. Students in other disciplines,
e.g. medicine or theology, were not selected because of their small program sizes. Eligible
individuals were asked to take part in a survey about attitudes towards corruption. The
questionnaire included a range of questions about the students' motivation to join the
university, their academic performance, previous experiences with informal practices4,
family background, and several demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. All the
4Here, informal practices refers to the practical norms that people often use in order to get things
done.
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interviews were conducted face-to-face and the interviewers ﬁlled out the questionnaire
forms in Russian, the native language of all the persons involved.5
At one point during the interview, before being asked about their attitudes towards
corruption and informal practices, every participant was randomized into one of the
four interventions, henceforth also referred to as treatments, or a control group. Each
treatment included exposure to one type of information materials about corruption and
its negative consequences. The interviewer asked students to play a little game, with
the subsequent question depending on the outcome of rolling a fair six-sided (cubical)
die. The following assignment rule was applied: if 1 was rolled, the student received an
oﬃcial corruption-awareness brochure (henceforth called the oﬃcial brochure). Rolling
a 2 entailed a brochure prepared by our research team on the basis of the materials by
Transparency International, a global anti-corruption NGO, and tailored to the student
audience (henceforth called the tailored brochure). For a 3 or 4, a short video by
Transparency International Russia about the negative consequences of bribery or about
hostile corporate takeovers (reiderstvo), respectively, was shown; 5 and 6 entailed
assignment to the control (or non-treated) group. The brochures were professionally
printed and the video materials were shown on tablets brought along by the interviewers.
The oﬃcial brochure was, in our opinion, overwhelming for readers, as it contained too
much detailed information, as well as long, redundant deﬁnitions, and it was pedantically
written and typed in a very small font. It included a portrait of the Russian president
Vladimir Putin and his quotation about the ﬁght against corruption, long deﬁnitions of
corruption and anti-corruption activities, a list of laws and directives against corruption,
some corruption-related statistics, examples of anti-corruption measures in the Khabarovsk
region, an enumeration of punishments for corruption-related crimes, and a long list of
contact information for various responsible authorities.
The tailored brochure was created by our research team with students in mind. We
provided succinct and practical information, knowing the experiment participants would
not have enough time to absorb less important details. Simple, everyday language was
preferred over complex oﬃcial formulations. The tailored brochure contained a short
deﬁnition of corruption, a graph describing diﬀerent types of corruption, some statistics,
the negative consequences of bribery (a common corruption type), examples of recent
corruption crimes in the Khabarovsk region, and a call for action.
5Two sensitive questions about the informal practices exercised by the students in their studies and
whether they had encountered bribery at the university were asked on a separate card and ﬁlled out by
the interviewees themselves.
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The videos about the negative consequences of bribery and hostile corporate raiding
were part of the Ten Faces of Corruption cartoon series developed by Transparency
International Russia within the educational project The Alphabet of a Corruption
Fighter. The project targeted high-school and university students and attempted to
clarify basic corruption-related concepts. The cartoons only oﬀered video content without
audio commentary. The characters were rats depicting the essence of various corrupt
behaviors. The video about bribery (Transparency International Russia, 2015a) featured
a suicide bomber rat giving a bribe to a security oﬃcer when boarding an airplane.
The bomb then exploded in the air destroying the plane. The video about reiderstvo
(Transparency International Russia, 2015b) showed rat police kicking out and arresting
the director of a well-functioning cheese factory and overtaking his position.6
After the individuals assigned to the treatment groups had familiarized themselves
with the respective information materials, the interviewers continued with questions
about the informal practices used by students, their moral assessment of corruption, and
whether corruption could be eradicated in Russia. At the end of the interview, students
were invited to participate in a roundtable discussion taking place on International
Anti-Corruption Day7 (December 9, 2016) at the Paciﬁc National University in
Khabarovsk. Finally, respondents were asked whether they would take part in a similar
survey next year. Interested students could leave their contact information. All of the
post-intervention questions described above were used to construct outcome variables.
Despite the aim to randomize treatment assignment by rolling a die, the distribution
of numbers 1 to 6 in the total sample is not perfectly uniform (as would be expected in
case of proper randomization), as illustrated in Figure 2.1. In fact, Pearson's chi-squared
test clearly rejects the uniform distribution at the 5% level of statistical signiﬁcance.8 The
probabilities of the brochure treatments (treatments 1 and 2 in Figure 2.1) were higher
compared to the video treatments (3 and 4) and the control group (5 and 6).
6Reiderstvo, or asset-grabbing, is the illicit acquisition of a business or part of a business in Russia; for
more, see, for example, Louise Shelley and Judy Deane, http://reiderstvo.org/.
7The General Assembly of the United Nations introduced Anti-Corruption Day in 2005 in order to
raise awareness of corruption and of the role of the Convention [against Corruption, resolution 58/4] in
combating and preventing it http://www.un.org/en/events/anticorruptionday/background.shtml.
8The test statistic and the critical value are equal to 21.08 and 9.24, respectively.
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Figure 2.1: Treatment distribution in the total sample
Despite such imbalances in treatment assignment, the average values of the covariates
measured in the survey prior to treatment are balanced across the treatment states similarly
to a successfully randomized experiment. F -tests conducted for each of the 87 observed
covariates revealed hardly any statistically signiﬁcant (at the 5% level) diﬀerences across
treatment groups; see Table A2.1 in Appendix 2. One exception was the indicator for
having a family with both parents with a p-value of 0.04. For four further covariates 
namely, the indicators for a family with no parents, father's occupation: househusband or
a retiree, having a Uniﬁed State Exam (USE) score of more than 250 (highest quantile),
and having a job related to students' education  diﬀerences were statistically signiﬁcant at
the 10% level. Given the large number of covariates tested, we are not concerned by these
few rejections. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we ran the main estimations presented
in Section 2.4 on the subsample of students surveyed by the interviewers for whom proper
treatment randomization (i.e., uniformly distributed numbers 1 to 6) could not be rejected
at the 10% level when conducting F -tests separately for each interviewer. Neither covariate
balance nor treatment eﬀect estimates in this subsample diﬀered to an important extent
from our main results based on the full sample.
Our ﬁnal sample is comprised of 2,003 individuals, 75% (1,501) of whom study in
Khabarovsk and 25% (502) in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Table 2.1 shows the means and the
standard deviations for selected covariates9 for the 1,741 respondents without any missing
9The full list of covariates can be found in Table A2.1 in Appendix 2.
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values in these variables. The typical respondent is about 20 years old and just over half
of the sample (54%) is female. About one third of the individuals reported to spend on
average less than 10,000 rubles (USD 155)10 a month, while 55% of the respondents have
average monthly expenditures between 10,000 and 20,000 rubles (USD 155-310), and 12%
spend more than 20,000 rubles. The university education of slightly more than half of
the students is state-ﬁnanced. About 37% of the survey participants study humanities,
31% major in social sciences, 25% are in technical sciences, and 8% specialize in natural
sciences.
Concerning previous experiences with wrongdoing and corruption, the self-assessed
use of connections is more common than bribery for solving problems. Yet the incidence
of additional payments in school prior to tertiary education (e.g., fees for construction,
maintenance and school repairs, guarding, etc.) is non-negligible and higher than
gift-giving to teachers.11 Strikingly, about 34% of the participants claimed to have
encountered forms of wrongdoing (e.g., bribes, gifts, and help from on-site proctors)
during the USE, while 21% encountered some wrongdoing in the university admission
process (e.g., cases of admission commissions, instances of preferential admissions).
Reportedly, the incidence of bribery at universities after admission appears to be less of
an issue. Concerning the use of informal practices by respondents while studying, by far
the most popular practice is partial plagiarism when writing papers, followed by crib
sheets and copying from others at exams. The least common form of academic dishonesty
is asking professors for preferential treatment (e.g., easing requirements, exemption from
exams, etc.).
Item non-response is low in our data. In about 4% of the observations, the students'
year of birth is missing. Non-response in other demographic, socioeconomic, or individual
characteristics is even rarer. About 3% of the students were reluctant to reveal their
own informal practices (concerning the question How often do you use the following
practices. . . ?) and whether they encountered bribery at the university. In the estimation
part of our analysis, observations with missing values in the covariates are kept in
10Based on the average of daily exchange rates from the Russian Central Bank in the period January
1 to November 1, 2016.
11Primary and secondary education is predominantly public and tuition-free in Russia. However,
informal payments at schools are widespread and range from covering basic maintenance of a school
building and the provision of school guarding to some excessive school needs. While voluntary additional
school payments have been ruled legal, the fees are often coercive in reality. Also, gift-giving to teachers
can be voluntary or forced by parental committees or even the teachers themselves. Our data do not
allow the distinguishing between the two types in both the cases of additional school fees and gift-giving
to teachers.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics for selected covariates
Variables Mean SD
Age 19.99 1.23
Gender: female (binary) 0.54 0.50
Monthly spending: <10k rub (binary) 0.33 0.47
Monthly spending: 1020k rub (binary) 0.55 0.50
Monthly spending: >20k rub (binary) 0.12 0.33
Education is state ﬁnanced (binary) 0.53 0.50
Major: humanities (binary) 0.37 0.48
Major: social sciences (binary) 0.31 0.46
Major: technical sciences (binary) 0.25 0.43
Major: natural sciences (binary) 0.08 0.27
Average grade (1=satisfactory...5=excellent) 3.26 1.12
Family or friends solved problems using connections 2.34 1.04
(1=never...5=system.)
Family or friends solved problems using bribes 1.92 0.98
(1=never...5=system.)
Frequency of giving gifts to teachers at school 2.80 1.08
(1=never...5=system.)
Frequency of paying additional fees at school 3.22 1.20
(1=never...5=system.)
Encountered (personally/friends/relatives) 0.34 0.47
wrongdoing at USE (binary)
Encountered (personally/friends/relatives) 0.21 0.41
wrongdoing at university admission (binary)
Encountered bribery at university 1.55 0.86
(1=never...5=system.)
How often do you use the following practices? (1=never...5=system.)
Use crib sheets at exams 2.90 1.17
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 2.25 1.26
Buy papers from friends or specialized ﬁrms 1.85 1.15
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 3.27 1.20
Copy from other students during exams or tests 2.85 1.17
Deceive professors about study problems 1.95 1.09
Ask professors for preferential treatment 1.63 0.95
the data. Missing values in covariates are replaced with zeros while dummy variables
indicating missing observations are generated.
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2.3 Methods
Two econometric methods are employed to evaluate the eﬀects of the anti-corruption
information materials on the outcomes of interest. Our ﬁrst strategy is to take diﬀerences
in mean outcome values between each of the treatment groups and the control group.
This yields unbiased estimates of the causal treatment eﬀects if randomization was
successful, meaning that any observed and unobserved pre-treatment characteristics are
comparable across the treatment groups.
Although the observed pre-treatment characteristics are well balanced in the sample,
a few minor diﬀerences are still present. As a robustness check, our second strategy aims
at controlling for such diﬀerences. Speciﬁcally, our goal is to control for the confounders
of both treatment assignment and outcome of interest in a ﬂexible functional way,
potentially allowing interactions as well as higher order terms of confounders to enter
both the treatment and outcome equations. To this end, we apply the method of Belloni
et al. (2014) to select confounders as well as non-linear functions thereof based on LASSO
regression, a machine learning approach permitting variable selection in high dimensional
data. More concisely, this so-called post-double-selection method relies on a two-step,
LASSO-based variable selection of control variables that are either predictive for the
treatment or the outcome (or both). Thereafter, the treatment eﬀects of interest are
estimated by an OLS regression of the outcome on the treatment indicators and the
selected controls. In our study, we generated higher order terms up to the third order and
interaction terms up to the second order for all covariates using the Generate.Powers
command in the LARF package by An and Wan (2016) for the statistical software R.
We added these terms to the list of potential controls for the two-step LASSO procedure
and estimated the treatment eﬀects using the rlassoEﬀects command with its default
options in the R package hdm by Spindler et al. (2016).
Our investigation goes beyond the analysis of treatment eﬀects in the total population
and explores the eﬀect heterogeneity of the intervention. We opted for a data-driven rather
than ad-hoc approach for ﬁnding the most substantial eﬀect heterogeneities in an honest
way, preventing inferential multiple testing issues related to snooping for subgroups with
signiﬁcant eﬀects. This technique builds on modiﬁcation of a popular method of regression
trees, yet another machine learning approach. While the regression tree method partitions
the sample in such a way that an outcome is best predicted,12 the method used in our
12That is to say the splitting minimizes the out-of-sample mean squared error.
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analysis, the causal tree approach by Athey and Imbens (2016), recursively searchers for
sample splits that maximize the mean squared treatment eﬀect.13
Speciﬁcally, we use the causalTree package by Athey et al. (2016) for ﬁnding covariates
and their values to split our sample on. To this end, we apply the so-called honest
estimation that uses only one part of a sample (training data) for subgroup partitioning,
while the other part of the sample (test data) is used to estimate treatment eﬀects within
the deﬁned subgroups. This approach, common in machine learning literature, is known as
sample splitting and used to prevent the aforementioned inference problems.14 Since our
analysis considers more than one treatment and several outcomes, the honest spitting is
conducted separately for each treatment-outcome combination, resulting in 124 regression
trees. We ﬁnd the most frequent predictors (and their levels) among those suggested by
the recursive partitioning algorithm for the ﬁrst-level (primary) splitting. At the next step,
we generate binary indicators for the most important predictors and use them for splitting
the total sample. In the eﬀect-heterogeneity analysis, the average treatment eﬀects are
then estimated separately in each of the constructed subsamples.
Our information intervention can potentially aﬀect a number of outcomes of interest
rather than just one key outcome. A concern related to estimating the treatment eﬀects
for a large number of outcome variables is known as the multiple testing problem, which
is an increase in the rate of false discoveries of statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects in multiple
simultaneous statistical tests. The issue is that a declared conﬁdence level applies to each
test considered individually, and as the number of tests increases, the expected number of
incorrect rejections of the null hypothesis also increases (compared to each test considered
individually).
We therefore conduct joint hypothesis tests to ﬁnd whether there are statistically
signiﬁcant treatment eﬀects on groups of outcomes deﬁned by speciﬁc questions asked in
the survey. To this end, we employ the multiple testing procedure by Ludwig et al. (2017)
based on machine learning. The question underlying this test is whether treatment status
is predictable from outcomes. Applying sample splitting methods, the test compares
the goodness of prediction of treatment status in the original sample with that in a
sample where the original treatment status is randomly permuted (i.e., observations are
13This is equivalent to ﬁnding the largest eﬀect heterogeneities across subgroups.
14Our sample is set to be split randomly, such that half of all observations are in the training dataset
and the rest are in the testing dataset. To limit the complexity of trees, we apply cross-validation and
pruning by specifying a complexity parameter equal the minimum cross validation error that penalizes
model complexity; furthermore, the minimum leaf (i.e., subgroup) size is set to 25 observations.
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randomly classiﬁed as treated or non-treated). If the prediction in the original sample is
signiﬁcantly better than in the permuted one, this is viewed as evidence of a treatment
eﬀect on a group of outcomes. We ﬁrst run the multiple outcome testing for logically
grouped outcomes separately for each treatment using the full sample. The multiple
signiﬁcance testing is later repeated in each subgroup deﬁned based on the causal tree
procedure.
2.4 Results
We subsequently present the ﬁndings, ﬁrst for the total sample and later on for speciﬁc
subsamples. Table 2.2 reports the eﬀect estimates based on diﬀerences in means in the
total sample. Column 2 presents the mean outcomes in the control group. The third
column contains the estimated treatment eﬀects of the oﬃcial corruption-awareness
brochure. Columns 4 and 5 give the heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and the
p-values, respectively. The estimates for the brochure developed by our team and the
videos about the negative consequences of bribery and a hostile corporate raid, i.e.
reiderstvo, are presented in columns 6  8, 9  11, and 12  14, respectively.
Looking at the control means, we ﬁnd that informal practices were judged to be quite
prevalent among the surveyed students. The use of crib sheets during exams, partial
plagiarism from the internet, and copying from other students during exams were thought
to occur rather often, as their control means are close to 4 on a scale from 1 (never) to 5
(systematically). What stands out when inspecting the moral assessment of corruption is
that crime and evil were the strongest associations with corruption, whereas deﬁning
corruption as a necessity was the least popular option. Interestingly, students perceived
corruption's impact on an aggregate level (i.e., its eﬀects on the Russian economy, politics,
education and health systems, and police) more negatively, on average, than on a personal
level (i.e., on students' career opportunities, quality of life, education, health, and safety).
As far as participation in future corruption-awareness activities is concerned, the students
expressed very little interest: only 5% agreed to join a roundtable discussion about
corruption, and 12% were willing to take part in a next-year survey about corruption.
Inspecting the treatment eﬀects, we ﬁnd only a handful of them to be statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The oﬃcial brochure increased the perceived frequency of
students copying from others during exams (signiﬁcant at the 10% level) and the tendency
to tolerate informal academic practices in several cases: when a course was considered
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useless, when students worked, and when it was hard to learn the material (the eﬀects
are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1, 10, and 5% levels, respectively). Also, students who
received the oﬃcial brochure were more likely to agree that corruption is a means of income
(signiﬁcant at the 5% level) and to more positively perceive corruption impact on the
Russian health system and police (signiﬁcant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively).
The tailored brochure was found to strengthen the perceived frequency of students
plagiarizing some chapters from the internet when writing papers (signiﬁcant at the 1%
level) and to decrease the tendency to never accept academic cheating (signiﬁcant at the
10% level). The anti-bribery video slightly increased the reported frequency of students
submitting papers downloaded from the internet (signiﬁcant at the 10% level).
Interestingly, almost all the presented information materials seemed to lower students'
interest in the roundtable on corruption and the next survey round, although only the
eﬀects of the oﬃcial brochure and the anti-bribery video were statistically signiﬁcant (at
the 5-10% level).
As a robustness check, we apply the post-double-selection method by Belloni et al.
(2014) to control for the covariates and their transformations when estimating treatment
eﬀects on individual outcomes. As shown in Table A2.2 in Appendix 2, the eﬀects are very
similar in terms of size and signiﬁcance to the mean diﬀerence estimates. Thus, our results
are robust to the inclusion of these background characteristics.
Since we consider a large number of individual outcomes, it is important to verify
whether treatment eﬀects are jointly signiﬁcant for groups of outcomes deﬁned by the
questions asked in the survey, using the method of Ludwig et al. (2017). The p-values
from the tests presented in Table 2.3 indicate that the multiple outcome tests fail to
reject the null hypotheses of no treatment eﬀects in the considered outcome groups. In
other words, the tests do not provide supporting evidence that there are diﬀerences in the
outcome distribution between the treatment and control groups. Therefore, we cannot rule
out that the few statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on individual outcomes are in fact spurious,
which implies that the treatments were not eﬀective for the total sample.
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Table 2.2: Eﬀects in the total sample
Outcome Control Oﬃcial brochure Tailored brochure Video: bribery Video: reiderstvo
mean Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v.
How often do you think students use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams 3.93 -0.02 0.06 0.77 -0.02 0.06 0.70 0.01 0.06 0.87 -0.02 0.07 0.75
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 3.49 0.02 0.07 0.81 -0.01 0.07 0.93 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.96
Buy papers 3.21 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.36 0.08 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.08 0.33
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 3.75 0.09 0.07 0.17 0.18 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.20 0.08 0.07 0.23
Copy from other students during exams or tests 3.74 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.42
Deceive professors about study problems 3.10 -0.04 0.08 0.62 0.06 0.08 0.47 -0.01 0.08 0.92 0.06 0.08 0.45
Ask professors preferential treatment 2.47 -0.04 0.08 0.57 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.39 0.04 0.08 0.61
When do you think these practices are acceptable? (1=deﬁnitely no... 5=deﬁnitely yes)
When a course is useless 2.63 0.27 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.72 -0.01 0.09 0.89 0.03 0.09 0.75
When students work 2.98 0.16 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.90 0.03 0.09 0.76 -0.08 0.09 0.37
If it is hard to learn material 2.71 0.17 0.08 0.04 -0.01 0.08 0.88 0.04 0.08 0.61 -0.09 0.09 0.31
Always acceptable 2.11 0.09 0.07 0.24 -0.02 0.07 0.80 0.09 0.08 0.23 0.00 0.08 0.99
Never acceptable 3.00 -0.13 0.09 0.16 -0.16 0.09 0.07 -0.09 0.09 0.33 -0.01 0.10 0.92
What does corruption mean to you? (1= deﬁnitely no... 5= deﬁnitely yes)
Necessity 1.92 0.10 0.07 0.19 0.03 0.07 0.69 0.04 0.08 0.59 0.03 0.08 0.72
Means of income 2.85 0.19 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.61 0.13 0.09 0.15 -0.06 0.10 0.50
Crime 4.08 -0.02 0.08 0.84 -0.06 0.07 0.38 0.06 0.08 0.45 -0.01 0.08 0.90
Means to solve problems 3.07 0.08 0.08 0.32 0.05 0.08 0.53 -0.02 0.09 0.82 -0.09 0.09 0.31
Compensation for low salaries 2.59 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.28 -0.01 0.09 0.90 -0.03 0.09 0.77
Evil 3.83 0.00 0.08 0.99 0.01 0.08 0.93 -0.01 0.09 0.91 -0.11 0.10 0.25
In your view, how does corruption aﬀect...? (1=strictly negative... 5=fully positive)
Your career opportunities 2.34 0.03 0.07 0.68 -0.05 0.07 0.47 -0.06 0.08 0.44 0.01 0.08 0.92
Your quality of life 2.39 0.03 0.07 0.68 -0.07 0.07 0.29 -0.04 0.07 0.56 -0.01 0.08 0.90
Your education 2.22 -0.01 0.07 0.94 -0.02 0.07 0.78 -0.09 0.07 0.20 -0.03 0.08 0.68
Your health 2.28 0.02 0.07 0.78 -0.05 0.07 0.46 -0.02 0.07 0.83 -0.10 0.07 0.19
Your safety 2.09 -0.04 0.07 0.53 -0.03 0.07 0.63 -0.09 0.07 0.18 -0.09 0.07 0.20
Russian economy 1.52 0.06 0.05 0.30 -0.01 0.05 0.86 0.01 0.05 0.84 0.07 0.06 0.27
Russian politics 1.58 0.03 0.06 0.56 -0.01 0.05 0.82 -0.01 0.05 0.80 0.03 0.06 0.65
Russian education 1.55 0.08 0.05 0.14 0.02 0.05 0.74 -0.01 0.05 0.82 0.04 0.06 0.50
Russian health system 1.54 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.84 0.03 0.06 0.61 0.05 0.06 0.42
Russian police 1.44 0.10 0.06 0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.82 0.01 0.06 0.83 0.06 0.06 0.28
Can corruption be eradicated in Russia? 2.52 -0.06 0.07 0.38 -0.10 0.07 0.13 -0.12 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.08 1.00
(1=deﬁnitely no... 5=deﬁnitely yes)
Take part in roundtable? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.15 -0.02 0.01 0.21 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.86
Take part in survey next year? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.12 -0.04 0.02 0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.04 0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.29
Notes: `Eﬀect' represents the diﬀerence between the mean outcome value in each treatment group and the control mean, `se' provides asymptotic standard
error robust to heteroskedasticity, and `p-v.' stands for p-value.
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Table 2.3: Multiple outcomes test in full sample
Question group Oﬃcial Tailored Video: Video:
brochure brochure bribery reiderstvo
How often do you think students use 0.97 0.17 0.69 0.33
the following [corrupt] practices?
When do you think these [corrupt] 0.30 0.77 0.58 0.40
practices are acceptable?
What does corruption mean to you? 0.94 0.55 0.50 0.88
In your view, how does corruption 0.61 0.65 0.69 0.51
aﬀect aspects of your life?
In your view, how does corruption 0.97 0.76 0.65 0.45
aﬀect public spheres in Russia?
Interest in anti-corruption activities 0.91 0.95 0.65 0.94
Note: The p-values of the joint signiﬁcance tests are presented.
Heterogeneity of eﬀects
The recursive partitioning algorithm of Athey and Imbens (2016) applied to our data
indicates that treatment eﬀects diﬀer most commonly across students who never, seldom,
or sometimes wrote papers by plagiarizing some chapters from the internet versus those
who did it often or systematically (10 primary-level splits).15
Before discussing individual treatment eﬀects in the subsamples, we examine p-values
using the joint signiﬁcance test of Ludwig et al. (2017) for groups of outcomes (based on
speciﬁc surey questions) in Table 2.4.16 In the subgroup of 463 students who tended
to plagiarize more often, the test ﬁnds a jointly statically signiﬁcant (at the 5% level)
eﬀect on the outcomes based on question In your view, how does corruption aﬀect
aspects of your life? (Table 2.4, Panel A). Among 513 students who never, seldom,
or sometimes plagiarize, the tailored brochure had a jointly statistically signiﬁcant (at
the 10% level) eﬀect on the outcomes related to students' interest in anti-corruption
activities. The anti-bribery video statistically signiﬁcantly (at the 5% level) aﬀected the
15There are 124 combinations of treatment-outcomes in total but, given our speciﬁcation of the recursive
partitioning, splits are not found for some combinations of treatment-outcomes, which results in 95
primary-level splits.
16Note that only the test subsample of 1,002 observations is used for the multiple outcome testing and
estimation of individual treatment eﬀects in the subsamples deﬁned by the recursive partitioning algorithm.
See Section 2.3 for details.
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group of outcomes based on the question In your view, how does corruption aﬀect public
spheres in Russia? (Table 2.4, Panel B).
Table 2.4: Multiple outcomes test: Subgroups based on plagiarism in studies
Question group Oﬃcial Tailored Video: Video:
brochure brochure bribery reiderstvo
Panel A: Students who often/systematically write papers plagiarizing from the internet
How often do you think students use 0.35 0.82 0.71 0.50
the following [corrupt] practices?
When do you think these [corrupt] 0.80 0.97 0.32 0.59
practices are acceptable?
What does corruption mean to you? 0.53 0.66 0.53 0.92
In your view, how does corruption 0.72 0.03 0.69 0.93
aﬀect aspects of your life?
In your view, how does corruption 0.23 0.62 0.42 0.59
aﬀect public spheres in Russia?
Interest in anti-corruption activities 0.28 0.80 0.40 0.51
Panel B: Students who never/seldom/sometimes write papers plagiarizing from the internet
How often do you think students use 0.18 0.50 0.58 0.14
the following [corrupt] practices?
When do you think these [corrupt] 0.30 0.57 0.12 0.12
practices are acceptable?
What does corruption mean to you? 0.44 0.67 0.28 0.59
In your view, how does corruption 0.87 0.42 0.34 0.39
aﬀect aspects of your life?
In your view, how does corruption 0.32 0.68 0.01 0.29
aﬀect public spheres in Russia?
Interest in anti-corruption activities 0.28 0.06 0.10 0.71
Note: The p-values of the joint signiﬁcance tests are presented.
Next, Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present the results for individual outcomes in, respectively, the
groups of students who frequently wrote papers while plagiarizing some chapters from the
internet and those who did so less frequently. Comparing the mean outcome values among
non-treated students in both groups, it is striking how those who tended to plagiarize
more reported a higher frequency of various informal practices among students, showed
more acceptance of dishonesty, and were more skeptic about the possibility of eradicating
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Table 2.5: Eﬀects among students who often/systematically write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet
Outcome Control Oﬃcial brochure Tailored brochure Video: bribery Video: reiderstvo
mean Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v.
How often do you think students use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams 4.09 -0.21 0.12 0.07 -0.23 0.12 0.05 -0.20 0.12 0.11 -0.06 0.11 0.59
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 3.71 -0.07 0.14 0.60 -0.08 0.13 0.56 -0.04 0.15 0.81 0.04 0.14 0.76
Buy papers 3.37 -0.11 0.15 0.44 -0.27 0.14 0.06 -0.02 0.16 0.91 -0.04 0.15 0.77
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 4.14 0.06 0.11 0.61 0.04 0.11 0.74 -0.23 0.14 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.84
Copy from other students during exams or tests 3.98 0.01 0.14 0.93 0.16 0.13 0.23 0.01 0.14 0.93 0.22 0.14 0.11
Deceive professors about study problems 3.23 -0.43 0.16 0.01 -0.13 0.16 0.40 -0.20 0.18 0.24 0.00 0.16 0.98
Ask professors for preferential treatment 2.51 -0.29 0.14 0.04 -0.21 0.17 0.22 -0.23 0.17 0.18 -0.09 0.16 0.57
When do you think these practices are acceptable? (1=deﬁnitely no... 5=deﬁnitely yes)
When useless course 2.85 -0.04 0.17 0.83 -0.14 0.17 0.42 -0.08 0.20 0.71 0.02 0.18 0.90
When students work 3.13 0.27 0.17 0.11 -0.16 0.18 0.36 -0.11 0.20 0.60 -0.13 0.18 0.47
If it is hard to learn material 2.80 0.02 0.17 0.90 -0.22 0.17 0.20 -0.02 0.19 0.91 -0.31 0.17 0.07
Always acceptable 2.16 -0.22 0.16 0.17 -0.34 0.15 0.02 -0.11 0.18 0.53 -0.32 0.16 0.05
Never acceptable 2.82 -0.13 0.18 0.50 -0.09 0.18 0.60 0.02 0.21 0.91 -0.06 0.18 0.75
What does corruption mean to you? (1= deﬁnitely no... 5= deﬁnitely yes)
Necessity 1.95 0.12 0.17 0.46 -0.14 0.14 0.33 -0.13 0.17 0.42 -0.13 0.15 0.39
Means of income 2.88 0.20 0.19 0.29 0.03 0.19 0.87 -0.21 0.21 0.33 -0.22 0.19 0.25
Crime 4.06 -0.10 0.16 0.52 -0.07 0.14 0.65 -0.01 0.18 0.96 -0.12 0.15 0.41
Means to solve problems 3.21 0.20 0.16 0.22 0.07 0.18 0.69 -0.30 0.20 0.14 -0.14 0.19 0.47
Compensation for low salaries 2.69 0.18 0.19 0.36 -0.13 0.20 0.50 -0.33 0.20 0.10 -0.32 0.20 0.11
Evil 3.75 -0.13 0.18 0.47 0.06 0.16 0.70 0.03 0.18 0.87 -0.32 0.21 0.12
In your view, how does corruption aﬀect...? (1=strictly negative... 5=fully positive)
Your career opportunities 2.43 -0.29 0.15 0.05 -0.46 0.15 0.00 -0.11 0.18 0.55 -0.25 0.16 0.11
Your quality of life 2.42 -0.08 0.15 0.60 -0.28 0.15 0.06 -0.04 0.18 0.81 -0.08 0.16 0.60
Your education 2.23 -0.28 0.14 0.05 -0.20 0.14 0.17 -0.15 0.16 0.33 -0.16 0.15 0.30
Your health 2.34 -0.06 0.16 0.72 -0.20 0.16 0.20 0.05 0.17 0.75 0.01 0.15 0.95
Your safety 2.09 -0.10 0.15 0.52 -0.14 0.15 0.37 -0.03 0.15 0.82 -0.18 0.14 0.20
Russian economy 1.54 0.07 0.12 0.58 -0.14 0.10 0.17 -0.10 0.12 0.38 -0.09 0.11 0.45
Russian politics 1.58 0.07 0.12 0.56 -0.14 0.11 0.19 -0.12 0.12 0.31 -0.10 0.12 0.39
Russian education 1.56 0.04 0.11 0.70 -0.01 0.11 0.93 -0.02 0.12 0.87 -0.14 0.11 0.20
Russian health system 1.54 0.12 0.12 0.34 -0.03 0.11 0.80 -0.01 0.12 0.93 -0.05 0.11 0.68
Russian police 1.44 0.03 0.11 0.76 -0.02 0.11 0.86 0.02 0.12 0.88 -0.04 0.11 0.73
Can corruption be eradicated in Russia? 2.29 0.09 0.13 0.52 -0.20 0.13 0.14 -0.07 0.16 0.66 -0.08 0.15 0.59
(1=deﬁnitely no... 5=deﬁnitely yes)
Take part in roundtable? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.84 -0.01 0.02 0.55 -0.02 0.02 0.31 0.00 0.03 0.92
Take part in survey next year? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.79 -0.06 0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.58 -0.02 0.04 0.68
Notes: `Eﬀect' represents the diﬀerence between the mean outcome value in each treatment group and the control mean, `se' provides asymptotic standard
error robust to heteroskedasticity, and `p-v.' stands for p-value.
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Table 2.6: Eﬀects among students who never/seldom/sometimes write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet
Outcome Control Oﬃcial brochure Tailored brochure Video: bribery Video: reiderstvo
mean Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v.
How often do you think students use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams 3.76 -0.02 0.14 0.89 0.15 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.23 0.05 0.15 0.72
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 3.37 0.06 0.15 0.66 0.15 0.14 0.29 0.22 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.16 0.93
Buy papers 3.19 0.02 0.15 0.91 0.14 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.15 0.35 0.08 0.16 0.61
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 3.57 0.03 0.14 0.85 0.22 0.13 0.08 0.30 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.93
Copy from other students during exams or tests 3.72 0.10 0.13 0.44 0.22 0.13 0.08 0.21 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.16 0.98
Deceive professors about study problems 3.08 -0.15 0.17 0.39 0.32 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.17 0.90 0.18 0.17 0.29
Ask professors for preferential treatment 2.50 -0.21 0.15 0.18 0.26 0.15 0.09 -0.14 0.16 0.36 0.16 0.17 0.33
When do you think these practices are acceptable? (1=deﬁnitely no... 5=deﬁnitely yes)
When useless course 2.48 0.48 0.17 0.01 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.09 0.16 0.58 0.15 0.18 0.39
When students work 2.82 0.08 0.16 0.61 0.15 0.16 0.33 0.04 0.17 0.80 0.11 0.18 0.54
If it is hard to learn material 2.63 0.09 0.16 0.56 0.07 0.16 0.64 -0.01 0.15 0.96 0.08 0.18 0.65
Always acceptable 2.10 0.31 0.15 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.44 -0.02 0.14 0.90 0.12 0.16 0.46
Never acceptable 2.94 -0.25 0.17 0.15 -0.29 0.17 0.08 -0.40 0.18 0.03 -0.10 0.20 0.61
What does corruption mean to you? (1= deﬁnitely no... 5= deﬁnitely yes)
Necessity 1.88 0.13 0.14 0.36 0.20 0.14 0.13 -0.10 0.12 0.43 0.17 0.15 0.27
Means of income 2.76 0.25 0.18 0.15 0.35 0.17 0.04 0.17 0.17 0.32 -0.10 0.18 0.57
Crime 4.01 0.06 0.16 0.68 0.07 0.15 0.64 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.15 0.12
Means to solve problems 2.95 0.08 0.16 0.60 0.21 0.15 0.17 0.02 0.17 0.92 -0.26 0.18 0.15
Compensation for low salaries 2.48 -0.12 0.16 0.47 0.24 0.15 0.12 -0.04 0.16 0.83 0.00 0.16 0.98
Evil 3.81 0.00 0.17 0.98 -0.10 0.17 0.54 -0.17 0.18 0.32 -0.02 0.18 0.93
In your view, how does corruption aﬀect...? (1=strictly negative... 5=fully positive)
Your career opportunities 2.29 -0.02 0.14 0.90 -0.01 0.13 0.97 -0.15 0.14 0.28 -0.08 0.14 0.57
Your quality of life 2.33 0.04 0.14 0.76 0.05 0.13 0.70 -0.19 0.14 0.18 -0.03 0.15 0.86
Your education 2.20 0.16 0.14 0.24 0.19 0.14 0.18 -0.16 0.13 0.22 -0.02 0.15 0.89
Your health 2.19 -0.11 0.14 0.42 0.06 0.13 0.64 -0.14 0.14 0.32 -0.14 0.15 0.33
Your safety 2.07 -0.17 0.14 0.22 -0.09 0.13 0.52 -0.31 0.14 0.02 -0.25 0.16 0.11
Russian economy 1.53 0.03 0.09 0.74 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.79 0.08 0.12 0.49
Russian politics 1.58 0.07 0.10 0.49 0.10 0.09 0.29 -0.03 0.10 0.76 0.01 0.11 0.89
Russian education 1.59 0.06 0.10 0.53 0.21 0.10 0.04 -0.07 0.10 0.49 0.02 0.11 0.85
Russian health system 1.61 0.12 0.11 0.29 0.23 0.11 0.03 -0.01 0.11 0.95 -0.04 0.12 0.73
Russian police 1.50 -0.01 0.11 0.94 -0.01 0.11 0.91 -0.25 0.10 0.01 -0.11 0.12 0.39
Can corruption be eradicated in Russia? 2.55 -0.20 0.14 0.13 -0.23 0.13 0.07 -0.11 0.15 0.45 -0.02 0.15 0.89
(1=deﬁnitely no... 5=deﬁnitely yes)
Take part in roundtable? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.32 -0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.34 0.00 0.03 0.89
Take part in survey next year? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.11 -0.05 0.04 0.21 -0.08 0.04 0.05 -0.05 0.04 0.23 -0.04 0.05 0.37
Notes: `Eﬀect' represents the diﬀerence between the mean outcome value in each treatment group and the control mean, `se' provides asymptotic standard
error robust to heteroskedasticity, and `p-v.' stands for p-value.
53
corruption in Russia.17 Focusing on general patters of treatment eﬀects, the tailored
brochure appears to have impacted students in both groups more than other information
materials, yielding a larger number of statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects. At the same time,
the video treatments seemed to be least eﬀective in changing students' attitudes.
Another observation worth mentioning is that students who plagiarized frequently
reacted to the provided information materials as expected by our research team.
Speciﬁcally, both brochures seemed to negatively aﬀect students' perception of the impact
of corruption on all the listed aspects of personal life, including career, quality of life,
education, health, and safety. Yet, only the ﬁrst three of these outcomes were aﬀected
statistically signiﬁcantly (at the 1-10% levels). The perceived frequencies of using crib
sheets at exams, deceiving professors about study problems, and asking professors for
preferential treatment were reduced by the oﬃcial brochure (signiﬁcant at the 5-10%
levels), whereas the tailored brochure reduced the reported use of crib sheets at exams
and buying papers (statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level). The tailored brochure
tended to lower the acceptance of informal practices in various situations; however,
only its negative eﬀect on the unconditional acceptance (i.e., always acceptable) was
statistically signiﬁcant (at the 5% level). The reiderestvo video negatively aﬀected the
unconditional acceptance of information academic practices and in cases when the
course material is hard to learn (both eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level).
For the group of students who plagiarized less frequently, some information materials
tended to raise the reported frequency of informal academic practices and their
acceptance, lower the belief that corruption can be eradicated in Russia, and reduce
the interest in corruption-awareness activities. Yet, only few of the treatment eﬀects
are found to be statistically signiﬁcant. Considering patterns of statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects, the tailored brochure increased the reported frequency of informal practices
such as plagiarizing chapters from the internet, copying from others at exams, deceiving
professors about study problems, and asking them for preferential treatment (statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5-10% levels). Contrary to our expectations, the tailored brochure led
to a more positive perception of the impact of corruption on education and health system
in Russia (both are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level). Furthermore, the brochure's
negative eﬀects on students' interest in the roundtable discussion on corruption and the
next round of the survey were also statistically signiﬁcant (at the 5% level), further
lowering students' interest. Lastly, the oﬃcial brochure increased the unconditional
17Most of these diﬀerences between the two subgroups are statically signiﬁcant at the 5% or 10% levels.
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acceptance of informal academic practices and when the course was considered useless
(statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level).
Additionally, we consider eﬀect heterogeneities by gender, comparing the groups of 911
male and 1,092 female students. Although not suggested by the recursive partitioning
algorithm, this is nevertheless common in the literature (see for example Swamy et al.,
2001; and Jetter and Walker, 2015). The p-values from the multiple outcome tests are
presented in Appendix 2 Table A2.3. The test of Ludwig et al. (2017) did not point to
jointly statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects for female students (Panel B). Among male students
(Panel A), however, the oﬃcial brochure aﬀected the acceptance of informal academic
practices and their opinion about the impact of corruption on public spheres in Russia
(signiﬁcant at the 5% level), and the reiderstvo video aﬀected the reported frequency of
informal academic practices and the perceived impact of corruption on public sectors in
the country (signiﬁcant at the 10% level).
Tables A2.4 (for males) and A2.5 (for females) report the eﬀects on individual outcome
variables. Considering mean outcome values in the respective control groups, females
appeared to have stronger negative opinions about the inﬂuence of corruption on their
lives and to be more reluctant to participate in future corruption-awareness activities than
males. Male students exposed to the oﬃcial brochure demonstrated more tolerance towards
informal academic practices, but only the eﬀects on the acceptance of these practices in
cases when the course was considered useless and when students worked were statistically
signiﬁcantly positive (at the 5-10% levels). The oﬃcial brochure also led to a more positive
perception of corruption on the global level, particularly on the Russian health system and
police (statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 and 10% levels). Furthermore, male students were
signiﬁcantly (at the 10% level) dissuaded by all the treatments (but the reiderstvo video)
from participation in corruption-awareness activities, whereas the participation propensity
of females remained unaﬀected. Overall, with fewer signiﬁcant treatment eﬀects, female
students were, on average, less responsive to the intervention than males.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the attitudes of Russian students towards dishonest academic
practices and corruption and used an experimental design to investigate the eﬀects of
an educational campaign consisting of four distinct interventions: two brochures (one
oﬃcially provided by the local authorities and one particularly tailored to students)
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and two videos (about bribery and hostile corporate takeovers) informing students
about corruption and its negative consequences. The results suggest that various forms
of academic cheating are quite common at Russian universities. At the same time,
the attitudes towards corruption are generally negative among the surveyed students.
Corruption is believed to have particularly detrimental consequences at the aggregate
(national) level, while its eﬀects at the individual level are viewed somewhat less
negatively.
Even though the eﬀects of the interventions were not too pronounced in the total
sample, we found interesting patterns of impacts, partly going in opposite directions, in
subsamples deﬁned along students' plagiarizing behavior and gender. One interesting
result is that the interventions promoted awareness of the negative consequences
of corruption among students who plagiarize, while they led to more tolerance
towards academic dishonesty and more pragmatic attitudes towards corruption among
non-plagiarists. Furthermore, while female students had a more negative opinion
about corruption than males, they were generally less responsive to interventions.
This demonstrates that information campaigns may aﬀect various groups substantially
diﬀerently. While the attitudes and behavior of some individuals might be slanted in the
desired direction, the very same information can produce detrimental eﬀects by increasing
the awareness of corruption among other groups of individuals. Thus, it appears critical
for policy makers to reﬂect on population heterogeneity before conducting large-scale
educational campaigns in order to avoid undesired eﬀects.
Comparing the eﬀectiveness across the four interventions, we conclude that the
brochures appeared to have more impact on students than the videos. However, only in
the subsample of students who frequently plagiarized did the brochures sway students'
attitudes towards informal academic practices and corruption in the desired direction.
Hence, both the content and the form of information materials appear to matter.
When preparing an educational campaign, policy makers should think carefully about
tailoring the information materials to the respective target audience in order to maximize
eﬀectiveness.
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Chapter 3
Direct and Indirect Eﬀects under Sample
Selection and Outcome Attrition
3.1 Introduction1
Following the seminal papers of Judd and Kenny (1981), Baron and Kenny (1986), and
Robins and Greenland (1992), the evaluation of direct and indirect eﬀects, also known
as mediation analysis, is widespread in social sciences, see for instance the applications
in MacKinnon (2008). The aim is to disentangle the total causal eﬀect of a treatment
on an outcome of interest into an indirect component operating through one or several
intermediate variables, i.e. mediators, as well as a direct component. As example, consider
the eﬀect of educational interventions on health, where part of the eﬀect might be
mediated by health behaviors, see Brunello et al. (2016), or personality traits, see Conti
et al. (2016). While earlier studies on mediation typically rely on tight linear models,
the more recent literature considers more ﬂexible and possibly nonlinear speciﬁcations.
A large number of contributions assumes a `sequential conditional independence'
assumption, implying that the assignment of the treatment and the mediator is
conditionally exogenous given observed covariates and given the treatment and the
covariates, respectively. For examples, see Pearl (2001), Robins (2003), Petersen et al.
(2006), van der Weele (2009), Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2009), Imai et al. (2010), Hong
(2010), Albert and Nelson (2011), Tchetgen Tchetgen and Shpitser (2012), Vansteelandt
et al. (2012), Zheng and van der Laan (2012), and Huber (2014a), among many others.
Our main contribution is the extension of such mediation models to account for issues
of outcome nonresponse and sample selection, implying that outcomes are only observed
for a subset of the initial population or sample of interest. These problems frequently
occur in empirical applications as, for instance, wage gap decompositions, where wages
1This essay was written in co-authorship with Martin Huber. It was released as a SES Working paper,
University of Fribourg (Huber and Solovyeva, 2018a).
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are only observed for those who select themselves into employment. In a range of studies
evaluating total (rather than direct and indirect eﬀects), sample selection is modelled by
a so-called missing at random (MAR) restriction, which assumes conditional exogeneity of
sample selection given observed variables, see for instance Rubin (1976), Little and Rubin
(1987), Robins et al. (1994), Robins et al. (1995), Carroll et al. (1995), Shah et al. (1997),
Fitzgerald et al. (1998), Abowd et al. (2001), and Wooldridge (2002, 2007). In contrast,
so-called sample selection or nonignorable nonresponse models permit sample selection to
be related to unobservables. Unless strong parametric assumptions are imposed (see for
instance Heckman 1976, 1979; Hausman and Wise, 1979; and Little, 1995), identiﬁcation
requires an instrumental variable (IV) for sample selection (e.g. Das et al., 2003; Newey,
2007; and Huber, 2012, 2014b).
In this paper, we combine the identiﬁcation of average natural direct and indirect eﬀects
based on sequential conditional independence with speciﬁc MAR or IV assumptions about
sample selection. We show under which conditions the parameters of interest in the total
as well as the selected population (whose outcomes are actually observed) are identiﬁed by
inverse probability weighting2 (IPW) based on particular propensity scores for treatment
and selection. Under MAR, eﬀects in the total population are obtained through reweighting
by the inverse of the selection propensity given observed characteristics. If selection is
related to unobservables, we make use of a control function that can be regarded as a
nonparametric version of the inverse Mill's ratio in Heckman-type selection models. Under
speciﬁc conditions, reweighting observations by the inverse of the selection propensity given
observed characteristics and the control function identiﬁes the eﬀects in the selected and
the total population. To convey the intuition of our identiﬁcation results, we provide a brief
simulation study, in which the ﬁnite sample properties of semiparametric IPW estimation
with probit-based propensity scores is investigated.
As an empirical illustration, we evaluate the average natural direct and indirect eﬀects
of Program STAR, an educational experiment in Tennessee, U.S., which randomly assigned
children to small classes in kindergarten and primary school. The positive impact of STAR
classes on academic achievement has been demonstrated, for example, in Krueger (1999),
but less is known about the underlying causal mechanisms. We consider absenteeism in
kindergarten as potential mediator of the overall eﬀect. The outcome of interest is the
score on a standardized math test in the ﬁrst grade of primary school, which is unobserved
for a non-negligible share of students in the data due to attrition. We apply one of our
2The idea of using inverse probability weighting to control for selection problems goes back to Horvitz
and Thompson (1952).
58
proposed IPW-based estimators to account for outcome attrition and compare the results
to several alternative mediation estimators that make no corrections for sample selection.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the parameters
of interest, the assumptions, and the nonparametric identiﬁcation results based on inverse
probability weighting. Section 3.3 outlines estimation based on the sample analogs of the
identiﬁcation results. Section 3.4 presents a simulation study. Section 3.5 provides an
application to Project STAR data. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Identiﬁcation
3.2.1 Parameters of interest
We would like to disentangle the average treatment eﬀect (ATE) of a binary treatment
variable D on an outcome variable Y into a direct eﬀect and an indirect eﬀect operating
through the mediator M , which has bounded support and may be a scalar or a vector
and discrete and/or continuous. To deﬁne the eﬀects of interest, we use the potential
outcome framework, see Rubin (1974), which has been applied in the context of mediation
analysis by Rubin (2004), Ten Have et al. (2007), and Albert (2008), among others.
M(d), Y (d,M(d′)) denote the potential mediator state as a function of the treatment
and potential outcome as a function of the treatment and the potential mediator,
respectively, under treatments d, d′ ∈ {0, 1}. Only one potential outcome and mediator
state, respectively, is observed for each unit, because the realized mediator and outcome
values are M = D ·M(1) + (1−D) ·M(0) and Y = D · Y (1,M(1)) + (1−D) · Y (0,M(0)).
The ATE is given by ∆ = E[Y (1,M(1))− Y (0,M(0))]. To disentangle the latter, note
that the (average) natural direct eﬀect (using the denomination of Pearl, 2001)3 is identiﬁed
by exogenously varying the treatment but keeping the mediator ﬁxed at its potential value
for D = d:
θ(d) = E[Y (1,M(d))− Y (0,M(d))], d ∈ {0, 1}, (3.1)
Equivalently, by exogenously shifting the mediator to its potential values under treatment
and non-treatment but keeping the treatment ﬁxed at D = d, the (average) natural indirect
3Robins and Greenland (1992) and Robins (2003) refer to this parameter as the total or pure direct
eﬀect and Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2009) as net average treatment eﬀect.
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eﬀect4 is obtained:
δ(d) = E[Y (d,M(1))− Y (d,M(0))], d ∈ {0, 1}. (3.2)
The ATE is the sum of the direct and indirect eﬀects deﬁned upon opposite treatment
states:
∆ = E[Y (1,M(1))− Y (0,M(0))]
= E[Y (1,M(1))− Y (0,M(1))] + E[Y (0,M(1))− Y (0,M(0))] = θ(1) + δ(0)
= E[Y (1,M(0))− Y (0,M(0))] + E[Y (1,M(1))− Y (1,M(0))] = θ(0) + δ(1). (3.3)
This follows from adding and subtracting E[Y (0,M(1))] or E[Y (1,M(0))], respectively.
The notation θ(1), θ(0) and δ(1), δ(0) points to possible eﬀect heterogeneity w.r.t. the
potential treatment state, implying the presence of interaction eﬀects between the
treatment and the mediator. However, the eﬀects cannot be identiﬁed without further
assumptions, as either Y (1,M(1)) or Y (0,M(0)) is observed for any unit, whereas
Y (1,M(0)) and Y (0,M(1)) are never observed.
In contrast to natural eﬀects, which are functions of the potential mediators, the
so-called controlled direct eﬀect is obtained by setting the mediator to a predetermined
value m, rather than M(d):
γ(m) = E[Y (1,m)− Y (0,m)], m in the support of M. (3.4)
Whether θ(d) or γ(m) is of primary interest depends on the research question at hand.
The controlled direct eﬀect may provide policy guidance whenever mediators can be
externally prescribed, as for instance in a sequence of active labor market programs
assigned by a caseworker, where D and M denotes assignment of the ﬁrst and second
program, respectively. This allows analysing the direct eﬀect of the ﬁrst program under
alternative combinations of program prescriptions. In contrast, the natural direct eﬀect
assesses the eﬀectiveness of the ﬁrst program given the status quo decision to participate
in the second program in the light of participation or non-participation in the ﬁrst
program. We refer to Pearl (2001) for further discussion of what he calls the descriptive
and prescriptive natures of natural and controlled eﬀects.
4Robins and Greenland (1992) and Robins (2003) refer to this parameter as the total or pure indirect
eﬀect and Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2009) as mechanism average treatment eﬀect.
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Our identiﬁcation results will make use of a vector of observed covariates, denoted by
X, that may confound the causal relations between D and M , D and Y , and M and Y .
A further complication in our evaluation framework is that Y is assumed to be observed
for a subpopulation, i.e. conditional on S = 1, where S is a binary variable indicating
whether Y is observed/selected, or not. We therefore also deﬁne the direct and indirect
eﬀects among the selected population:
θS=1(d) = E[Y (1,M(d))− Y (0,M(d))|S = 1],
δS=1(d) = E[Y (d,M(1))− Y (d,M(0))|S = 1],
γS=1(m) = E[Y (1,m)− Y (0,m)|S = 1].
Empirical examples with partially observed outcomes include wage regressions, with S
being an employment indicator, see for instance Gronau (1974), or the evaluation of the
eﬀects of policy interventions in education on test scores, with S being participation in the
test, see Angrist et al. (2006). Throughout our discussion, S is allowed to be a function of
D, M , and X, i.e. S = S(D,M,X). However, S must neither be aﬀected by nor aﬀect Y .5
S is therefore not a mediator, as selection per se does not causally inﬂuence the outcome.
An example for such a set up in terms of nonparametric structural models is given by
Y = φ(D,M,X,U), S = ψ(D,M,X, V ), (3.5)
where U, V are unobserved characteristics and φ, ψ are general functions.6
3.2.2 Assumptions and identiﬁcation results under MAR
This section presents identifying assumptions that formalize the sequential conditional
independence of D and M as imposed by Imai et al. (2010) and many others as well as a
MAR restriction on Y that implies that S is related to observables.7
5See for instance Imai (2009) for an alternative set of restrictions, assuming that selection is related
to the outcome but is independent of the treatment conditional on the outcome and other observable
variables.
6Note that Y (d,M(d′)) = φ(d,M(d′), X, U), which means that ﬁxing the treatment and the potential
mediator yields the potential outcome.
7We also implicitly impose the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA, see Rubin, 1990)
stating that the potential mediators and outcomes for any individual are stable in the sense that their
values do not depend on the treatment allocations in the rest of the population.
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Assumption 1 (conditional independence of the treatment):
(a) Y (d,m)⊥D|X = x, (b) M(d′)⊥D|X = x for all d, d′ ∈ {0, 1} and m in the support of
M .
By Assumption 1, there are no unobservables jointly aﬀecting the treatment, on the one
hand, and the mediator and/or the outcome, on the other hand, conditional on X. In
observational studies, the plausibility of this assumption crucially hinges on the richness of
the data, while in experiments, it is satisﬁed if the treatment is randomized within strata
deﬁned by X or randomized independently of X.8
Assumption 2 (conditional independence of the mediator):
Y (d,m)⊥M |D = d′, X = x for all d, d′ ∈ {0, 1} and m,x in the support of M,X.
By Assumption 2, there are no unobservables jointly aﬀecting the mediator and the outcome
conditional on D and X. Assumption 2 only appears realistic if detailed information on
possible confounders of the mediator-outcome relation is available in the data (even in
experiments with random treatment assignment) and if post-treatment confounders of M
and Y can be plausibly ruled out when controlling for D and X.9
Assumption 3 (conditional independence of selection):
Y⊥S|D = d,M = m,X = x for all d ∈ {0, 1} and m,x in the support of M,X.
By Assumption 3, there are no unobservables jointly aﬀecting selection and the outcome
conditional on D,M,X, such that outcomes are are missing at random (MAR) in the
denomination of Rubin (1976). Put diﬀerently, selection is assumed to be selective w.r.t.
observed characteristics only.
Assumption 4 (common support):
(a) Pr(D = d|M = m,X = x) > 0 and (b) Pr(S = 1|D = d,M = m,X = x) > 0 for all
d ∈ {0, 1} and m,x in the support of M,X.
Assumption 4(a) is a common support restriction requiring that the conditional probability
to be treated given M,X, henceforth referred to as propensity score, is larger than zero in
either treatment state. It follows that Pr(D = d|X = x) > 0 must hold, too. By Bayes'
theorem, Assumption 4(a) implies that Pr(M = m|D = d,X = x) > 0, or in the case
of M being continuous, that the conditional density of M given D,X is larger than zero.
8In the latter case, even the stronger condition {Y (d′,m),M(d), X}⊥D holds.
9Several studies in the mediation literature discuss identiﬁcation in the presence of post-treatment
confounders of the mediator that may themselves be aﬀected by the treatment. See for instance Robins
and Richardson (2010), Albert and Nelson (2011), Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele (2014), Imai and
Yamamoto (2011), and Huber (2014a).
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Conditional onX,M must not be deterministic inD, as otherwise identiﬁcation fails due to
the lack of comparable units in terms of the mediator across treatment states. Assumption
4(b) requires that for any combination of D,M,X, the probability to be observed is larger
than zero. Otherwise, the outcome is not observed for some speciﬁc combinations of these
variables implying yet another common support issue.
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Figure 3.1: Causal framework under MAR
Figure 3.1 illustrates the causal framework underlying our assumptions by means of
a causal graph, see for instance Pearl (1995), in which each arrow represents a potential
causal eﬀect. Further (unobserved) variables that only aﬀect one of the variables explicitly
displayed in the system are kept implicit. For instance, there may be unobservable variables
U that aﬀect the outcome, but do not inﬂuence D, M , or S; otherwise, there would be
confounding.
Under Assumptions 1 to 4, potential outcomes as well as direct and indirect eﬀects in
the total population are identiﬁed based on weighting by the inverse of the treatment and
selection propensity scores.
Theorem 1:
(i) Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, for d ∈ {0, 1},
E[Y (d,M(1− d))] = E
[
Y · I{D = d} · S
Pr(D = d|M,X) · Pr(S = 1|D,M,X) ·
Pr(D = 1− d|M,X)
Pr(D = 1− d|X)
]
,
E[Y (d,M(d))] = E
[
Y · I{D = d} · S
Pr(D = d|X) · Pr(S = 1|D,M,X)
]
. (3.6)
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(ii) Under Assumptions 1(a), 2, 3, and 4, and M following a discrete distribution,
E[Y (d,m)] = E
[
Y · I{D = d} · I{M = m} · S
Pr(D = d|X) · Pr(M = m|D,X) · Pr(S = 1|D,M,X)
]
. (3.7)
Proof: See Appendix 3.0.1
Using the results of Theorem 1, it can be shown that the direct and indirect eﬀects are
identiﬁed by
θ(d) = E
[(
Y ·D
Pr(D = 1|M,X) −
Y · (1−D)
1− Pr(D = 1|M,X)
)
· Pr(D = d|M,X) · S
Pr(D = d|X) · Pr(S = 1|D,M,X)
]
,
δ(d) = E
[
Y · I{D = d} · S
Pr(D = d|M,X) · Pr(S = 1|D,M,X) ·
(
Pr(D = 1|M,X)
Pr(D = 1|X) −
1− Pr(D = 1|M,X)
1− Pr(D = 1|X)
)]
,
γ(m) = E
[(
Y ·D
Pr(D = 1|X) −
Y · (1−D)
1− Pr(D = 1|X)
)
· I{M = m} · S
Pr(M = m|D,X) · Pr(S = 1|D,M,X)
]
.
These expressions are related to the IPW-based identiﬁcation in Huber (2014a) for the
case with no missing outcomes with the diﬀerence that here, multiplication by S/Pr(S =
1|D,M,X) is included to account for sample selection. Furthermore, our results ﬁt into the
general framework of Wooldridge (2002), who considers the IPW-based M-estimation of
missing data models. Finally, for the identiﬁcation of γ(m), Assumption 1 can be relaxed
to Assumption 1(a) because (in contrast to θ(d), δ(d)) the distribution of the potential
mediator M(d) need not be identiﬁed.
3.2.3 Assumptions and identiﬁcation results under selection
related to unobservables
In the following discussion, we consider the case that selection is related to both
observables and unobservables that are associated with the outcome. Assumptions 3
and 4 are therefore replaced. Rather, we assume that an instrumental variable for S is
available to tackle sample selection.
Assumption 5 (Instrument for selection):
(a) There exists an instrument Z that may be a function of D,M , i.e. Z = Z(D,M),
is conditionally correlated with S, i.e. E[Z · S|D,M,X] 6= 0, and satisﬁes (i)
Y (d,m, z) = Y (d,m) and (ii) {Y (d,m),M(d′)}⊥Z(d′′,m′)|X = x for all d, d′, d′′ ∈ {0, 1}
and z,m,m′, x in the support of Z,M,X,
(b) S = I{V ≤ Π(D,M,X,Z)}, where Π is a general function and V is a scalar (index
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of) unobservable(s) with a strictly monotonic cumulative distribution function conditional
on X,
(c) V⊥(D,M,Z)|X.
Assumption 5 no longer imposes the independence of Y and S given observed
characteristics. As the unobservable V in the selection equation is allowed to be
associated with unobservables aﬀecting the outcome, Assumptions 1 and 2 generally do
not hold conditional on S = 1 due to the endogeneity of the post-treatment variable
S. In fact, S = 1 implies that Π(D,M,X,Z) > V such that conditional on X, the
distribution of V generally diﬀers across values of D,M . This entails a violation of
the sequential conditional independence assumptions on D,M given S = 1 if potential
outcome distributions diﬀer across values of V . We therefore require an instrumental
variable denoted by Z, which is allowed to be aﬀected by D and M , but must not aﬀect
Y or be associated with unobservables aﬀecting M or Y conditional on X, as invoked in
(5a).10 We apply a control function approach based on this instrument,11 which requires
further assumptions.
By the threshold crossing model postulated in 5(b), Pr(S = 1|D,M,X,Z) =
Pr(V ≤ Π(D,M,X,Z)) = FV (Π(D,M,X,Z)), where FV (v) denotes the cumulative
distribution function of V evaluated at v. We will henceforth use the notation
p(W ) = Pr(S = 1|D,M,X,Z) with W = D,M,X,Z for the sake of brevity. Again by
Assumption 5(b), the selection probability p(W ) increases strictly monotonically in Π
conditional on X, such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the distribution
function FV and speciﬁc values v given X. For X ﬁxed, the identiﬁcation of FV by p(W )
is `as good as good as' identifying V . By Assumption 5(c), V is independent of (D,M,Z)
given X, implying that the distribution function of V given X is (nonparametrically)
identiﬁed. Figure 3.2 illustrates the causal framework underlying Assumptions 1, 2, and 5
by means of a causal graph.
By comparing individuals with the same p(W ), we control for FV and thus for the
confounding associations of V with (i) D and {Y (d,m),M(d′)} and (ii) M and Y (d,m)
that occur conditional on S = 1. In other words, p(W ) serves as control function where
10As an alternative set of IV restrictions in the context of selection, d'Haultfoeuille (2010) permits the
instrument to be associated with the outcome, but assumes conditional independence of the instrument
and selection given the outcome.
11Control function approaches have been applied in semi- and nonparametric sample selection models,
e.g., Ahn and Powell (1993), Das et al. (2003), Newey (2007), and Huber (2012, 2014b) as well as in
nonparametric instrumental variable models, see, for example, Newey et al. (1999), Blundell and Powell
(2004), and Imbens and Newey (2009).
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Figure 3.2: Causal framework under selection on unobservables
the exogenous variation comes from Z. More concisely, it follows from our assumptions for
any bounded function g that
E [g(Y (d,m))|D,M,X, p(W ), S = 1] = E [g(Y (d,m))|D,M,X, FV , S = 1]
= E [g(Y (d,m))|D,X, FV , S = 1] = E [g(Y (d,m))|X,FV , S = 1] .
The ﬁrst equality follows from p(W ) = FV under Assumption 5, the second from the fact
that when controlling for FV , conditioning on S = 1 does not result in an association
between Y (d,m) and M given D,X such that Y (d,m)⊥M |D,X, p(W ), S = 1 holds by
Assumptions 2 and 5. The third equality follows from the fact that when controlling for
FV , conditioning on S = 1 does not result in an association between Y (d,m) and D given
X such that Y (d,m)⊥D|X, p(W ), S = 1 holds by Assumptions 1 and 5. Similarly,
E [g(M(d))|D,X, p(W ), S = 1] = E [g(M(d))|D,X, FV , S = 1] = E [g(M(d))|X,FV , S = 1]
follows from the fact that when controlling for FV , conditioning on S = 1 does not result
in an association between M(d) and D given X such that M(d)⊥D|X, p(W ), S = 1 holds
by Assumptions 1 and 5. These results will be useful in the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3
(see Appendix 3.0.2).
Furthermore, identiﬁcation requires the following common support assumption, which
is similar to Assumption 4(a), but in contrast to the latter also includes p(W ) as a
conditioning variable.
Assumption 6 (common support):
Pr(D = d|M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1) > 0 for all d ∈ {0, 1} and m,x, z in the
66
support of M,X,Z.
By Bayes' theorem, Assumption 6 implies that the conditional density of p(W ) = p(w)
given D,M,X, S = 1 is larger than zero. This means that in fully nonparametric contexts,
the instrument Z must in general be continuous and strong enough to importantly
shift the selection probability p(W ) conditional on D,M,X in the selected population.
Assumptions 1, 2, 5, and 6 are suﬃcient for the identiﬁcation of mean potential outcomes
as well as direct and indirect eﬀects in the selected population.
Theorem 2:
(i) Under Assumptions 1, 2, 5, and 6 for d ∈ {0, 1},
E[Y (d,M(1− d))|S = 1] = E
[
Y · I{D = d}
Pr(D = d|M,X, p(W )) ·
Pr(D = 1− d|M,X, p(W ))
Pr(D = 1− d|X, p(W ))
∣∣∣∣S = 1] ,
E[Y (d,M(d))|S = 1] = E
[
Y · I{D = d}
Pr(D = d|X, p(W ))
∣∣∣∣S = 1] . (3.8)
(ii) Under Assumptions 1(a), 2, 5, and 6, and M following a discrete distribution,
E[Y (d,m)|S = 1] = E
[
Y · I{D = d} · I{M = m}
Pr(D = d|X, p(W )) · Pr(M = m|D,X, p(W ))
∣∣∣∣S = 1] (3.9)
Proof: See Appendix 3.0.2.
Therefore, the direct and indirect eﬀects are identiﬁed by
θS=1(d) = E
[(
Y ·D
Pr(D = 1|M,X, p(W )) −
Y · (1−D)
1− Pr(D = 1|M,X, p(W ))
)
· Pr(D = d|M,X, p(W ))
Pr(D = d|X, p(W ))
∣∣∣∣S = 1] ,
δS=1(d) = E
[
Y · I{D = d}
Pr(D = d|M,X, p(W )) ·
(
Pr(D = 1|M,X, p(W ))
Pr(D = 1|X, p(W )) −
1− Pr(D = 1|M,X, p(W ))
1− Pr(D = 1|X, p(W ))
) ∣∣∣∣S = 1] ,
γS=1(m) = E
[(
Y ·D
Pr(D = 1|X, p(W )) −
Y · (1−D)
1− Pr(D = 1|X, p(W ))
)
· I{M = m}
Pr(M = m|D,X, p(W ))
∣∣∣∣S = 1] .
In nonparametric models that allow for general forms of eﬀect heterogeneity related
to unobservables, direct and indirect eﬀects can generally only be identiﬁed among the
selected population. The reason is that eﬀects among selected observations cannot be
extrapolated to the non-selected population if the eﬀects of D and M interact with
unobservables that are distributed diﬀerently across S = 1, 0. The identiﬁcation of eﬀects
in the total population therefore requires additional assumptions. In Assumption 7 below,
we impose homogeneity in the direct and indirect eﬀects across selected and non-selected
populations conditional on X, V . A suﬃcient condition for eﬀect homogeneity is the
separability of observed and unobserved components in the outcome variable, i.e.
Y = η(D,M,X) + ν(U), where η, ν are general functions and U is a scalar or vector of
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unobservables. Furthermore, common support as postulated in Assumption 6 needs to
be strengthened to hold in the entire population. In addition, the selection probability
p(w) must be larger than zero for any w in the support of W ; otherwise, outcomes are
not observed for some values of D,M,X. Assumption 8 formalizes these common support
restrictions.
Assumption 7 (conditional eﬀect homogeneity):
E[Y (1,m) − Y (0,m)|X = x, V = v, S = 1] = E[Y (1,m) − Y (0,m)|X = x, V = v] and
E[Y (d,M(1)) − Y (d,M(0))|X = x, V = v, S = 1] = E[Y (d,M(1)) − Y (d,M(0))|X =
x, V = v], for all d ∈ {0, 1} and m,x, v in the support of M,X, V .
Assumption 8 (common support):
(a) Pr(D = d|M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w)) > 0 and (b) p(w) > 0 for all d ∈ {0, 1} and
m,x, z in the support of M,X,Z.
While the mean potential outcomes in the total population remain unknown even under
Assumptions 7 and 8, the eﬀects of interest are nevertheless identiﬁed by the separability
of U .
Theorem 3:
(i) Under Assumptions 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 for d ∈ {0, 1},
θ(d) = E
[(
Y ·D
Pr(D = 1|M,X, p(W )) −
Y · (1−D)
1− Pr(D = 1|M,X, p(W ))
)
· Pr(D = d|M,X, p(W )) · S
Pr(D = d|X, p(W )) · p(W )
]
(3.10)
δ(d) = E
[
Y · I{D = d} · S
Pr(D = d|M,X, p(W )) · p(W ) ·
(
Pr(D = 1|M,X, p(W ))
Pr(D = 1|X, p(W )) −
1− Pr(D = 1|M,X, p(W ))
1− Pr(D = 1|X, p(W ))
)]
.
(ii) Under Assumptions 1(a), 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8, and M following a discrete distribution,
γ(m) = E
[(
Y ·D
Pr(D = 1|X, p(W )) −
Y · (1−D)
1− Pr(D = 1|X, p(W ))
)
· I{M = m} · S
Pr(M = m|D,X, p(W )) · p(W )
]
.
(3.11)
Proof: See Appendix 3.0.3.
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3.2.4 Extensions to further populations, parameters, and variable
distributions
This section brieﬂy sketches how the identiﬁcation results can be extended to further
populations of interest, policy-relevant parameters, and richer distributions of the
treatment and/or the mediator. First and in analogy to the concept of weighted
treatment eﬀects in Hirano et al. (2003), direct and indirect eﬀects can be identiﬁed for
particular target populations by reweighting observations according to the distribution of
X in the target population. To this end, we deﬁne ω(X) to be a well-behaved weighting
function depending on X. Including ω(X)
E[ω(X)]
in the expectation operators presented in
the theorems above yields the parameters of interest for the target population. As an
important example, consider ω(X) = Pr(D = 1|X). For some well-behaved function
f(Y,D,M, S,X, Z) of the observed data,
E
[
ω(X)
E[ω(X)]
· f(Y,D,M, S,X, Z)
]
= E
[
Pr(D=1|X)
Pr(D=1)
· f(Y,D,M, S,X, Z)
]
(3.12)
= E
[
Pr(D=1|X)
Pr(D=1)
· f(Y,D,M, S,X, Z)
]
= E [f(Y,D,M, S,X, Z)|D = 1] ,
i.e. the expected value of that function among the treated is identiﬁed. Likewise, deﬁning
ω(X) = 1 − Pr(D = 1|X) gives the expected value among the non-treated. Any of the
expressions in the expectation operators of the theorems may serve as f(Y,D,M, S,X, Z)
in (3.12).12
Second, the identiﬁcation results may be extended to well-behaved functions of Y ,
rather than Y itself. For instance, replacing Y by I{Y ≤ a}, the indicator function
that Y is not larger than some value a, everywhere in the theorems permits identifying
distributional features or eﬀects. The inversion of potential outcome distribution functions
allows identifying quantile treatment eﬀects.
12For instance, the weighted versions of the parameters identiﬁed in Theorem 1 correspond to
Eω[Y (d,M(1− d))] = E
[
ω(X)
E[ω(X)]
· Y · I{D = d} · S
Pr(D = d|M,X) · Pr(S = 1|D,M,X) ·
Pr(D = 1− d|M,X)
Pr(D = 1− d|X)
]
,
Eω[Y (d,M(d))] = E
[
ω(X)
E[ω(X)]
· Y · I{D = d} · S
Pr(D = d|X) · Pr(S = 1|D,M,X)
]
,
Eω[Y (d,m)] = E
[
ω(X)
E[ω(X)]
· Y · I{D = d} · I{M = m} · S
Pr(D = d|X) · Pr(M = m|D,X) · Pr(S = 1|D,M,X)
]
.
.
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Third, our framework can be adapted to allow for multiple or multivalued (rather than
binary) treatments. If D is multivalued discrete, the derived expressions may be applied
under minor adjustments. For instance, for any d 6= d′ in the discrete support of D, the
expression for potential outcomes in Theorem 1 becomes
E[Y (d,M(d′))] = E
[
Y · I{D = d} · S
Pr(D = d|M,X) · Pr(S = 1|D,M,X) ·
Pr(D = d′|M,X)
Pr(D = d′|X)
]
under appropriate common support conditions. If D is continuous, any indicator functions
for treatment values, which are only appropriate in the presence of mass points, need to
be replaced by kernel functions, while treatment propensity scores need to be substituted
by conditional density functions. In analogy to Hsu et al. (2018b), who consider mediation
analysis with continuous treatments in the absence of sample selection, the expression for
potential outcomes in Theorem 1 becomes
E[Y (d,M(d′))] = lim
h→0
E
[
Y · ω(D; d, h) · S
E[ω(D; d, h)|M,X] · Pr(S = 1|D,M,X)
× E[ω(D; d
′, h)|M,X]
E[ω(D; d′, h)|X]
]
.
The weighting function ω(D; d) = K ((D − d)/h) /h, with K being a symmetric
second order kernel function assigning more weight to observations closer to d and h
being a bandwidth operator. For h going to zero, i.e. limh→0, E[ω(D; d′, h)|X] and
E[ω(D; d′, h)|M,X] correspond to the conditional densities of D given X and given M,X,
respectively, also known as generalized propensity scores. We refer to Hsu et al. (2018b)
for more discussion on direct and indirect eﬀects of continuous treatments and how
estimation may proceed based on generalized propensity scores. We also note that in the
context of controlled direct eﬀects, such kernel methods not only allow for a continuous
treatment, but (contrarily to our theorems) also for a continuous mediator.
3.3 Estimation
The parameters of interest can be estimated using the normalized versions of the sample
analogs of the IPW-based identiﬁcation results in Section 4.2. This implies that the weights
of the observations used for the computation of mean potential outcomes add up to unity,
as advocated in Imbens (2004) and Busso et al. (2009). For instance, the normalized sample
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analogs of the results in Theorem 1, part (i) are given by
µˆ1,M(0) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Yi ·Di · Si
pˆ(Mi, Xi) · pˆi(Di,Mi, Xi)
1− pˆ(Mi, Xi)
1− pˆ(Xi)
/
1
n
n∑
i=1
Di · Si
pˆ(Mi, Xi) · pˆi(Di,Mi, Xi)
1− pˆ(Mi, Xi)
1− pˆ(Xi) ,
µˆ0,M(1) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Yi · (1−Di) · Si
(1− pˆ(Mi, Xi)) · pˆi(Di,Mi, Xi)
pˆ(Mi, Xi)
pˆ(Xi)
/
1
n
n∑
i=1
(1−Di) · Si
(1− pˆ(Mi, Xi)) · pˆi(Di,Mi, Xi)
pˆ(Mi, Xi)
pˆ(Xi)
,
µˆ1,M(1) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Yi ·Di · Si
pˆ(Xi) · pˆi(Di,Mi, Xi)
/
1
n
n∑
i=1
Di · Si
pˆ(Xi) · pˆi(Di,Mi, Xi) ,
µˆ0,M(0) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Yi · (1−Di) · Si
(1− pˆ(Xi)) · pˆi(Di,Mi, Xi)
/
1
n
n∑
i=1
(1−Di) · Si
(1− pˆ(Xi)) · pˆi(Di,Mi, Xi) .
i indexes observations in an i.i.d. sample of size n and µˆd,M(d′) is an estimate of
µd,M(d′) = E[Y (d,M(d
′))] with d, d′ ∈ {1, 0}. pˆ(Mi, Xi), pˆ(Xi) are estimates of the
treatment propensity scores Pr(D = 1|Mi, Xi), Pr(D = 1|Xi), respectively, while
pˆi(Di,Mi, Xi) is an estimate of the selection propensity score Pr(S = 1|D,M,X).
Direct and indirect eﬀect estimates are obtained by θˆ(d) = µˆ1,M(d) − µˆ0,M(d) and
δˆ(d) = µˆd,M(1) − µˆd,M(0).
When propensity scores are estimated parametrically, e.g. based on probit models as
in the simulations and application below, then µˆd,M(d′), θˆ(d), δˆ(d) satisfy the sequential
GMM framework discussed in Newey (1984), with propensity score estimation representing
the ﬁrst step and parameter estimation the second step. This approach is
√
n-consistent
and asymptotically normal under standard regularity conditions. When the propensity
scores are estimated nonparametrically,
√
n-consistency and asymptotic normality can be
obtained if the ﬁrst step estimators satisfy particular regularity conditions. See Hsu et al.
(2018a), who consider series logit estimation of the propensity scores, however, for the case
without sample selection. Furthermore, the bootstrap is consistent for inference as the
proposed IPW estimators are smooth and asymptotically normal.
3.4 Simulation study
This section provides a brief simulation study, in which we investigate the ﬁnite sample
properties of estimation of natural direct and indirect eﬀects based on the sample analogs
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of Theorems 1 to 3. To this end, the following data generating process is considered:
Y = 0.5D +M + 0.5DM +X − αDU + U, Y is observed if S = 1,
S = I{0.5D − 0.5M + 0.25X + Z + V > 0},
M = 0.5D + 0.5X +W, D = I{0.5X +Q > 0},
Z = 0.25X − 0.25M +R,
X,U, V,W,Q,R ∼ N (0, 1), independently of each other.
The outcome Y is a linear function of the observed variables D,M,X and an unobserved
term U , and is only observed if the selection indicator S  which depends on D,M,X,
an instrument Z, and an unobservable V  is equal to one. α gauges the interaction of
D and U in the outcome equation. For α 6= 0, the treatment eﬀect is heterogeneous in
U such that Assumption 7 is violated. W and R denote the unobservables in the linearly
modelled mediator M and instrument Z, respectively. Any unobservable as well as the
observed covariate X are standard normally distributed independent of each other. In this
framework, the assumptions underlying Theorem 1 are satisﬁed.
We run 5,000 Monte Carlo simulations with sample sizes n = 1000, 4000 and consider
estimation of the natural direct and indirect eﬀects in the total population (θ(d), δ(d))
based on three diﬀerent estimators: (i) normalized IPW as suggested in Huber (2014a)
among the selected (`IPW w. S = 1') that controls for X but ignores selection bias, (ii)
normalized IPW based on Theorem 1 assuming MAR (`IPW MAR'), and (iii) normalized
IPW based on Theorem 3 (`IPW IV'). We estimate the treatment and selection propensity
scores by probit and apply a trimming rule that discards observations with pˆ(M,X) smaller
than 0.05 or larger than 0.95 or with pˆi(D,M,X) smaller than 0.05 to prevent exploding
weights due to small denominators. Trimming hardly aﬀects IPW estimator (i), but reduces
the variance of estimation based on Theorems 1 and 3 in several cases.
Table 3.1 reports the simulations results under α = 0.25,13 namely the bias, standard
deviation (std), and the root mean squared error (RMSE) of the various estimators for
the natural direct and indirect eﬀects in the total population. Ignoring selection (IPW w.
S = 1) yields biased estimates of the direct eﬀects under either sample size, while biases
are generally small for estimation based on Theorem 1. Interestingly, the latter result also
holds for estimation related to Theorem 3, where the selection process accounts for the
same observed factors as under the correct MAR assumption, plus the control function.
13Results are very similar when α = 0 and therefore omitted.
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Table 3.1: Simulations under selection on observables, total population
θˆ(1) θˆ(0) δˆ(1) δˆ(0)
bias std rmse bias std rmse bias std rmse bias std rmse
α = 0.25, n = 1000
IPW w. S = 1 -0.16 0.14 0.21 -0.17 0.16 0.23 -0.01 0.15 0.15 -0.02 0.11 0.12
IPW MAR 0.03 0.28 0.28 0.01 0.20 0.20 -0.03 0.13 0.14 -0.05 0.14 0.15
IPW IV -0.01 0.30 0.30 -0.02 0.31 0.31 -0.02 0.18 0.18 -0.03 0.15 0.15
α = 0.25, n = 4000
IPW w. S = 1 -0.16 0.07 0.18 -0.17 0.08 0.19 0.00 0.08 0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.06
IPW MAR 0.01 0.15 0.15 0.01 0.10 0.10 -0.02 0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.08 0.09
IPW IV -0.01 0.15 0.15 -0.02 0.16 0.16 -0.01 0.09 0.09 -0.02 0.08 0.08
Note: `std' and `rmse' report the standard deviation and root mean squared error, respectively.
Even though including the control function is not required for consistency, it does not
jeopardize identiﬁcation either, even if Assumption 7 requiring α = 0 is not satisﬁed,14
as reﬂected in the low biases. However, accounting for this unnecessary variable entails
an increase of the standard deviation in some cases. In general, the estimators based on
Theorems 1 and 3 are (due to the estimation of the sample selection propensity score)
less precise than IPW without selection correction in the selected sample. The proposed
methods become relatively more competitive in terms of the RMSE as the sample size
increases and gains in bias reduction become relatively more important compared to losses
in precision.
As a modiﬁcation to our initial setup, we introduce a correlation between U and V ,
which implies that the assumptions underlying Theorem 1 no longer hold, while those of
Theorem 2 are satisﬁed and those of Theorem 3 are satisﬁed when α = 0:(
U
V
)
∼ N (µ,Σ), where µ =
(
0
0
)
and Σ =
(
1 0.8
0.8 1
)
Table 3.2 reports the results for the estimation of natural eﬀects in the total population
under α = 0 and 0.25 using the same methods as before. Non-negligible biases occur
not only when ignoring sample selection (`IPW w. S = 1'), but also when selection is
assumed to be related to observables only (IPW MAR). When α = 0, estimation based
on Theorem 3 (IPW IV) is close to being unbiased and dominates the other methods in
14Note that in spite of α = 0.25, estimation based on (the incorrect) Theorem 3 is consistent because
the distribution of U is not associated with S conditional on D,M,X.
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Table 3.2: Simulations with selection on unobservables, total population
θˆ(1) θˆ(0) δˆ(1) δˆ(0)
bias std rmse bias std rmse bias std rmse bias std rmse
α = 0, n = 1000
IPW w. S = 1 -0.28 0.13 0.31 -0.27 0.16 0.32 0.07 0.16 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.14
IPW MAR (Th. 1) -0.09 0.30 0.31 -0.11 0.21 0.24 0.06 0.14 0.15 0.04 0.15 0.16
IPW IV (Th. 3) 0.02 0.32 0.32 -0.01 0.31 0.31 -0.02 0.18 0.18 -0.05 0.16 0.16
α = 0, n = 4000
IPW w. S = 1 -0.28 0.07 0.29 -0.28 0.08 0.29 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.11
IPW MAR (Th. 1) -0.11 0.16 0.20 -0.11 0.10 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.11
IPW IV (Th. 3) 0.01 0.17 0.17 -0.01 0.16 0.16 -0.02 0.09 0.09 -0.04 0.08 0.09
α = 0.25, n = 1000
IPW w. S = 1 -0.37 0.13 0.39 -0.35 0.15 0.38 0.05 0.16 0.16 0.07 0.12 0.14
IPW MAR (Th. 1) -0.20 0.30 0.36 -0.20 0.21 0.28 0.03 0.14 0.14 0.04 0.15 0.16
IPW IV (Th. 3) -0.14 0.32 0.34 -0.16 0.31 0.35 -0.02 0.18 0.18 -0.05 0.16 0.16
α = 0.25, n = 4000
IPW w. S = 1 -0.38 0.07 0.38 -0.36 0.08 0.36 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.11
IPW MAR (Th. 1) -0.22 0.16 0.27 -0.20 0.10 0.22 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.11
IPW IV (Th. 3) -0.14 0.16 0.22 -0.16 0.16 0.23 -0.01 0.09 0.09 -0.04 0.08 0.09
Note: `std' and `rmse' report the standard deviation and root mean squared error, respectively.
terms of RMSE under the larger sample size (n = 4000). When α = 0.25, however, also
the latter approach is biased due to the violation of Assumption 7. Therefore, Table 3.3
considers the estimation of natural eﬀects among the selected population only (θS=1(d),
δS=1(1)) in the presence of the D-U -interaction eﬀect. We investigate the performance
of estimation based on Theorem 2 (`IPW IV w. S = 1'), as well as of IPW among the
selected ignoring selection. While the latter approach is biased, the former is close to
being unbiased, but less precise. Under the larger sample size, our approach dominates
both in terms of unbiasedness and RMSE.15
Table 3.3: Simulations with selection on unobservables, selected population (S = 1)
θˆS=1(1) θˆS=1(0) δˆS=1(1) δˆS=1(0)
bias std rmse bias std rmse bias std rmse bias std rmse
α = 0.25, n = 1000
IPW w. S = 1 -0.11 0.13 0.17 -0.09 0.15 0.17 0.05 0.16 0.16 0.07 0.12 0.14
IPW IV w. S = 1 (Th. 2) 0.00 0.21 0.21 -0.03 0.23 0.23 0.02 0.17 0.17 -0.01 0.12 0.12
α = 0.25, n = 4000
IPW w. S = 1 -0.12 0.07 0.14 -0.10 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.11
IPW IV w. S = 1 (Th. 2) 0.01 0.10 0.10 -0.02 0.11 0.12 0.03 0.08 0.08 -0.00 0.06 0.06
Note: `std' and `rmse' report the standard deviation and root mean squared error, respectively.
15Results are very similar when setting α = 0 and therefore omitted.
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3.5 Empirical application
This section illustrates the evaluation of direct and indirect treatment eﬀects in the
presence of sample selection using data from Project STAR (Student-Teacher Achievement
Ratio), an educational experiment conducted from 1985 to 1989 in Tennessee, USA.
In the experiment, a cohort of students entering kindergarten and their teachers were
randomly assigned within their school to one of three class types: small (13  17 students),
regular (22  26 students), or regular with an additional teacher's aid. Students were
supposed to remain in the assigned class type through third grade, returning to regular
classes afterwards. The goal of Project STAR was to investigate the impact of class
size on academic achievement measured by standardized and curriculum-based tests in
mathematics, reading, and basic study skills. Numerous studies found positive eﬀects of
reduced class size on academic performance both short- (Folger and Breda, 1989; Finn
and Achilles, 1990; Krueger, 1999), mid- (Finn et al., 1989), long-term (Nye et al., 2001;
Krueger and Whitmore, 2001), and even on later-life outcomes (Chetty et al., 2011).
While beneﬁts of small classes are well documented, the causal mechanisms underlying
the eﬀect are less well-understood. Finn and Achilles (1990) argue that the impact is
likely driven by classroom processes related to higher teacher morale and satisfaction
translated to students, increased teacher-student interactions and time for individual
attention, and student involvement in learning activities.
We investigate whether the eﬀect of reduced class size on academic performance is
mediated by the number of days absent from school. There might be several explanations
for why class size aﬀects days of absence. A smaller concentration of children in a classroom
may be related to reduced transmission of infectious diseases and hence absenteeism.16
Increased student involvement and closer teacher-student relationships in smaller classes
may represent further channels making children and their parents more engaged and less
likely to miss classes. As for the link between school absence and academic performance,
a number of studies demonstrated a negative association between the two, see for instance
Gershenson et al. (2017), Gottfried (2009), and Morrissey et al. (2014).
We compare results using the IPW MAR estimator (`IPW MAR' in Table 3.5)
based on Theorem 1 (relying on Assumptions 1 through 4) in Section 3.2 to three
16Odongo et al. (2017) ﬁnd a positive correlation between school size and communicable disease
prevalence rates in Kenya. We are, however, not aware of any such study considering class (rather than
school) size.
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previously developed mediation estimators that ignore sample selection:17 (i) a linear
mediation estimator allowing for treatment-mediator interactions but neither accounting
for observed pre-treatment confounders, nor selection, which is numerically equivalent to
the decomposition of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) (`Lin w. S = 1, no X');18 (ii) a
semiparametric IPW-based analog of the linear mediation estimator not accounting for
confounding considered in Huber (2015) (`IPW w. S = 1, no X'); and (iii) the IPW
estimator suggested in Huber (2014a) that incorporates observed pre-treatment covariates
X but ignores sample selection when estimating the eﬀect for the total population (`IPW
w. S = 1'). We apply the same trimming rule as in the simulations presented in Section
3.4, which discards observations with treatment propensity scores pˆ(M,X) smaller than
0.05 or larger than 0.95 or with pˆi(D,M,X) smaller than 0.05. However, no observations
are dropped for any IPW method, as such extreme propensity scores do not occur in our
sample.
The treatment (D) is a binary indicator which is one if a child entering kindergarten was
enrolled in a small class and zero otherwise.19 The outcome (Y ) is the ﬁrst grade score in the
Stanford Achievement Test (SAT) in mathematics. For IPW MAR estimation, a selection
indicator S for missing outcomes is generated and all observations in our evaluation sample
are preserved, such that eﬀects are estimated for the entire population. In the case of the
remaining three estimators, the evaluation is based on the data with non-missing Y , such
that estimation relies on the selected sample only. The mediator (M) is the number of
days a child was absent during the kindergarten year. Observed covariates (X) consist
of child's race, gender, year of birth, and free lunch status as a proxy for socio-economic
status. They are controlled for in the `IPW w. S = 1' and `IPW MAR' estimators. Even
if these variables are initially balanced due to the random assignment of D, they might
confoundM and Y , implying that they are imbalanced when conditioning on the mediator
for estimating direct and indirect eﬀects.20
17We do not consider IPW IV estimation based on Theorems 2 and 3, as our data do not contain
credible instruments.
18See Huber (2015) on the equivalence of conventional wage gap decompositions and a simple mediation
model.
19Following Chetty et al. (2011), we consider regular class size with and without additional teaching
aid to be one treatment.
20For example, Ready (2010) reports a stronger negative impact of absenteeism on early literacy
outcomes for students with lower socioeconomic status, which implies that socioeconomic status and
absenteeism interact in explaining the outcome. If socioeconomic status in addition aﬀects absenteeism, it
is a confounder of the association between absenteeism and the literacy outcomes.
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We restrict the initial sample of 11,601 children to 6,325 observations who were part
of Project STAR in kindergarten such that their treatment status was observed.21 About
30% of participants in the kindergarten year were randomized into small classes. Table 3.4
presents summary statistics for the variables included in our empirical illustration for
individuals without any missing values in the covariates by treatment status (d = 0 is
for children randomized into the regular-size classes and d = 1 is for children in small
classes). It shows a positive and statistically signiﬁcant association between reduced class
size and the average score in the standardized math test. Furthermore, children in small
classes are, on average, about 0.7 days less absent and this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the
5% level. There are no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in students' gender, race,22 and
free lunch status across treatment states due to treatment randomization. The sample
is not perfectly balanced in terms of students' years of birth: children born in 1978 and
1980 are less likely to be in small classes (diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant at the
1 and 10% levels, respectively), while those born in 1979 are more likely to be in small
classes (signiﬁcant at the 5% level). There is substantial attrition: math SAT scores in
the ﬁrst grade are observed for only 70% of program participants in the kindergarten year.
The number of missing values in other key variables is much smaller. In the estimations,
observations with missing values inM or X are dropped, which concerns all in all 83 cases,
or about 1% of the sample.
Table 3.4: Mean covariate values by treatment status
Variable Total d = 0 d = 1 Diﬀerence p-value
Student's gender: male 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.00 0.96
[0.50] [0.50] [0.50] (0.01)
Student's race: white 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.01 0.42
[0.47] [0.47] [0.47] (0.02)
Free lunch 0.48 0.49 0.47 -0.02 0.25
[0.50] [0.50] [0.50] (0.02)
Born 1978 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
[0.08] [0.09] [0.05] (0.00)
Born 1979 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.03 0.04
[0.42] [0.42] [0.43] (0.01)
Continued on next page
215,276 students joined the program in subsequent years. About 2,200 entered the experiment in the
ﬁrst grade, 1,600 in the second and 1,200 in the third grade.
22Less than 1% of students in the sample are Asian, Hispanic, Native American or other race. In our
analysis, they are included in one group with black students.
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Table 3.4  continued from previous page
Variable Total d = 0 d = 1 Diﬀerence p-value
Born 1980 0.76 0.77 0.74 -0.02 0.09
[0.43] [0.42] [0.44] (0.01)
Born 1981 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] (0.00)
Kindergarten days absent 10.51 10.72 10.01 -0.71 0.02
[9.76] [9.95] [9.29] (0.31)
Math SAT grade 1 534.54 531.52 541.25 9.73 0.00
[43.83] [42.92] [45.10] (2.14)
Note: Standard deviations are in squared brackets. Cluster-robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
Table 3.5 provides point estimates (`est.'), cluster-robust standard errors (`s.e.') based
on blockbootstrapping the eﬀects 1999 times, and p-values for the total treatment eﬀect, as
well as natural direct and indirect eﬀects under treatment and non-treatment (θˆ(1), θˆ(0),
δˆ(1), δˆ(0)) for the four estimators.
Table 3.5: Eﬀects of small class size in kindergarten on the math SAT in grade 1
Total eﬀect θˆ(1) θˆ(0) δˆ(1) δˆ(0)
est. s.e. p-val est. s.e. p-val est. s.e. p-val est. s.e. p-val est. s.e. p-val
IPW MAR 8.74 2.37 0.00 8.52 2.36 0.00 7.75 2.70 0.00 0.99 0.79 0.21 0.23 0.13 0.09
Lin w. S = 1, no X 9.73 2.16 0.00 9.46 2.17 0.00 9.55 2.15 0.00 0.27 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.16
IPW w. S = 1, no X 9.73 2.16 0.00 9.55 2.15 0.00 9.43 2.18 0.00 0.30 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.15
IPW w. S = 1 9.20 2.14 0.00 9.01 2.14 0.00 8.77 2.19 0.00 0.43 0.32 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.18
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors (`s.e.') and p-values (`p-val') for the point estimates (`est.') are
obtained by bootstrapping the latter 1999 times.
The total average eﬀect of small class assignment is very similar across all the
methods and highly statistically signiﬁcant, amounting to an increase of almost 10 points.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that if anything, the contribution of the indirect eﬀects due to
reduced days of absence is positive, but rather modest, ranging 0.18 to 0.99 points across
diﬀerent methods and treatment states. The IPW MAR estimator yields the largest
indirect eﬀects (amounting to 3  11% of the total eﬀect), and the indirect eﬀect on the
non-treated group is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. It is thus the direct eﬀects,
which are highly statistically signiﬁcant for any method, that mostly drive the total
eﬀect. IPW MAR yields direct eﬀect estimates of 8.52 points under treatment and 7.75
points under non-treatment, which is slightly smaller than those of the other estimators
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exploiting the subsample with non-missing outcomes only (ranging from 9.01 to 9.55
points under treatment and from 8.77 to 9.55 points under non-treatment). We therefore
conclude that causal mechanisms not observed in the data (possibly including teacher
motivation and individual teacher-student interaction) and entering the direct eﬀect are
much more important than absenteeism for explaining the eﬀect of small kindergarten
classes on math performance.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an approach for disentangling a total causal eﬀect into a
direct component and a indirect eﬀect operating through a mediator in the presence of
outcome attrition or sample selection. To this end, we combined sequential conditional
independence assumptions about the assignment of the treatment and the mediator with
either selection on observables/missing at random or instrumental variable assumptions
on the outcome attrition process. We demonstrated the identiﬁcation of the parameters
of interest based on inverse probability weighting by speciﬁc treatment, mediator, and/or
selection propensity scores and outlined estimation based on the sample analogs of these
results. We also provided a brief simulation study and an empirical illustration based on
the Project STAR experiment in the U.S. to evaluate the direct and indirect eﬀects of
small classes in kindergarten on math test scores in ﬁrst grade.
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Chapter 4
On the Sensitivity of Wage Gap Decompositions
4.1 Introduction1
A vast empirical literature is concerned with the analysis and decomposition of gender wage
gaps. Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) (see also Duncan, 1967) suggested a linear method
allowing disentangling the total gap into an explained part that is linked to diﬀerences in
observed characteristics, for instance education, and an unexplained part that is linked to
unobserved factors, for instance discrimination. Several studies proposed non-parametric
decomposition methods dropping the linearity assumptions, see for instance DiNardo et al.
(1996), Barsky et al. (2002), Frolich (2007), Mora (2008), and Nopo (2008). Finally,
another branch of the literature suggested decomposition methods at quantiles (rather
than means) of the wage distribution, see for instance Juhn et al. (1993), DiNardo et al.
(1996), Machado and Mata (2005), Melly (2005), Firpo et al. (2007), Chernozhukov et al.
(2009), and Firpo et al. (2009).
The aforementioned methods ignore the potential endogeneity of the observed
characteristics, which are typically `bad controls' in the sense of Angrist and Pischke
(2009) as they are determined later in life, i.e. after gender. This implies that the
explained and unexplained parts do not correspond to the true causal mechanisms related
to observed and unobserved factors, respectively, through which gender inﬂuences wage.
For this reason, policy conclusions  for instance about the magnitude of discrimination 
are diﬃcult to derive from such conventional decompositions, see Kunze (2008), Huber
(2015), and Yamaguchi (2014) for related criticisms. Using an approach that comes from
the literature on nonparametric causal mediation analysis (see for instance Robins and
Greenland, 1992 and Pearl, 2001), Huber (2015) controls for observed confounders at
birth as one possible approach to improve upon the endogeneity issue. However, a further
threat to identiﬁcation is sample selection (see Heckman, 1976b and Heckman, 1979) due
1This essay was written in co-authorship with Martin Huber. It was released as a SES Working paper,
University of Fribourg (Huber and Solovyeva, 2018b).
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to the fact that wages are only observed for those who work. For this reason, Neuman
and Oaxaca (2003) and Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) combine classic decompositions
with Heckman-type sample selection correction.2 Alternatively, Maasoumi and Wang
(2016) apply the copula approach of Arellano and Bonhomme (2010) to model the joint
distribution of the quantile of the wage distribution and selection. In the presence of
panel data, Blau and Kahn (2006) and Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008)3 consider proxying
non-observed wages by the observed wage in the closest period.4 Finally, few studies aim
at controlling for both endogeneity and sample selection. Garcia et al. (2001) combine
instrumental variable regression to control for the endogeneity of one of the observed
characteristics (education) with Heckman-type sample selection correction in a parametric
framework. The more ﬂexible causal mediation method by Huber and Solovyeva (2018a)
aims at tackling endogeneity by conditioning on observed potential confounders and
sample selection by controlling for the selection probability based on observables and/or
instruments.
In this paper, we investigate the sensitivity of average wage gap decompositions to
various methods ignoring and considering endogeneity and sample selection, to provide
insights on the robustness of decompositions across identifying assumptions. To this
end, we consider US wage data collected in the year 2000 coming from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY). The latter is a panel study of young
individuals in the US aged 14 to 22 years in 1979. The analysed estimators include the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition; semiparametric inverse probability weighting (IPW, see
Hirano et al., 2003), which eases linearity but ignores endogeneity and sample selection
just as the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition; IPW controlling for potential confounders at
birth to mitigate endogeneity as in Huber (2015) but ignoring sample selection; and the
approaches proposed in Huber and Solovyeva (2018a) to tackle both endogeneity and
sample selection.
We ﬁnd that the explained and unexplained wage gap components are generally
not stable across methods. Even the total gap estimates diﬀer non-negligibly between
methods ignoring and controlling for sample selection. Although we do not claim that
2See also the method of Machado (2017), which permits arbitrary unobserved heterogeneity in the
selection process.
3Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) also estimate the Manski bounds (Manski, 1989) on the distribution
of wages, using the actual and the imputed wage distributions. Bicakova (2014) derives bounds on gender
unemployment gaps.
4As an alternative use of panel data, Lemieux (1998) combines ﬁxed eﬀect estimation with
decomposition methods and allows for heterogeneity of the return to ﬁxed eﬀects across groups. However,
this strategy depends on individuals switching groups, which is rarely the case for gender.
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any of the estimators is capable of fully tackling identiﬁcation concerns, our results
cast doubts about the usefulness of standard decompositions used in the vast majority
of empirical studies, which ignore endogeneity and sample selection altogether. We
also investigate the robustness of our ﬁndings w.r.t. the deﬁnition of the observed
characteristics. In our main speciﬁcation, we include both levels as well as histories of
such characteristics (e.g., current occupation as well as years in current occupation). In
a robustness check, we only keep the levels and omit histories (as it appears to be the
convention in many decompositions) and ﬁnd this to reduce the explained and increase
the unexplained component across our estimators. In light of the sensitivity of some
of our results w.r.t. methods and variable deﬁnitions, we advise caution when basing
policy recommendations (which typically require a proper identiﬁcation of the causal
mechanisms underlying the wage gap) on the outcomes of wage decompositions. This
seems important given that the empirical literature on wage decompositions appears to
have paid comparably little attention to identiﬁcation issues that may jeopardize the
interpretability of the parameters of interest.
Goraus et al. (2015) provide a further study systematically investigating the robustness
of wage gap decompositions across speciﬁcations, considering the Polish Labor Force
Survey. The authors compare estimates of the unexplained component across parametric
and nonparametric methods for both means and quantiles. They also analyze issues of
common support (or overlap) in observed characteristics across females and males and
selection into employment based on Heckman-type sample selection corrections. Their
results suggest that enforcing versus not enforcing common support in the characteristics
has a non-negligible impact on the estimates. Also our IPW procedures enforce common
support by speciﬁc trimming rules to ensure the comparability of observations across
gender and employment states in terms of observables. The sample selection corrections,
on the other hand, barely aﬀect estimates of the unexplained component in Goraus et al.
(2015). We also ﬁnd that our weighting-based sample selection corrections change the
unexplained component moderately when compared to IPW controlling for potential
confounders alone, while more variation is observed for the total wage gap and the
explained component. We point out that one major distinction of our study and Goraus
et al. (2015) is that they do not consider methods that control for confounders at birth to
tackle the endogeneity of the observed characteristics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 formally discusses the
econometric parameters of interest and the identifying assumptions required for the various
methods considered to consistently decompose wage gaps into observed and unobserved
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causal mechanisms. Section 4.3 discusses the NLSY data, sample deﬁnition, and descriptive
statistics. Section 4.4 presents and interprets the estimation results. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Identiﬁcation
Fortin et al. (2011) pointed out that while it is standard in econometrics to ﬁrst discuss
identiﬁcation and then introduce appropriate estimators, most studies in the ﬁeld of wage
gap decompositions jump directly to estimation without clarifying identiﬁcation ﬁrst. Here,
we ﬁrst deﬁne what, in our opinion, should be the parameters of interest to be able to derive
useful policy recommendations. To this end, letG denote a binary group dummy for gender,
Y the outcome of interest (e.g., log wage) and X the vector of observed characteristics (e.g.,
education, work experience, occupation, industry, and others). We assume that G causally
precedes X, which appears intuitive, as gender is determined even prior to birth, while X is
determined by decisions later in life. G might inﬂuence Y `indirectly' via its eﬀect on X, i.e.
by a causal mechanism related to observed characteristics. For instance, gender may have
an eﬀect on wage because females and males select themselves into diﬀerent occupations.
G might aﬀect Y also `directly', i.e. through factors not observed by the researcher, such
that they do not appear in X. For instance, gender could have an impact on the perception
of individual traits by decision makers in the labor market (see Greiner and Rubin, 2011),
which in turn may entail discriminatory behavior. A graphical representation of this causal
framework is given in Figure 4.1, where arrows represent causal eﬀects: G inﬂuences Y
either through X or `directly'.
 
G 
X 
Y 
Figure 4.1: A graphical representation of the decomposition under Assumption 1
For a formal deﬁnition of the causal mechanisms running through observed
characteristics X and unobserved factors as parameters of interest, we denote by Y (g)
and X(g) the potential outcomes and characteristics when exogenously setting gender G
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to a speciﬁc g, with g ∈ {1, 0}.5 E(X(1)) − E(X(0)) gives the average causal eﬀect of G
on X (represented by the arrow of G to X in Figure 4.1), so to speak the `ﬁrst stage'
of the indirect eﬀect. E(Y (1)) − E(Y (0)), on the other hand, gives the total average
causal eﬀect of G on Y , represented by the sum of direct and indirect (i.e. operating
through X) eﬀects. Following the causal mediation literature (see Robins and Greenland,
1992 and Pearl, 2001), we further reﬁne the potential outcome notation to be able
to distinguish between the causal mechanisms in Figure 4.1: Let Y (g) = Y (g,X(g)),
to make explicit that the potential outcome is aﬀected by the group variable both
directly and indirectly via X(g). This permits rewriting the total eﬀect of G on Y as
E(Y (1)) − E(Y (0)) = E[Y (1, X(1))] − E[Y (0, X(0))] and more importantly, it allows
disentangling the latter into the causal mechanisms of interest. That is, the diﬀerence
in potential outcomes due to a switch from X(1) to X(0) while keeping gender ﬁxed
at G = 1 yields the indirect eﬀect denoted by ψ, while varying gender and ﬁxing
characteristics at X(0) gives the direct eﬀect η. Both together add up to the total causal
eﬀect:
E[Y (1, X(1))]− E[Y (0, X(0))] = E[Y (1, X(1))]− E[Y (1, X(0))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ
+
E[Y (1, X(0))]− E[Y (0, X(0))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
η
. (4.1)
We now introduce the ﬁrst identifying assumption considered in our empirical analysis,
which rules out endogeneities of G,X and sample selection issues.
Assumption 1 (sequential independence):
(a) {Y (g′, x), X(g)}⊥G for all g′, g ∈ {0, 1} and x in the support of X,
(b) Y (g′, x)⊥X|G = g for all g′, g ∈ {0, 1} and x in the support of X,
(c) Y (g,X) is linear X for g ∈ {0, 1},
(d) Pr(G = 1|X = x) > 0 for all x in the support of X,
where `⊥' denotes statistical independence. Under Assumption 1(a), G is as good as
randomly assigned, i.e. there are no factors confounding G on the one hand and Y and/or
X on the other hand. Under Assumption 1(b), observed characteristics like education are
as good as randomly assigned within gender, i.e. given G, so that there are no factors
confounding X and Y . Assumption 1(c) imposes potential outcomes to be linear in X.
5See for instance Rubin (1974) for an introduction to the potential outcome framework.
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Finally, Assumption 1(d) is a common support restriction. It implies that the conditional
probability (the so-called propensity score) to belong to the reference group (G = 1), e.g.,
males, is larger than zero for any value in the support of X, such that for each female
observation (G = 0), there exists a male who is comparable w.r.t. X.
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition consistently estimates ψ and η under Assumptions
1(a)-1(c). To see this, note that under Assumption 1(a), E(X(g)) = E(X|G = g). Under
Assumptions 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c), E[Y (g, x)] = E(Y |G = g,X = x) = cg + xβg, where cg
denotes a gender-speciﬁc constant and βg denotes a vector of gender-speciﬁc coeﬃcients
on X in the respective female or male population. Finally, by iterated expectations,
E[Y (g,X(g′))] = cg + E(X|G = g′)βg for g, g′ ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore,
ψ = E[Y (1, X(1))]− E[Y (1, X(0))] = [E(X|G = 1)− E(X|G = 0)]β1, (4.2)
η = E[Y (1, X(0))]− E[Y (0, X(0))] = c1 − c0 + E(X|G = 0)(β1 − β0). (4.3)
The left hand expressions in (4.2) and (4.3) correspond to the probability limits
of the explained and unexplained components, respectively, in the Oaxaca-Blinder
decompositions. For (4.2) and (4.3) to hold, Assumptions 1(a) and 1(b) could be relaxed
to mean independence, while full independence needs to be maintained for decompositions
of quantiles.6
Nonparametric approaches do not rely on the linearity assumption 1(c), but instead
require common support as postulated in Assumption 1(d). This becomes obvious from
considering the denominators of the following expressions based on inverse probability
weighting (IPW) by the propensity score, which identify the parameters of interest as
discussed in Huber (2015):
ψ = E
[
Y ·G
Pr(G = 1)
]
− E
[
Y ·G
Pr(G = 1|X) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X)
1− Pr(G = 1)
]
, (4.4)
η = E
[
Y ·G
Pr(G = 1|X) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X)
1− Pr(G = 1)
]
− E
[
Y · (1−G)
1− Pr(G = 1)
]
. (4.5)
(4.5) is identical to the identiﬁcation result for the average treatment eﬀect on the
non-treated (see Hirano et al., 2003 for IPW-based treatment evaluation in subgroups
based on reweighting), even though the causal framework diﬀers. In classic treatment
evaluation, one typically controls for pre-treatment (or pre-group) variables to tackle the
6However, analogous results to (4.2) and (4.3) cannot be applied to quantile decompositions, because
the law of iterated expectations does not apply, see Fortin et al. (2011).
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endogeneity of the treatment (or group). Here, X are post-group variables such that
conditioning allows separating the indirect causal mechanism via X from the direct one
related to unobservables. Obviously, this is only feasible if neither G nor X given G are
endogenous as postulated in Assumption 1. In the empirical application presented in
Section 4.4, we consider both the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and estimation based on
the sample analogues of (4.4) and (4.5).
In a next step, we ease Assumption 1 by assuming that the identifying restrictions
need not hold unconditionally but conditional on a set of observed covariates measured
at birth and denoted by W . This allows for endogeneity of X, as long as it can be
tackled by W . The dashed arrow going from W to G in Figure 4.2 even points to the
possibility of an endogenous G. This may appear unnecessary when assuming gender to
be randomly assigned by nature. However, speciﬁc interventions like selective abortions
could in principle jeopardize randomization, which is permitted in Assumption 2 below as
long as W captures all confounding.
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Figure 4.2: A graphical representation of the decomposition under Assumption 2
Assumption 2 (sequential conditional independence):
(a) {Y (g′, x), X(g)}⊥G|W for all g′, g ∈ {0, 1} and x in the support of X,
(b) Y (g′, x)⊥X|G = g,W = w for all g′, g ∈ {0, 1} and x,w in the support of X,W ,
(c) Pr(G = 1|X = x,W = w) > 0 and 0 < Pr(G = 1|W = w) < 1 for all x,w in the
support of X,W .
Identical or similar conditions as Assumption 2 have been frequently applied in the
literature on causal mediation analysis, see for instance Pearl (2001), and Imai et al.
(2010). Assumptions 2(a) and (b) imply that after controlling for W , no unobserved
variables confound either G and Y , G and X, or X and Y given G. Assumption 2(c)
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is a reﬁned common support restriction, requiring that the conditional probability of
belonging to the reference group given X,W is larger than zero, while the conditional
probability given W must neither be zero nor one. The latter implies that for each female
in the population, there exists a comparable observation in terms of W among males and
vice versa. Under Assumption 2, it follows from the results of IPW-based identiﬁcation of
direct and indirect eﬀects in Huber (2014a) that
ψ = E
[
Y ·G
Pr(G = 1|W )
]
− E
[
Y ·G
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X,W )
1− Pr(G = 1|W )
]
, (4.6)
η = E
[
Y ·G
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X,W )
1− Pr(G = 1|W )
]
− E
[
Y · (1−G)
1− Pr(G = 1|W )
]
. (4.7)
Estimation of (ethnic) wage gaps based on (4.6) and (4.7) has been considered in Huber
(2015), and is also among the methods investigated in our empirical application presented
further below.
The approaches discussed so far abstract from sample selection stemming from the fact
that wages are only observed for individuals in employment and that the decision to work
is unlikely to be random. However, the previous sets of assumptions, even if satisﬁed in the
total population, do not hold in the working subpopulation if selection into employment is
related to factors that also aﬀect the outcome, for instance, ability. To improve upon this
problem both notationally and methodologically, we introduce a binary selection indicator
S which is equal to one if an individual is employed, such that the wage outcome Y is
observed in the data and zero otherwise. We maintain that G,X,W are observed for all
individuals and note that each of these variables might aﬀect S, which can be considered
as yet another outcome variable.
Using the results of Huber and Solovyeva (2018a), one may combine Assumption 2
with speciﬁc restrictions on the nature of selection into employment. The ﬁrst approach
of Huber and Solovyeva (2018a) assumes selection to be related to the observed variables
G,X,W only.
Assumption 3 (Selection on observables):
(a) Y⊥S|G = g,X = x,W = w for all g ∈ {0, 1} and x,w in the support of X,W ,
(b) Pr(S = 1|G = g,X = x,W = w) > 0 for all g ∈ {0, 1} and x,w in the support of
X,W .
By Assumption 3(a), there are no unobservables confounding S and Y conditional on
G,X,W , so that outcomes are missing at random (MAR) in the denomination of Rubin
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(1976). The common support restriction implies that conditional on the values of G,X,W
in their joint support, the probability to be observed is larger than zero; otherwise, no
outcome is observed for some speciﬁc combinations of these variables and identiﬁcation
fails. Figure 4.3 presents a graphical illustration of the decomposition with selection on
observables.
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Figure 4.3: A graphical representation of the decomposition under Assumption 3
Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the parameters of interest are identiﬁed by the following
IPW expression, which ﬁts the general framework of IPW-based M-estimation of missing
data models in Wooldridge (2002):
ψ = E
[
Y ·G · S
Pr(G = 1|W ) · Pr(S = 1|G,X,W )
]
− E
[
Y ·G · S
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) · Pr(S = 1|G,X,W ) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X,W )
1− Pr(G = 1|W )
]
, (4.8)
η = E
[
Y ·G · S
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) · Pr(S = 1|G,X,W ) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X,W )
1− Pr(G = 1|W )
]
− E
[
Y · (1−G) · S
(1− Pr(G = 1|W )) · Pr(S = 1|G,X,W )
]
. (4.9)
Alternatively to Assumption 3, Huber and Solovyeva (2018a) present a control function
approach for the case that selection is related to unobservables aﬀecting the outcome. This
requires an instrument for selection, denoted by Z, which aﬀects selection but is not directly
associated with the outcome. Figure 4.4 provides a graphical representation of mediation
with selection on unobservables and an instrument for selection. E , V , and U denote
88
unobserved variables that aﬀect the instrument for selection Z, the selection indicator S,
and the outcome Y , respectively.
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Figure 4.4: A graphical representation of the decomposition under Assumption 4
Assumption 4 (Instrument for selection):
a) There exists an instrument Z that may be a function of G,X, i.e. Z = Z(G,X), is
conditionally correlated with S, i.e. E[Z · S|G,X,W ] 6= 0, and satisﬁes (i) Y (g, x, z) =
Y (g, x) and (ii) {Y (g, x), X(g′)}⊥Z(g′′, x′)|W = w for all g, g′, g′′ ∈ {0, 1} and z, x, x′, w in
the support of Z,X,W ,
(b) S = I{V ≤ Π(G,X,W,Z)}, where Π is a general function and V is a scalar (index of)
unobservable(s) with a strictly monotonic cumulative distribution function conditional on
W ,
(c) V⊥(G,X,Z)|W ,
(d) E[Y (1, x) − Y (0, x)|W = w, V = v, S = 1] = E[Y (1, x) − Y (0, x)|W = w, V = v]
and E[Y (g,X(1))− Y (g,X(0))|W = w, V = v, S = 1] = E[Y (g,X(1))− Y (g,X(0))|W =
w, V = v], for all g ∈ {0, 1} and x,w, v in the support of X,W, V ,
(e) Pr(G = 1|X = x,W = w, p(Q) = p(q)) > 0, 0 < Pr(G = 1|W = w, p(Q) = p(q)) < 1,
and p(q) > 0 for all g ∈ {0, 1} and x,w, z in the support of X,W,Z.
In contrast to Assumption 3(a), the unobservable V in the selection equation is now allowed
to be associated with unobservables U aﬀecting the outcome. Therefore, the distribution
of V generally diﬀers across values of G,X conditional on W , which entails confounding.
Identiﬁcation hinges on exogenous shifts in the conditional selection probability p(Q) =
Pr(S = 1|G,X,W,Z) based on instrument Z, with Q = (G,X,W,Z) for the sake of
brevity. By using p(Q) as additional control variable in the decompositions, one controls
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for the distribution of V and thus, for the confounding associations of V with (i) G and
{Y (g, x), X(g′)} and (ii) X and Y (g, x) that occur conditional on S = 1.
Z and S have to satisfy particular conditions. Z must not aﬀect Y or be associated
with unobservables aﬀecting X or Y conditional on W , as invoked in Assumption 4(a).
By the threshold crossing model in Assumption 4(b), p(Q) identiﬁes the distribution
function of V given W . Assumption 4(c) implies the (nonparametric) identiﬁcation of the
distribution of V , as the latter is independent of (G,X,Z) given W . Assumption 4(d)
imposes homogeneity of the observed and unobserved causal mechanisms across employed
and non-employed populations conditional on W,V . Without this restriction, wage
decompositions can merely be conducted for the employed but not the total population, as
eﬀects might be heterogeneous in unobservables, see also the discussion in Newey (2007).
A suﬃcient condition for eﬀect homogeneity in unobservables is separability of observed
and unobserved components in the outcome variable, i.e. Y = η(G,X,W ) + ν(U), where
η, ν are general functions and U is a scalar or vector of unobservables. Finally, the ﬁrst
part of Assumption 4(e) strengthens the previous common support assumption 2(c) to
also hold when including p(Q) as additional control variable. The second part requires
the selection probability p(Q) to be larger than zero for any combination of values in the
support of G,X,W,Z to ensure that outcomes are observed for all values occurring in
the population. Under Assumptions 2 and 4, the causal mechanisms are identiﬁed by the
following expressions:
ψ = E
[
Y ·G · S
Pr(G = 1|W, p(Q)) · p(Q)
]
− E
[
Y ·G · S
Pr(G = 1|X,W, p(Q)) · p(Q) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X,W, p(Q))
1− Pr(G = 1|W, p(Q))
]
, (4.10)
η = E
[
Y ·G · S
Pr(G = 1|X,W, p(Q)) · p(Q) ·
1− Pr(G = 1|X,W, p(Q))
1− Pr(G = 1|W, p(Q))
]
− E
[
Y · (1−G) · S
(1− Pr(G = 1|W, p(Q))) · p(Q)
]
. (4.11)
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4.3 Data
Our data come from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), a panel
survey of young individuals who were aged 14 to 22 years at the ﬁrst wave in 1979.7
Conducted annually until 1994, it then became biannual. The data contain a wealth of
individual characteristics, including rich information relevant for labor market decisions,
such as education, occupation, work experience and more. We estimate decompositions
for wages reported in the year 2000 when respondents were 35  43 years old. After
excluding 1,351 observations from the total NLSY79 sample in 2000 due to various data
issues,8 our evaluation sample consists of 6,658 individuals (3,162 men and 3,496 women).
Table A4.1 in Appendix 4 provides descriptive statistics (mean values, mean diﬀerences,
and respective p-values based on two-sample t-tests) for the key variables in our analysis.
The group variable G is equal to zero for female and one for male respondents, such that
male wages are regarded as reference wages, as it is frequently the case in the decomposition
literature.9 The outcome variable of interest (Y ) is the log average hourly wage in the past
calendar year reported in 2000. The selection indicator S is equal to one for individuals
who indicated to have worked at least 1,000 hours in the past calendar year. This is the
case for 87% of males and 70% of females.
The set of post-group characteristics X, which potentially mediate the eﬀect of gender
on wages, consists of individual variables reported in or constructed with reference to
1998: marital status, years in marriage, the region of residence and how many years
an individual has been residing in that region, an indicator for living in an urban area
(SMSA) and the number of years living in an urban area, education level, indicators for
the year when ﬁrst worked, number of jobs ever had, tenure with the current employer
(in weeks), industry and the number of years working there, occupation and the number
7The NLSY79 data consist of three independent probability samples: a cross-sectional sample (6,111
subjects, or 48%) representing the non-institutionalized civilian youth; a supplemental sample (42%)
oversampling civilian Hispanic, black, and economically disadvantaged nonblack/non-Hispanic young
people; and a military sample (10%) comprised of youth serving in the military as of September 30,
1978 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, 2001).
8Speciﬁcally, we excluded 502 persons who reported to have worked 1,000 hours or more in the past
calendar year, but whose average hourly wages in the past calendar year were either missing or equal to
zero. We also dropped 54 working individuals with average hourly wages of less than $1 in the past calendar
year. Furthermore, 608 observations with missing values in mediators (see Table A4.1 in Appendix 4 for
the full list of mediators) and 186 observations with missing values in the instruments for selection  the
number of young children and the employment status of the respondent's mother back when the respondent
was 14 years old  were excluded.
9We refer to Sloczynski (2013) for a discussion of reference group choice in the potential outcome
framework.
91
of years working in that occupation, whether employed in 1998 and total years of
employment. Further characteristics are the form of employment (whether full-time),
the share of full-time employment in employment years in 199498, total weeks of
employment, the number of weeks unemployed and the number of weeks out of the labor
force, and whether health problems prevented work. Moreover, several higher-order
(squared and cubed) and interaction terms are included to make the propensity score
speciﬁcation more ﬂexible. p-values of the two-sample t-tests in Table A4.1 in Appendix 4
reveal that women in our sample diﬀer signiﬁcantly (at the 5% level) from men in a range
of variables. For instance, males have on average more labor market experience, while
females have a higher average level of education. Important diﬀerences also arise in other
factors related to labor market performance (e.g., industry, occupation, employment form,
etc.).
Although X includes and even surpasses the set of variables conventionally used in wage
decompositions, further potentially important characteristics mediating the eﬀect of gender
on wage are not considered. For instance, risk preferences, attitudes towards competition
and negotiations, and other socio-psychological factors (see Bertrand 2011 and Azmat
and Petrongolo 2014) are not available in our data. Their eﬀects thus contribute to the
unexplained component.
Potential confounders W related to factors determined at or prior to birth include
race, religion, year of birth, birth order, parental place of birth (in the US or abroad),
and parental education. We acknowledge that further confounders not available in our
data but correlated with G, X, and/or Y likely exist. For instance, see Cobb-Clark
(2016) for a review of biological factors, such as sensory functioning (e.g., time-space
perceptions), emotions, and levels of sex hormones, potentially linking gender with
labor market behavior and outcomes. In particular, some studies relate higher levels of
prenatal testosterone to stronger preference for risk (Garbarino et al., 2011) and sorting
into traditionally male-dominated occupations (Manning et al. 2010 and Nye and Orel
2015). Therefore, we do not claim that controlling for W fully tackles endogeneity
bias. Nevertheless, we are interested in the sensitivity of decompositions w.r.t. to the
inclusion and exclusion of W , even if these variables only comprise a subset of the actual
confounders.
Finally, we deﬁne the number of children in 1999 younger than 6 and 15 years old,
respectively, as instruments Z for selection into our employment indicator S. Such
instruments based on the number of children in a household have been widely used as
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instruments for labor supply in the empirical labor market literature, see for instance
Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008). We, however, note that the validity of this approach
is not undisputed, as the number of children might be correlated with unobservables
also aﬀecting the wage outcome, like relative preference for family and working life. For
this reason, Huber and Mellace (2014) provided a method to partially test instrument
validity, namely a joint test for the exclusion restriction and additive separability of
the unobservable V in the selection equation. They applied them to children-based
instruments for female labor supply in four data sets but found no statistical evidence for
the violation of the IV assumptions. As a word of caution, however, their tests cannot
detect all possible violations of instrument validity even asymptotically, as they rely
on a partial identiﬁcation approach. Even though concerns about the instruments may
therefore remain, it is our aim to verify how sensitive decompositions are across diﬀerent
methods, also w.r.t. modelling selection based on instruments commonly used in the
literature. In a robustness check, we consider an indicator for the respondent's mother
working for pay back when the respondent was 14 years old as an additional instrument
for selection. This, however, yields very similar point estimates based on (4.10) and (4.11)
as when using the children-based instruments alone, see the discussion below.
4.4 Empirical results
We decompose the gender wage gap based on the ﬁve approaches outlined in Section 4.2.
Table 4.1 provides the estimated eﬀects (est.) along with standards errors (s.e.) and
p-values (p-val) using 999 bootstrap replications. It also shows the shares (% tot.) of the
explained and unexplained components in the total gender wage gap. The last two columns
(Trimmed obs., %) indicate, respectively, the number and the share of units dropped in the
IPW estimations due to a trimming rule that discards observations with extreme propensity
scores larger than 0.99 and/or smaller than 0.01. This is done to prevent the assignment
of very large weights to speciﬁc observations (due to small denominators in IPW) as a
consequence of insuﬃcient common support across gender or selection into employment.
Our main speciﬁcation includes the full list of post-group characteristics (X) presented
in Table A4.1 in in Appendix 4 as well as several higher-order and interaction terms.10
10The included higher-order terms are marriage history squared and cubed, tenure squared and cubed,
and years in current occupation squared and cubed. The interaction terms are between binary indicators
for region in 1998 and urban residency, ﬁrst job before 1975, ﬁrst job in 1976-79, industry indicators, and
employment in 1998; between education indicators and occupation indicators, years in current occupation,
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The standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca-Bl.) based on (4.2) and (4.3) as
well as IPW (IPW no W ) based on (4.4) and (4.5) invoke Assumption 1 and thus neither
control for the potential endogeneity of X nor for selection. Therefore, estimations are
conducted in the subsample with S = 1. Under Assumption 2, IPW is based on (4.6)
and (4.7) and includes potential confounders W listed in Table A4.1 in Appendix 4 (IPW
with W ) to tackle endogeneity. Under Assumption 3, IPW based on (4.8) and (4.9) uses
these covariates to control for both endogeneity and selection (IPW MAR). Finally, under
Assumption 4, IPW based on (4.10) and (4.11) in addition utilizes a combination of the
number of children younger than 6 and 15 years old as instruments (Z) for selection into
employment (IPW IV).
Table 4.1: Gender wage gap decomposition based on NLSY79: main speciﬁcation
Total gap in log wages Explained (Indirect) Unexplained (Direct) Trimmed
est. s.e. p-val est. s.e. p-val % tot. est. s.e. p-val % tot. obs. %
Oaxaca-Bl. 0.299 0.019 0.000 0.083 0.021 0.000 28% 0.215 0.024 0.000 72% 0 0%
IPW no W 0.293 0.019 0.000 0.118 0.030 0.000 40% 0.176 0.031 0.000 60% 28 0%
IPW with W 0.264 0.017 0.000 0.096 0.028 0.001 36% 0.168 0.030 0.000 64% 28 0%
IPW MAR 0.365 0.035 0.000 0.219 0.033 0.000 60% 0.147 0.035 0.000 40% 90 1%
IPW IV 0.141 0.324 0.665 -0.005 0.102 0.964 -3% 0.145 0.328 0.658 103% 584 9%
Notes: Standard errors and p-values are estimated based on 999 bootstrap replications. The trimming
rule discards observations with propensity scores (speciﬁc to each estimator) below 0.01 or above 0.99.
When applying the classic Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, 28% (0.083) of the total
gender wage gap11 of 0.299 is attributed to diﬀerences in the included post-group
characteristics X, while about 72% (0.215) remains unexplained. All estimates are highly
statistically signiﬁcant.12 In contrast to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, IPW without
W does not impose linearity of Y in X given G but instead requires an estimate of the
propensity score Pr(G = 1|X), which is obtained by logit regression. Figures A4.1 to A4.9
and Tables A4.2 and A4.3 in Appendix 4 present, respectively, histograms and summary
statistics (minimum, mean, and maximum) of the within-group propensity scores used in
our IPW-based estimations.13 Figure A4.1 suggests a decent overlap in the distribution of
and the employment indicator 1998; and between tenure and the urban indicator, occupation indicators,
years in current occupation, and the full-time employment indicator in 1998.
11Among the methods considered, the diﬀerences in the estimates of the total wage gap are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10% level between the Oaxaca-Blinder and the IPW MAR estimators, Oaxaca-Blinder
and IPW IV, IPW without and with controlling for W , IPW without W and IPW IV, and IPW MAR
and IPW IV.
12The regression-based Oaxaca-Blinder estimator does not rely on common support, see the discussion
in Section 4.2, and therefore does not require trimming observations with extreme propensity score values.
13Table A4.5 in Appendix 4 additionally provides the number and the share of trimmed observations
for each propensity score.
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estimates of Pr(G = 1|X), implying common support in observed characteristics across
females and males over most of the support of X. Applying a trimming rule that excludes
observations with propensity scores below 0.01, we drop 28 units from the sample.
Compared to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, the explained component is slightly
larger and the unexplained component is somewhat smaller, while total wage gap remains
almost unchanged. For IPW including potential confounders W , Figures A4.2 and A4.3
in Appendix 4 display the histograms of the logit-based estimates of Pr(G = 1|W ) and
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) and point to decent common support w.r.t. either propensity score.
Therefore, (only) the same 28 observations as for IPW are without controls dropped
from the sample. Controlling for W leads to moderately smaller estimates of the total
wage gap as well as the explained and unexplained components when compared to IPW
without controls.
IPW MAR relies on estimating the selection propensity score Pr(S = 1|G,X,W )
to control for the employment decision based on observables, again by logit regression.
Figure A4.6 in Appendix 4 presents histograms of estimated selection probabilities for
individuals who worked less than 1,000 hours in the past calendar year (S = 0) and
those who worked 1,000 hours or more (S = 1). We note that the selection probability
is close to zero for a subset of individuals but clearly larger than zero for most of the
sample. 90 (1%) observations are dropped from estimation, once the additional condition
that selection propensity scores must not be smaller than 0.01 is added to the previous
trimming rule. The total wage gap (0.365 log points) and the explained component (0.219
log points) are considerably larger than under IPW controlling for W (but ignoring
selection). In contrast, the magnitude of the unexplained component (0.147 log points) is
slightly smaller, resulting in an overall drop of its share in the total wage gap to 40%. All
estimates discussed so far are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
In addition to controlling for observables, our last estimator, IPW IV, uses the number
of children under 15 and under 6 years as instruments to control for selection. It requires
the estimation of p(Q) = Pr(S = 1|Q) (with Q = (G,X,W,Z)), Pr(G = 1|W, p(Q)), and
Pr(G = 1|X,W, p(Q)). Figures A4.7, A4.8, and A4.9 provide the logit estimates of the
respective propensity scores. Common support is by and large satisfactory. The trimming
rule discards observations with estimates of Pr(G = 1|X = x,W = w, p(Q) = p(q)) < 0.01,
of Pr(G = 1|W = w, p(Q) = p(q)) > 0.99, and of p(q) < 0.01, all in all 584 cases (9%).
This needs to be kept in mind when interpreting the results, as trimming generally changes
the target population for which the parameters are estimated. The total wage gap drops
substantially when compared to previous estimates and amounts to 0.141 log points. The
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unexplained component is similar in magnitude to the IPW MAR estimate, while the
explained part is very close to zero but even negative. However, the IPW IV estimates
are far from being statistically signiﬁcant at any conventional level, pointing to a weak
instrument problem.
We conduct several sensitivity checks by gradually reducing the set of post-group
characteristics X. Table A4.6 in Appendix 4 presents the estimates obtained when
dropping any higher-order and interaction terms of X, such that the functional forms in
the outcome and propensity score speciﬁcations become less ﬂexible. While the total
wage gap estimates remain largely unchanged, the explained components generally
decline slightly (by about 0.03 log points), and the unexplained components increase, on
average, by the same amount. The exception is the IPW IV decomposition, where both
the total gap and its explained component somewhat increase, whereas the size and the
share of the unexplained component decline. However, all the IPW IV estimates remain
statistically insigniﬁcant. All in all, these diﬀerences are minor, which suggests that our
results are rather robust to the exclusion of higher-order and interaction terms of X.
Our next robustness check excludes not only the higher-order and interaction terms, but
also all variables in X that reﬂect developments or histories like years in marriage, years
worked in current occupation, etc. We point out that many of these variables are frequently
not included in wage decompositions, even though they appear a priori similarly important
as characteristics measured at a particular point in time. For instance, one would suspect
that not only the current occupation matters for human capital accumulation and the
determination of the current wage, but also employment history and tenure in the current
occupation. The exclusion of these additional variables generally decreases the explained
component and increases the unexplained component, which accounts for 77% to 96% of
the total gap across the ﬁrst four methods. IPW IV yields diﬀerent and even more extreme
estimates, which are, however, at best marginally signiﬁcant. Table 4.2 provides the results.
Table 4.2: Robustness check: parsimonious set of X
Total gap in log wages Explained (Indirect) Unexplained (Direct) Trimmed
est. s.e. p-val est. s.e. p-val % tot. est. s.e. p-val % tot. obs. %
Oaxaca-Bl. 0.299 0.019 0.000 0.067 0.019 0.000 22% 0.231 0.022 0.000 77% 0 0%
IPW no W 0.298 0.019 0.000 0.026 0.023 0.269 9% 0.272 0.026 0.000 91% 1 0%
IPW with W 0.269 0.017 0.000 0.011 0.023 0.648 4% 0.258 0.027 0.000 96% 2 0%
IPW MAR 0.362 0.032 0.000 0.076 0.025 0.002 21% 0.287 0.032 0.000 79% 1 0%
IPW IV 0.124 0.324 0.703 -0.186 0.102 0.067 -151% 0.310 0.328 0.345 251% 850 13%
Notes: Standard errors and p-values are estimated based on 999 bootstrap replications. The trimming
rule discards observations with propensity scores (speciﬁc to each estimator) below 0.01 or above 0.99.
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The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition yields quite stable estimates when compared to
the main speciﬁcation of Table 4.1. The total gap estimate does not change, while the
explained component decreases and the unexplained component increases each by about
0.02 log points, or about 5 percentage points of the total gap. For the IPW estimators
not accounting for selection, the explained components decline by about 0.1 log point, now
constituting only a small share of the total gap and losing their statistical signiﬁcance.
Over 90% of the total wage gap remains unexplained both for IPW with and without
controlling for W . Also for the IPW estimators accounting for selection, the explained
components decrease considerably, while the explained components increase and the total
gap is slightly smaller than before. In the case of IPW MAR, the unexplained part now
accounts for nearly 80% of the total wage gap. All the IPWMAR estimates are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The IPW IV estimator yields rather implausible results. The
large unexplained component of 0.31 log points comprises 251% of the total wage gap, due
to a negative estimate of the explained component. However, none of these estimates are
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%.
As a ﬁnal robustness check for IPW IV, we add an indicator for whether an individual's
mother worked for pay when the individual was 14 years old as an additional instrument
for selection into paid work. Table A4.7 in Appendix 4 shows that the estimates remain
unchanged compared to the main speciﬁcation. Overall, our empirical results suggest that
estimates of the gender wage decomposition are dependent on the choice of underlying
identiﬁcation assumptions and, to some extent, the deﬁnition of the observed characteristics
X. Given the variability of estimates across methods and speciﬁcations, we advise to be
cautious w.r.t. the use of wage decompositions for policy conclusions, for instance about
the magnitude of gender discrimination in the labor market.
4.5 Conclusion
We assessed the sensitivity of average gender wage gap decompositions in data from
the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, comparing several decomposition
methods and sets of included variables. We ﬁrst discussed the identiﬁcation problem
from a causal perspective, namely separating the explained component of the wage eﬀect
of gender operating through observed characteristics from the unexplained component.
Five decomposition techniques were reviewed. Starting with the linear Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition, we gradually relaxed the identifying assumptions regarding functional
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form, exogeneity of observed characteristics and gender, and selection into employment.
Speciﬁcally, we considered inverse probability weighting (IPW) as a semiparametric
analog of the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. We also included IPW versions
controlling for confounders (of observed characteristics, gender, and the wage outcome)
or for both confounders and sample selection into employment, the latter either based
on observed variables or instruments. When applying all ﬁve estimators to the data, we
also considered less and more parsimonious deﬁnitions of the observed characteristics and
instruments included in the analysis.
We found the total wage gap as well as the explained and unexplained components to
diﬀer importantly across some of the methods considered. Furthermore, the deﬁnition of
the observed characteristics related to the explained component mattered: Including only
levels of variables rather than both levels and histories generally reduced the explained
and increased the unexplained components across the considered estimators. Given our
results, the usefulness of wage decompositions that neither account for identiﬁcation
issues like endogeneity and selection into employment nor for histories of observed
characteristics appears questionable in terms of policy conclusions, for instance, when
aiming at quantifying gender discrimination. Unfortunately, a vast number of empirical
applications rely on exactly such kind of decompositions. At the very least, we advise
checking the robustness of the results across several decomposition methods and variable
speciﬁcations to improve upon the status quo of the literature.
98
Bibliography
Abowd, J., Crepon, B., and Kramarz, F. (2001). Moment estimation with attrition:
An application to economic models. Journal of the American Statistical Association,
96:12231230.
Achuonjei, P., dos Santos, F., and Reyes, Y. (2003). Farmers' perceptions of the
eﬀectivness of the Agricultural Rehabilitation Project (ARP) information campaign,
East Timor. Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference of Association for International
Agricultural and Extension Education (Raleigh, North Carolina, USA). Available
at https://www.aiaee.org/attachments/article/1236/Achuonjei11.pdf (accessed
August 15, 2017).
Ahn, H. and Powell, J. (1993). Semiparametric estimation of censored selection models
with a nonparametric selection mechanism. Journal of Econometrics, 58:329.
Albert, J. M. (2008). Mediation analysis via potential outcomes models. Statistics in
Medicine, 27:12821304.
Albert, J. M. and Nelson, S. (2011). Generalized causal mediation analysis. Biometrics,
67:10281038.
Altbach, P. G. (2016). Global perspectives on higher education. John Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore.
Altmann, S., Falk, A., Jaeger, S., and Zimmermann, F. (2015). Learning about job search:
A ﬁeld experiment with job seekers in Germany. IZA discussion paper No. 9040.
Altmann, S. and Traxler, C. (2014). Nudges at the dentist. European Economic Review,
72:19  38.
An, W. and Wan, X. (2016). R: Local average response functions for instrumental variable
estimation of treatment eﬀects. https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/LARF/
(accessed June 2017).
99
Angrist, J., Bettinger, E., and Kremer, M. (2006). Long-term educational consequences of
secondary school vouchers: Evidence from administrative records in colombia. American
Economic Review, 96:847862.
Angrist, J. D. and Pischke, J.-S. (2009). Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Epiricist's
Companion. Princeton University Press.
APM Database (2015). Agricultural policy measures database compiled for The
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under the FAO/SWG project Streamlining
of agriculture and rural development policies of SEE countries for EU accession.
Unpublished data.
Arellano, M. and Bonhomme, S. (2010). Quantile selection models. Unpublished
manuscript.
Armantier, O. and Boly, A. (2011). A controlled ﬁeld experiment on corruption. European
Economic Review, 55:1072  1082.
Armantier, O. and Boly, A. (2013). Comparing corruption in the laboratory and in the
ﬁeld in Burkina Faso and in Canada. The Economic Journal, 123:11681187.
Athey, S. and Imbens, G. (2016). Recursive partitioning for heterogeneous causal eﬀects.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113:73537360.
Athey, S., Imbens, G., Kong, Y., and Ramachandra, V. (2016). An introduction to recursive
partitioning for heterogeneous causal eﬀects estimation using causalTree package. https:
//github.com/susanathey/causalTree (accessed June 2017).
Azmat, G. and Petrongolo, B. (2014). Gender and the labor market: What have we learned
from ﬁeld and lab experiments? Labour Economics, 30:32  40.
Baron, R. M. and Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction
in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51:11731182.
Barr, A. and Serra, D. (2010). Corruption and culture: An experimental analysis. Journal
of Public Economics, 94:862  869.
Barsky, R., Bound, J., Charles, K., and Lupton, J. (2002). Accounting for the black-white
wealth gap: A nonparametric approach. Journal of the American Statistical Association,
97:663673.
100
Belloni, A., Chernozhukov, V., and Hansen, C. (2014). Inference on treatment eﬀects after
selection among high-dimensional controls. Review of Economic Studies, 81:608650.
Benders, R. M., Kok, R., Moll, H. C., Wiersma, G., and Noorman, K. J. (2006). New
approaches for household energy conservationin search of personal household energy
budgets and energy reduction options. Energy Policy, 34:3612  3622.
Bertrand, M. (2011). New perspectives on gender. In Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D., editors,
Handbook of Labor Economics, pages 15431590. Elsevier.
Bicakova, A. (2014). Selection into labor force and gender unemployment gaps. CERGE-EI
Working Paper, 513.
Blau, F. and Kahn, L. (2006). The US gender pay gap in the 1990s: Slowing convergence.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 60:4566.
Blinder, A. (1973). Wage discrimination: Reduced form and structural estimates. Journal
of Human Resources, 8:436455.
Blundell, R. W. and Powell, J. L. (2004). Endogeneity in semiparametric binary response
models. The Review of Economic Studies, 71:655679.
Brunello, G., Fort, M., Schneeweis, N., and Winter-Ebmer, R. (2016). The causal eﬀect
of education on health: What is the role of health behaviors? Health Economics,
25:314336.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor (2001). National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth 1979 cohort, 1979-2000 (rounds 1-19). Produced and distributed by the Center
for Human Resource Research, The Ohio State University. Columbus, OH.
Busso, M., DiNardo, J., and McCrary, J. (2009). New evidence on the ﬁnite sample
properties of propensity score matching and reweighting estimators. IZA Discussion
Paper No. 3998.
Carroll, R., Ruppert, D., and Stefanski, L. (1995).Measurement Error in Nonlinear Models.
Chapman and Hall, London.
Chernozhukov, V., Fernandez-Val, I., and Melly, B. (2009). Inference on counterfactual
distributions. CeMMAP working paper CWP09/09.
101
Chetty, R., Friedman, J. N., Hilger, N., Saez, E., Schanzenbach, D. W., and Yagan, D.
(2011). How does your kindergarten classroom aﬀect your earnings? Evidence from
Project STAR. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126:15931660.
Chetty, R. and Saez, E. (2013). Teaching the tax code: Earnings responses to an experiment
with EITC recipients. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5:131.
Cobb-Clark, D. A. (2016). Biology and gender in the labor market. IZA DP No. 10386.
Conti, G., Heckman, J. J., and Pinto, R. (2016). The eﬀects of two inﬂuential early
childhood interventions on health and healthy behaviour. The Economic Journal,
126:F28F65.
Corbacho, A., Gingerich, D. W., Oliveros, V., and Ruiz-Vega, M. (2016). Corruption as
a self-fulﬁlling prophecy: Evidence from a survey experiment in Costa Rica. American
Journal of Political Science, 60:10771092.
Das, M., Newey, W. K., and Vella, F. (2003). Nonparametric estimation of sample selection
models. Review of Economic Studies, 70:3358.
Denisova-Schmidt, E. (2017). The challenges of academic integrity in higher education:
Current trends and outlook. CIHE Perspectives 5. Boston: Boston College.
Denisova-Schmidt, E. (2019). Corruption in higher education. In Teixeira, Nuno, P.,
and Shin, J.-C., editors, Encyclopedia of International Higher Education Systems and
Institutions. Springers.
Denisova-Schmidt, E. and de Wit, H. (2017). The global challenge of corruption in higher
education. IAU HORIZONS, 22:2829.
Denisova-Schmidt, E., Huber, M., and Leontyeva, E. (2016). Do anti-corruption
educational campaigns reach students? Some evidence from Russia and Ukraine.
Educational Studies Moscow, 1:6183.
Denisova-Schmidt, E., Huber, M., and Prytula, Y. (2015). An experimental evaluation of an
anti-corruption intervention among Ukrainian university students. Eurasian Geography
and Economics, 56:713734.
d'Haultfoeuille, X. (2010). A new instrumental method for dealing with endogenous
selection. Journal of Econometrics, 154:115.
102
Dimant, E. and Tosato, G. (2018). Causes and eﬀects of corruption: What has past
decade's research taught us? A survey. Journal of Economic Surveys, 32:335356.
Dimitrievski, D., Kotevska, A., Janeska Stamenkovska, I., Tuna, E., and Nacka, M. (2014).
Agriculture and agricultural policy in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In
Volk, T., Erjavec, E., and Mortensen, K., editors, Agricultural Policy and European
Integration in Southeastern Europe. Budapest: Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations.
DiNardo, J., Fortin, N., and Lemieux, T. (1996). Labor market institutions and
the distribution of wages, 1973-1992: A semiparametric approach. Econometrica,
64:10011044.
Dollar, D., Fisman, R., and Gatti, R. (2001). Are women really the fairer sex? Corruption
and women in government. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 46:423429.
Duﬂo, E. and Saez, E. (2003). The role of information and social interactions in retirement
plan decisions: Evidence from a randomized experiment. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 118:815842.
Duncan, O. D. (1967). Discrimination against negroes. Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science, 371:85103.
Dwyer, J., Buckwell, A., Hart, K., Menadue, H., Mantino, F., Erjavec, E., and Ilbery, B.
(2012). Study: How to improve the sustainable competitiveness and innovation of the
agriculture sector, IP/ B/AGRI/IC/2011-100. Brussels: European Parliament. Available
at www.europarl.europa.eu/studies (accessed August 15, 2017).
Dwyer, J. and Powell, J. (2016). Rural development programmes and transaction eﬀects:
Reﬂections on maltese and english experience. Journal of Agricultural Economics,
67:545565.
European Commission (2005). Council Regulation (EC) No. 1698/2005 of 20 August
2005 on Support for Rural Development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural
Development (EAFRD). Brussels: Commission of the European Communities.
European Commission (2013). IPA Rural Development Programme (IPARD) for
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Fifth Modiﬁcation. Available at
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/enlargement/countries/fyrom/ipard_en.pdf
(accessed August 15, 2017).
103
Federal State Statistics Service (2016). Chislennost' naselenia Rossiyskoy
Federatsiy po municipalnim obrazovaniyam [The population of the Russian
Federation by municipalities]. Online bulletin, Federal State Statistics Service.
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/
publications/catalog/afc8ea004d56a39ab251f2bafc3a6fce (accessed June 2017).
Feld, S., Frenzen, H., Kraﬀt, M., Peters, K., and Verhoef, P. C. (2013). The eﬀects
of mailing design characteristics on direct mail campaign performance. International
Journal of Research in Marketing, 30:143  159.
Ferraro, P. J. and Miranda, J. J. (2013). Heterogeneous treatment eﬀects and
mechanisms in information-based environmental policies: Evidence from a large-scale
ﬁeld experiment. Resource and Energy Economics, 35:356  379.
Findley, M., Nielson, D., and Sharman, J. (2014). Global shell games. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Finn, J. D. and Achilles, C. M. (1990). Answers and questions about class size: A statewide
experiment. American Educational Research Journal, 27:557577.
Finn, J. D., Fulton, D., Zaharias, J., and Nye, B. A. (1989). Carry-over eﬀects of small
classes. Peabody Journal of Education, 67:7584.
Firpo, S., Fortin, N. M., and Lemieux, T. (2007). Decomposing wage distributions using
recentered inﬂuence functions regressions. Mimeo, University of British Columbia.
Firpo, S., Fortin, N. M., and Lemieux, T. (2009). Unconditional quantile regressions.
Econometrica, 77:953973.
Fitzgerald, J., Gottschalk, P., and Moﬃtt, R. (1998). An analysis of sample attrition in
panel data: The michigan panel study of income dynamics. Journal of Human Resources,
33:251299.
Flores, C. A. and Flores-Lagunes, A. (2009). Identiﬁcation and estimation of causal
mechanisms and net eﬀects of a treatment under unconfoundedness. IZA DP No. 4237.
Folger, J. and Breda, C. (1989). Evidence from Project STAR about class size and student
achievement. Peabody Journal of Education, 67:1733.
Fortin, N., Lemieux, T., and Firpo, S. (2011). Chapter 1 - Decomposition methods in
economics. volume 4, Part A of Handbook of Labor Economics, pages 1  102. Elsevier.
104
Frank, B., Lambsdorﬀ, J. G., and Boehm, F. (2011). Gender and corruption: Lessons from
laboratory corruption experiments. The European Journal of Development Research,
23:5971.
Frolich, M. (2007). Propensity score matching without conditional independence
assumptionwith an application to the gender wage gap in the United Kingdom.
Econometrics Journal, 10:359407.
Galadima, M. (2014). Constraints on farmers' access to agricultural information delivery:
Survey of rural farmers in Yobe State, Nigeria. IOSR Journal of Agriculture and
Veterinary Science, 7:1822.
Garbarino, E., Slonim, R., and Sydnor, J. (2011). Digit ratios (2d:4d) as predictors of risky
decision making for both sexes. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 42:126.
Garcia, J., Hernandez, P. J., and Lopez-Nicolas, A. (2001). How wide is the gap? An
investigation of gender wage diﬀerences using quantile regression. Empirical Economics,
26:149167.
Gershenson, S., Jacknowitz, A., and Brannegan, A. (2017). Are student absences worth
the worry in U.S. primary schools? Education Finance and Policy, 12:137165.
Goraus, K., Tyrowicz, J., and van der Velde, L. (2015). Which gender wage gap estimates
to trust? A comparative analysis. Review of Income and Wealth, 63:118146.
Gottfried, M. A. (2009). Excused versus unexcused: How student absences in elementary
school aﬀect academic achievement. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis,
31:392415.
Greiner, D. J. and Rubin, D. B. (2011). Causal eﬀects of perceived immutable
characteristics. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 93:775785.
Gronau, R. (1974). Wage comparisons - a selectivity bias. Journal of Political Economy,
82:11191143.
Hainmueller, J. (2012). Entropy balancing for causal eﬀects: A multivariate reweighting
method to produce balanced samples in observational studies. Political Analysis,
20:2546.
Hainmueller, J. and Xu, Y. (2013). ebalance: A Stata package for entropy balancing.
Journal of Statistical Software, Articles, 54:118.
105
Hassan, S., Shaﬀril, H. A. M., Ali, M. S. S., and Ramli, N. S. (2010). Agriculture agency,
mass media and farmers: combination for creating knowledgeable agriculture community.
African Journal of Agricultural Research, 5:35003513.
Hausman, J. and Wise, D. (1979). Attrition bias in experimental and panel data: The
Gary income maintenance experiment. Econometrica, 47:455473.
Heckman, J. (1976a). The common structure of statistical models of truncation, sample
selection, and limited dependent variables, and a simple estimator for such models.
Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, 5:475492.
Heckman, J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a speciﬁcation error. Econometrica,
47:153161.
Heckman, J. J. (1976b). The common structure of statistical models of truncation, sample
selection and limited dependent variables and a simple estimator for such models. Annals
of Economic and Social Measurement, 5:475492.
Hirano, K., Imbens, G. W., and Ridder, G. (2003). Eﬃcient estimation of average treatment
eﬀects using the estimated propensity score. Econometrica, 71:11611189.
Holmes, L. (2015). Corruption: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Hong, G. (2010). Ratio of mediator probability weighting for estimating natural direct
and indirect eﬀects. In Proceedings of the American Statistical Association, Biometrics
Section, page 24012415. Alexandria, VA: American Statistical Association.
Horvitz, D. and Thompson, D. (1952). A generalization of sampling without replacement
from a ﬁnite population. Journal of American Statistical Association, 47:663685.
Hsu, Y., Huber, M., and Lai, T. (2018a). Nonparametric estimation of natural direct and
indirect eﬀects based on inverse probability weighting. Forthcoming in the Journal of
Econometric Methods.
Hsu, Y., Huber, M., Lee, Y., and Pipoz, L. (2018b). Direct and indirect eﬀects of continuous
treatments based on generalized propensity score weighting. SES Working papers 495,
University of Fribourg.
Huber, M. (2012). Identiﬁcation of average treatment eﬀects in social experiments
under alternative forms of attrition. Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics,
37:443474.
106
Huber, M. (2014a). Identifying causal mechanisms (primarily) based on inverse probability
weighting. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 29:920943.
Huber, M. (2014b). Treatment evaluation in the presence of sample selection. Econometric
Reviews, 33:869905.
Huber, M. (2015). Causal pitfalls in the decomposition of wage gaps. Journal of Business
and Economic Statistics, 33:179191.
Huber, M., Denisova-Schmidt, E., Leontyeva, E., and Solovyeva, A. (2017). Combining
experimental evidence with machine learning to assess anti-corruption educational
campaigns among Russian university students. SES Working paper 487, University of
Fribourg.
Huber, M., Kotevska, A., Stojcheska, A. M., and Solovyeva, A. (2018). Evaluating an
information campaign about rural development policies in FYR Macedonia. Agricultural
and Resource Economics Review, pages 125.
Huber, M., Lechner, M., and Wunsch, C. (2013). The performance of estimators based on
the propensity score. Journal of Econometrics, 175:121.
Huber, M. and Mellace, G. (2014). Testing exclusion restrictions and additive separability
in sample selection models. Empirical Economics, 47:7592.
Huber, M. and Solovyeva, A. (2018a). Direct and indirect eﬀects under sample selection
and outcome attrition. SES Working paper 496, University of Fribourg.
Huber, M. and Solovyeva, A. (2018b). On the sensitivity of wage gap decompositions. SES
Working paper 497, University of Fribourg.
Imai, K. (2009). Statistical analysis of randomized experiments with non-ignorable missing
binary outcomes: an application to a voting experiment. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society Series C, 58:83104.
Imai, K., Keele, L., and Yamamoto, T. (2010). Identiﬁcation, inference and sensitivity
analysis for causal mediation eﬀects. Statistical Science, 25:5171.
Imai, K. and Yamamoto, T. (2011). Identiﬁcation and sensitivity analysis for multiple
causal mechanisms: Revisiting evidence from framing experiments. Unpulished
manuscript.
107
Imbens, G. W. (2004). Nonparametric estimation of average treatment eﬀects under
exogeneity: A review. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 86:429.
Imbens, G. W. and Newey, W. K. (2009). Identiﬁcation and estimation of triangular
simultaneous equations models without additivity. Econometrica, 77:14811512.
IPARD II (2015). EU Instrument for Pre-Accession Rural Development Programme
20142020. Final version as adopted by the European Commission on 13.02.2015.
Skopje, Republic of Macedonia. Available at http://ipardpa.gov.mk/Root/mak/
_docs/Zakonodavstvo/IPARD%20II%20Programme_ENG.pdf (accessed November 20,
2017).
Jetter, M. and Walker, J. K. (2015). Good girl, bad boy: Corrupt behavior in professional
tennis. Working paper, Center for Research in Economics and Finance (CIEF).
John, L. K., Loewenstein, G., and Rick, S. I. (2014). Cheating more for less: Upward social
comparisons motivate the poorly compensated to cheat. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 123:101  109.
Judd, C. M. and Kenny, D. A. (1981). Process analysis: Estimating mediation in treatment
evaluations. Evaluation Review, 5:602619.
Juhn, C., Murphy, K., and Pierce, B. (1993). Wage inequality and the rise in returns to
skill. Journal of Political Economy, 101:410442.
Kasamara, V. and Sorokina, A. (2017). Rebuilt empire or new collapse? Geopolitical
visions of Russian students. Europe-Asia Studies, 69:262283.
Klemencic, M. (2014). Student power in a global perspective and contemporary trends in
student organising. Studies in Higher Education, 39:396411.
Korostelev, A., Romenskiy, V., and Sagieva, K. (Hosts) (2017). Progulka rasserzhennyh
shkol'nikov: kak pokolenie YouTube vyshlo na ulicu i kak ego nakazhut [Angry pupils'
walk: how the YouTube generation went out into the streets and how it will be punished].
In Pushkarev, V., Yapparova, L., Borzunova, M., Alexandrov, A., Zhelvnov, A., Ruzavin,
P. et al., editor, Zdes' i sejchas. Vechernee shou [Here and now. The evening show].
Dozhd', Moscow, Russia. https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/vechernee_shou/on_vam_
ne_dimon-430761/ (accessed June 2017).
108
Kotevska, A., Bogdanov, N., Nikolic, A., Dimitrievski, D., Martinovska-Stojcheska, A.,
Tuna, E., Milic, T., Simonovska, A., Papic, R., Petrovic, L., Uzunovic, M., Becirovic, E.,
Angjelkovic, B., Gjoshevski, D., and Georgiev, N. (2015). The impact of socio-economic
structure of rural population on success of Rural Development Policy  Macedonia,
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Skopje: Association of Agricultural Economists of
Republic of Macedonia.
Krueger, A. B. (1999). Experimental estimates of education production functions.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114:497532.
Krueger, A. B. and Whitmore, D. M. (2001). The eﬀect of attending a small class in the
early grades on college-test taking and middle school test results: Evidence from Project
STAR. The Economic Journal, 111:128.
Kullback, J. (1959). Information Theory and Statistics. Wiley, New York.
Kunze, A. (2008). Gender wage gap studies: consistency and decomposition. Empirical
Economics, 35:6376.
Lemieux, T. (1998). Estimating the eﬀects of unions on wage inequality in a panel
data model with comparative advantage and nonrandom selection. Journal of Labor
Economics, 16:261291.
Liebman, J. B. and Luttmer, E. F. P. (2015). Would people behave diﬀerently if they better
understood social security? Evidence from a ﬁeld experiment. American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy, 7:275  299.
Little, R. and Rubin, D. (1987). Statistical Analysis with Missing Data. Wiley, New York.
Little, R. J. A. (1995). Modeling the drop-out mechanism in repeated-measures studies.
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 90:11121121.
Ludwig, J., Mullainathan, S., and Spiess, J. (2017). Machine learning tests for eﬀects on
multiple outcomes. Mimeo, Cornell University.
Lwoga, E. T., Stilwell, C., and Ngulube, P. (2011). Access and use of agricultural
information and knowledge in Tanzania. Library Review, 60:383395.
Maasoumi, E. and Wang, L. (2016). The gender gap between earnings distributions.
Working paper, Emory University.
109
Machado, C. (2017). Unobserved selection heterogeneity and the gender wage gap. Journal
of Applied Econometrics, 32:13481366.
Machado, J. and Mata, J. (2005). Counterfactual decomposition of changes in wage
distributions using quantile regression. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 20:445465.
MacKinnon, D. P. (2008). Introduction to Statistical Mediation Analysis. Taylor and
Francis, New York.
Manning, J. T., Reimers, S., Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., and Fink, B. (2010).
Sexually dimorphic traits (digit ratio, body height, systemizingempathizing scores)
and gender segregation between occupations: Evidence from the BBC internet study.
Personality and Individual Diﬀerences, 49:511  515.
Manski, C. F. (1989). Anatomy of the selection problem. Journal of Human Resources,
24:343360.
Melly, B. (2005). Decomposition of diﬀerences in distribution using quantile regression.
Labour Economics, 12:577590.
Mora, R. (2008). A nonparametric decomposition of the Mexican American average wage
gap. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 23:463485.
Morrissey, T. W., Hutchison, L., and Winsler, A. (2014). Family income, school attendance,
and academic achievement in elementary school. Developmental Psychology, 50:741753.
Mulligan, C. B. and Rubinstein, Y. (2008). Selection, investment, and women's relative
wages over time. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123:10611110.
National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia (2017). List of exchange rates. Available at
http://www.nbrm.mk/kursna_lista-en.nspx (accessed August 15, 2017).
Neuman, S. and Oaxaca, R. L. (2003). Gender versus ethnic wage diﬀerentials
among professionals: Evidence from Israel. Annales d' Economie et de Statistique,
71/72:267292.
Neuman, S. and Oaxaca, R. L. (2004). Wage decompositions with selectivity-corrected
wage equations: A methodological note. The Journal of Economic Inequality, 2:310.
Newey, W., Powell, J., and Vella, F. (1999). Nonparametric estimation of triangular
simultaneous equations models. Econometrica, 67:565603.
110
Newey, W. K. (1984). A method of moments interpretation of sequential estimators.
Economics Letters, 14:201206.
Newey, W. K. (2007). Nonparametric continuous/discrete choice models. International
Economic Review, 48:14291439.
Nopo, H. (2008). Matching as a tool to decompose wage gaps. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 90:290299.
Nye, B., Hedges, L. V., and Konstantopoulos, S. (2001). The long-term eﬀects of small
classes in early grades: Lasting beneﬁts in mathematics achievement at grade 9. The
Journal of Experimental Education, 69:245257.
Nye, J. and Orel, E. (2015). The inﬂuence of prenatal hormones on occupational choice:
2d:4d evidence from Moscow. Personality and Individual Diﬀerences, 78:39  42.
Oaxaca, R. (1973). Male-female wage diﬀerences in urban labour markets. International
Economic Review, 14:693709.
Obrazovanie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: 2014 [Education in the Russian Federation: 2014]
(2014). Statistical compilation, National Research Institute "Higher School of
Economics", Moscow, Russia.
Odongo, D. O., Wakhungu, W. J., and Stanley, O. (2017). Causes of variability in
prevalence rates of communicable diseases among secondary school students in Kisumu
County, Kenya. Journal of Public Health, 25:161166.
Olivetti, C. and Petrongolo, B. (2008). Unequal pay or unequal employment? A
cross-country analysis of gender gaps. Journal of Labor Economics, 26:621654.
Pearl, J. (1995). Causal diagrams for empirical research. Biometrika, 82:669710 (with
discussion).
Pearl, J. (2001). Direct and indirect eﬀects. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth Conference on
Uncertainty in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, pages 411420, San Francisco. Morgan Kaufman.
Petersen, M. L., Sinisi, S. E., and van der Laan, M. J. (2006). Estimation of direct causal
eﬀects. Epidemiology, 17:276284.
Ready, D. D. (2010). Socioeconomic disadvantage, school attendance, and early cognitive
development: The diﬀerential eﬀects of school exposure. Sociology of Education,
83:271286.
111
Rivas, M. F. (2013). An experiment on corruption and gender. Bulletin of Economic
Research, 65:1042.
Robins, J. M. (2003). Semantics of causal DAG models and the identiﬁcation of direct and
indirect eﬀects. In Green, P., Hjort, N., and Richardson, S., editors, In Highly Structured
Stochastic Systems, pages 7081, Oxford. Oxford University Press.
Robins, J. M. and Greenland, S. (1992). Identiﬁability and exchangeability for direct and
indirect eﬀects. Epidemiology, 3:143155.
Robins, J. M. and Richardson, T. (2010). Alternative graphical causal models and the
identiﬁcation of direct eﬀects. In Shrout, P., Keyes, K., and Omstein, K., editors,
Causality and Psychopathology: Finding the Determinants of Disorders and Their Cures.
Oxford University Press.
Robins, J. M., Rotnitzky, A., and Zhao, L. (1994). Estimation of regression coeﬃcients
when some regressors are not always observed. Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 90:846866.
Robins, J. M., Rotnitzky, A., and Zhao, L. (1995). Analysis of semiparametric regression
models for repeated outcomes in the presence of missing data. Journal of American
Statistical Association, 90:106121.
Rosenbaum, P. R. and Rubin, D. B. (1985). Constructing a control group using multivariate
matched sampling methods that incorporate the propensity score. The American
Statistician, 39:3338.
Rubin, D. B. (1974). Estimating causal eﬀects of treatments in randomized and
nonrandomized studies. Journal of Educational Psychology, 66:688701.
Rubin, D. B. (1976). Inference and missing data. Biometrika, 63:581592.
Rubin, D. B. (1990). Formal modes of statistical inference for causal eﬀects. Journal of
Statistical Planning and Inference, 25:279292.
Rubin, D. B. (2004). Direct and indirect causal eﬀects via potential outcomes. Scandinavian
Journal of Statistics, 31:161170.
Saez, E. (2009). Details matter: The impact of presentation and information on the take-up
of ﬁnancial incentives for retirement saving. American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy, 1:204  228.
112
Serra, D. andWantchekon, L. (2012). New advances in experimental research on corruption.
Emerald, Bingley, U.K.
Shah, A., Laird, N., and Schoenfeld, D. (1997). A random-eﬀects model for multiple
characteristics with possibly missing data. Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 92:775779.
Sloczynski, T. (2013). Population average gender eﬀects. IZA Discussion Paper No. 7315.
Smith, J. and Todd, P. (2005). Does matching overcome LaLonde's critique of
nonexperimental estimators? Journal of Econometrics, 125:305353.
Solovyeva, A. (2018). Student experience with academic dishonesty and corruption in the
Khabarovsk Region of Russia. Higher Education in Russia and Beyond (HERB), 3:911.
Spindler, M., Chernozhukov, V., and Hansen, C. (2016). R: High-dimensional metrics.
https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/hdm/ (accessed June 2017).
State Statistical Oﬃce of the Republic of Macedonia (2015). Indicators. Available at
http://www.stat.gov.mk/Default_en.aspx (accessed August 15, 2017).
Swamy, A., Knack, S., Lee, Y., and Azfar, O. (2001). Gender and corruption. Journal of
Development Economics, 64:25  55.
Tchetgen Tchetgen, E. J. and Shpitser, I. (2012). Semiparametric theory for causal
mediation analysis: Eﬃciency bounds, multiple robustness, and sensitivity analysis. The
Annals of Statistics, 40:18161845.
Tchetgen Tchetgen, E. J. and VanderWeele, T. J. (2014). On identiﬁcation of natural direct
eﬀects when a confounder of the mediator is directly aﬀected by exposure. Epidemiology,
25:282291.
Ten Have, T. R., Joﬀe, M. M., Lynch, K. G., Brown, G. K., Maisto, S. A., and Beck, A. T.
(2007). Causal mediation analyses with rank preserving models. Biometrics, 63:926934.
Transparency International Russia (2015a). Episode 1: Bribe. YouTube video. https:
//www.youtube.com/watch?v=zGeworhwEFo (accessed July 2017).
Transparency International Russia (2015b). Episode 3: Corruption corporate raid.
YouTube video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4aTjUyX67xc (accessed July
2017).
113
van der Weele, T. J. (2009). Marginal structural models for the estimation of direct and
indirect eﬀects. Epidemiology, 20:1826.
Vansteelandt, S., Bekaert, M., and Lange, T. (2012). Imputation strategies for the
estimation of natural direct and indirect eﬀects. Epidemiologic Methods, 1:129158.
Volkov, D. (2017). Eﬀekt ot ﬁlma ¾On vam ne Dimon¿ pochti proshel [The eﬀect of the
ﬁlm "He is not Dimon to you" has almost passed]. Gazeta.ru. https://www.gazeta.
ru/comments/2017/05/25_a_10691315.shtml (accessed June 2017).
Wooldridge, J. (2002). Inverse probability weigthed M-estimators for sample selection,
attrition and stratiﬁcation. Portuguese Economic Journal, 1:141162.
Wooldridge, J. (2007). Inverse probability weighted estimation for general missing data
problems. Journal of Econometrics, 141:12811301.
Yamaguchi, K. (2014). Decomposition of gender or racial inequality with endogenous
intervening covariates: An extension of the DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux method. RIETI
Discussion Paper Series 14-E-061.
Zakon za Zemjodelstvo i Ruralen Razvoj [Law of Agriculture and Rural Development]
(2010). Sluzben Vesnik na Republika Makedonija 49: 1  84. Available
at http://www.slvesnik.com.mk/Issues/9E6050C54BDFFE46AD6BC1607D67D671.pdf
(accessed August 15, 2017).
Zheng, W. and van der Laan, M. J. (2012). Targeted maximum likelihood estimation of
natural direct eﬀects. The International Journal of Biostatistics, 8:140.
114
Appendices
i
Appendix 1
Table A1.1: Propensity score speciﬁcation Pr(T = 1|X)
Regressors Coef. s.e. z -value p-value
Age -0.025 0.016 -1.520 0.129
Male (binary) 0.132 0.203 0.650 0.514
Education: high school (binary) 0.831 0.329 2.530 0.011
Education: college/ university (binary) 0.652 0.391 1.670 0.095
Education missing 1.151 0.449 2.560 0.010
Household head's occupation: agriculture (binary) 0.006 0.196 0.030 0.975
Years in farming 0.014 0.016 0.850 0.393
Household size 0.061 0.077 0.790 0.431
Proﬁtable farma 0.397 0.165 2.410 0.016
Subsidy dependentb -0.066 0.111 -0.590 0.553
Frequency of cooperationc -0.027 0.069 -0.400 0.692
Share of agricultural production sold on a market -0.009 0.006 -1.450 0.147
Share of income from farming -0.001 0.005 -0.240 0.810
Capacity: farmed area (ha) -0.085 0.091 -0.930 0.351
Capacity: total livestock (number of heads) -0.019 0.032 -0.600 0.552
Household head's occupation: missing (binary) -0.342 0.660 -0.520 0.604
Constant -0.153 1.029 -0.150 0.882
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
aProﬁtable farm: 1=very unproﬁtable; 2=moderately unproﬁtable; 3=break-even;
4=moderately proﬁtable; 5=very proﬁtable. bSubsidy dependent : 1=not dependent;
2=slightly dependent; 3=very dependent. cFrequency of cooperation: 1=never; 2=rarely;
3=not sure; 4=sometimes; 5=always.
ii
Figure A1.1: Ease of getting a loan by farm proﬁtability
Source: The 2015 survey of farmers conducted by the authors.
Notes: The graph is based on the evaluation sample. Observations with missing information on
proﬁtability (1 obs.) and loan accessibility (62 obs.) are excluded, resulting in 195 observations (92
unproﬁtable farms and 103 proﬁtable farms).
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Appendix 2
Table A2.1: F -tests of covariate balance
Covariate variables F -test Prob >F
University 1 1.13 0.34
University 2 0.45 0.77
University 3 0.52 0.72
University 4 1.41 0.23
University 5 0.94 0.44
University 6 1.17 0.32
University 7 1.26 0.28
Major: humanities 0.27 0.90
Major: social sciences 0.53 0.72
Major: technical sciences 0.87 0.48
Major: natural sciences 1.14 0.34
Current academic year: bachelor 0.37 0.83
Current academic year: master 1.03 0.39
Current academic year: diploma 1.40 0.23
Reason for university education: to obtain good education 1.00 0.41
Reason for university education: hard to ﬁnd job without education 0.32 0.87
Reason for university education: must have degree 1.35 0.25
Reason for university education: wanted to please parents 1.08 0.37
Reason for university education: everyone does that 0.81 0.52
Reason for university education: to delay army service 0.50 0.74
Academic performance (1=satisfactory... 5=excellent) 0.45 0.78
Presents to teachers at school (1=never... 5=systematically) 0.51 0.73
Paying fees at school (1=never... 5=systematically) 0.16 0.96
You/friends encountered any wrongdoing at USE 0.59 0.67
You/friends encountered any wrongdoing at univ.admission 0.90 0.46
Have you heard of your friends solving problems using connections? 0.34 0.85
Have you heard of your solved problems through bribery? 1.15 0.33
Female 0.43 0.79
University education is state ﬁnanced 1.41 0.23
Place of residence before university: village or town 0.32 0.86
Continued on next page
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Table A2.1  continued from previous page
Covariate variables F -test Prob>F
Place of residence before university: city with population 2250k 0.36 0.84
Place of residence before university: city with population 250500k 0.44 0.78
Place of residence before university: city with population >500k 1.95 0.10
Age 0.19 0.95
Family status: both parents 2.52 0.04
Family status: only mother 1.59 0.18
Family status: only father 1.95 0.10
Family status: no parents 2.10 0.08
Number of siblings: 0 0.80 0.53
Number of siblings: 1 0.17 0.95
Number of siblings: 2 0.71 0.58
Number of siblings: 3 and more 0.17 0.95
Order of birth 0.75 0.56
Mother's education: secondary 1.19 0.31
Mother's education: higher 0.87 0.48
Mother's education: academic title 0.64 0.64
Father's education: secondary 0.49 0.74
Father's education: higher 0.97 0.42
Father's education: academic title 1.73 0.14
Mother's occupation: high level manager 1.14 0.34
Mother's occupation: middle level manager 1.69 0.15
Mother's occupation: highly qualiﬁed specialist 1.36 0.24
Mother's occupation: clerk 1.79 0.13
Mother's occupation: worker 0.79 0.53
Mother's occupation: entrepreneur 1.09 0.36
Mother's occupation: housewife or retiree 0.72 0.58
Mother's occupation: unemployed 0.61 0.66
Mother's occupation: military personnel 1.16 0.33
Father's occupation: high level manager 1.33 0.26
Father's occupation: middle level manager 0.91 0.46
Father's occupation: highly qualiﬁed specialist 0.69 0.60
Father's occupation: clerk 0.16 0.96
Father's occupation: worker 0.45 0.77
Father's occupation: entrepreneur 1.68 0.15
Father's occupation: househusband or retiree 1.99 0.09
Continued on next page
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Table A2.1  continued from previous page
Covariate variables F -test Prob>F
Father's occupation: unemployed 1.24 0.29
Father's occupation: military personnel 1.18 0.32
Financial situation (1=can only aﬀord food... 5=can aﬀord everything) 1.41 0.23
Monthly expenditures: <10k rub 0.98 0.42
Monthly expenditures: 10  20k rub 1.38 0.24
Monthly expenditures: >20k rub 1.27 0.28
Current accommodation: dormitory 0.77 0.55
Current accommodation: living with parents 1.19 0.31
Current accommodation: rent 0.75 0.56
Current accommodation: own an apartment 0.37 0.83
USE points: <150 points 0.25 0.91
USE points: 150  200 points 1.26 0.28
USE points: 200  250 points 1.62 0.17
USE points: >250 points 2.30 0.06
Student works 1.08 0.36
Employment related to education 2.11 0.08
Encountered bribery at university (1=never... 5=systematically) 0.02 1.00
How often do you use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams 1.26 0.28
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 0.83 0.51
Buy papers 1.66 0.16
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 1.97 0.10
Copy from other students during exams or tests 1.46 0.21
Deceive professors about study problems 1.06 0.38
Ask professors preferential treatment 1.09 0.36
Note: The F -tests test the equality of coeﬃcients across the treatment groups in a regression of each
individual characteristic on treatment indicators with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.

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Table A2.2: Estimates based on OLS with LASSO-selected covariates
Outcome Oﬃcial brochure Tailored brochure Video: bribery Video: reiderstvo
Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v.
How often do you think students use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams -0.04 0.06 0.51 -0.02 0.05 0.71 0.00 0.06 0.97 -0.04 0.06 0.45
Submit papers downloaded from the internet -0.02 0.07 0.76 -0.02 0.06 0.75 0.12 0.07 0.08 -0.01 0.07 0.86
Buy papers 0.08 0.07 0.27 0.06 0.07 0.36 0.06 0.08 0.40 0.08 0.08 0.31
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 0.06 0.06 0.32 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.42 0.02 0.07 0.71
Copy from other students during exams or tests 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.27 0.04 0.07 0.60
Deceive professors about study problems -0.05 0.08 0.52 0.02 0.07 0.84 -0.03 0.08 0.72 0.05 0.08 0.55
Ask professors preferential treatment -0.02 0.07 0.73 0.08 0.07 0.29 0.06 0.08 0.45 0.04 0.07 0.56
When do you think these practices are acceptable? (1=deﬁnitely no... 5=deﬁnitely yes)
When useless course 0.19 0.08 0.03 -0.01 0.08 0.94 -0.06 0.08 0.45 -0.01 0.09 0.92
When students work 0.13 0.08 0.09 -0.01 0.08 0.85 0.02 0.08 0.84 -0.09 0.08 0.30
If hard to learn material 0.14 0.08 0.08 -0.03 0.08 0.69 0.01 0.08 0.92 -0.10 0.08 0.24
Always acceptable 0.04 0.07 0.56 -0.07 0.07 0.27 0.04 0.07 0.59 0.00 0.07 0.98
Never acceptable -0.15 0.09 0.11 -0.16 0.09 0.07 -0.10 0.09 0.26 -0.02 0.10 0.82
What does corruption mean to you? (1= deﬁnitely no... 5= deﬁnitely yes)
Necessity 0.08 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.07 0.98 0.03 0.07 0.72 0.02 0.07 0.77
Means of income 0.18 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.63 0.13 0.09 0.16 -0.08 0.09 0.36
Crime 0.01 0.07 0.94 -0.04 0.07 0.55 0.08 0.07 0.26 -0.01 0.07 0.86
Means to solve problems 0.05 0.08 0.50 0.04 0.08 0.58 -0.04 0.08 0.63 -0.13 0.09 0.14
Compensation for low salaries 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.30 -0.01 0.08 0.91 -0.04 0.09 0.61
Evil 0.00 0.08 0.98 0.01 0.08 0.89 0.00 0.08 0.97 -0.11 0.09 0.25
In your view, how does corruption aﬀect...? (1=strictly negative... 5=fully positive)
Your career opportunities 0.02 0.07 0.74 -0.04 0.07 0.52 -0.07 0.07 0.35 0.00 0.07 0.97
Your quality of life 0.02 0.07 0.76 -0.06 0.07 0.37 -0.04 0.07 0.61 -0.01 0.07 0.89
Your education 0.00 0.07 0.99 -0.03 0.07 0.64 -0.09 0.07 0.21 -0.04 0.07 0.59
Your health 0.03 0.07 0.69 -0.05 0.07 0.49 0.00 0.07 0.99 -0.09 0.07 0.24
Your safety -0.04 0.07 0.57 -0.03 0.07 0.61 -0.09 0.07 0.19 -0.09 0.07 0.22
Russian economy 0.04 0.05 0.48 -0.03 0.05 0.54 0.00 0.05 0.95 0.06 0.06 0.27
Russian politics 0.01 0.05 0.83 -0.03 0.05 0.48 -0.02 0.05 0.66 0.02 0.06 0.72
Russian education 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.97 -0.01 0.05 0.88 0.03 0.06 0.56
Russian health system 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.96 0.03 0.06 0.59 0.05 0.06 0.41
Russian police 0.09 0.06 0.10 -0.02 0.05 0.65 0.01 0.05 0.89 0.06 0.06 0.33
Can corruption be eradicated in Russia? -0.03 0.07 0.65 -0.09 0.07 0.20 -0.10 0.07 0.16 0.02 0.07 0.79
(1=deﬁnitely no... 5=deﬁnitely yes)
Take part in roundtable? (0=no, 1=yes) -0.01 0.01 0.39 -0.01 0.01 0.31 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.82
Take part in survey next year?(0=no, 1=yes) -0.03 0.02 0.09 -0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.03 0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.02 0.36
Notes: `Eﬀect' represents the estimate from an OLS regression of an outcome variable on a set of regressors selected in the post-double-selection
LASSO procedure, `se' provides asymptotic standard error, and `p-v.' stands for p-value.
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Table A2.3: Multiple outcomes test: Subsample based on gender
Question group Oﬃcial Tailored Video: Video:
brochure brochure bribery reiderstvo
Panel A: Male students
How often do you think students use 0.52 0.93 0.93 0.07
the following [corrupt] practices?
When do you think these [corrupt] 0.03 0.63 0.87 0.13
practices are acceptable?
What does corruption mean to you? 0.19 0.28 0.56 0.60
In your view, how does corruption 0.30 0.90 0.95 0.18
aﬀect aspects of your life?
In your view, how does corruption 0.02 0.34 0.73 0.06
aﬀect public spheres in Russia?
Interest in anti-corruption activities 0.88 0.85 0.90 0.43
Panel B: Female students
How often do you think students use 0.74 0.55 0.13 0.21
the following [corrupt] practices?
When do you think these [corrupt] 0.97 0.49 0.16 0.28
practices are acceptable?
What does corruption mean to you? 0.59 0.39 0.13 0.17
In your view, how does corruption 0.89 0.45 0.15 0.25
aﬀect aspects of your life?
In your view, how does corruption 0.52 0.61 0.17 0.33
aﬀect public spheres in Russia?
Interest in anti-corruption activities 0.53 0.65 0.15 0.39
Note: The p-values of the joint signiﬁcance tests are presented.
viii
Table A2.4: Eﬀects in the male subsample
Outcome Control Oﬃcial brochure Tailored brochure Video: bribery Video: reiderstvo
mean Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v.
How often do you think students use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams 3.86 -0.01 0.09 0.94 0.04 0.09 0.67 0.03 0.10 0.77 0.08 0.10 0.46
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 3.54 0.03 0.10 0.77 -0.05 0.10 0.63 0.07 0.11 0.52 0.03 0.12 0.80
Buy papers 3.29 0.03 0.11 0.82 -0.02 0.11 0.87 0.15 0.11 0.16 -0.12 0.12 0.35
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 3.80 0.04 0.10 0.73 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.23 -0.01 0.11 0.94
Copy from other students during exams or tests 3.71 0.18 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.20 0.13 0.10 0.20 0.05 0.12 0.66
Deceive professors about study problems 3.15 -0.07 0.12 0.55 0.05 0.12 0.68 0.05 0.12 0.71 0.00 0.12 0.98
Ask professors preferential treatment 2.58 -0.01 0.11 0.96 0.10 0.12 0.40 0.16 0.12 0.18 -0.02 0.11 0.85
When do you think these practices are acceptable? (1= deﬁnitely no... 5= deﬁnitely yes)
When a course is useless 2.61 0.39 0.13 0.00 0.15 0.12 0.22 -0.02 0.13 0.88 -0.05 0.14 0.70
When students work 3.01 0.24 0.12 0.04 -0.02 0.12 0.88 -0.06 0.13 0.64 -0.13 0.14 0.35
If hard to learn material 2.69 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.11 1.00 -0.01 0.12 0.93 -0.11 0.13 0.41
Always acceptable 2.19 0.10 0.12 0.42 -0.03 0.11 0.76 0.10 0.11 0.39 -0.08 0.12 0.50
Never acceptable 3.10 -0.07 0.13 0.60 -0.20 0.13 0.11 -0.21 0.13 0.12 -0.06 0.15 0.68
What does corruption mean to you? (1= deﬁnitely no... 5= deﬁnitely yes)
Necessity 1.99 0.12 0.11 0.28 -0.02 0.10 0.89 -0.01 0.11 0.96 -0.07 0.12 0.54
Means of income 2.93 0.32 0.14 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.56 0.14 0.13 0.31 -0.32 0.15 0.03
Crime 4.01 0.13 0.11 0.22 0.02 0.11 0.85 0.05 0.12 0.65 0.03 0.11 0.78
Means to solve problems 3.21 0.06 0.12 0.59 -0.05 0.12 0.71 0.02 0.13 0.86 -0.11 0.13 0.39
Compensation for low salaries 2.67 0.14 0.13 0.29 0.13 0.13 0.31 -0.11 0.13 0.41 -0.07 0.14 0.63
Evil 3.83 0.09 0.12 0.43 -0.01 0.12 0.96 0.14 0.12 0.23 -0.23 0.14 0.11
In your view, how does corruption aﬀect...? (1=strictly negative... 5=fully positive)
Your career opportunities 2.37 0.06 0.11 0.58 -0.08 0.10 0.43 -0.10 0.11 0.39 0.10 0.11 0.39
Your quality of life 2.45 -0.01 0.10 0.95 -0.12 0.10 0.26 -0.09 0.11 0.44 -0.03 0.11 0.79
Your education 2.33 -0.06 0.10 0.54 -0.08 0.10 0.46 -0.23 0.10 0.03 -0.06 0.11 0.59
Your health 2.36 0.01 0.11 0.93 -0.14 0.11 0.20 -0.04 0.11 0.76 -0.10 0.11 0.39
Your safety 2.21 -0.04 0.11 0.71 -0.09 0.11 0.43 -0.13 0.11 0.22 -0.14 0.12 0.25
Russian economy 1.52 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.07 0.95 0.05 0.08 0.57 0.10 0.09 0.29
Russian politics 1.56 0.11 0.08 0.18 0.02 0.08 0.85 0.03 0.08 0.73 0.12 0.09 0.18
Russian education 1.59 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.81 -0.03 0.08 0.69 0.10 0.09 0.26
Russian health system 1.56 0.26 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.70 0.06 0.09 0.51 0.13 0.10 0.17
Russian police 1.48 0.18 0.09 0.05 -0.02 0.08 0.82 0.02 0.09 0.87 0.16 0.10 0.12
Can corruption be eradicated in Russia? 2.47 0.01 0.11 0.95 -0.17 0.11 0.11 -0.05 0.11 0.64 0.12 0.12 0.32
(1=deﬁnitely no... 5=deﬁnitely yes)
Take part in roundtable? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.32
Take part in survey next year? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.14 -0.05 0.03 0.10 -0.05 0.03 0.06 -0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.16
Notes: `Eﬀect' represents the diﬀerence between the mean outcome value in each treatment group and the control mean, `se' provides asymptotic standard
error robust to heteroskedasticity, and `p-v.' stands for p-value.
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Table A2.5: Eﬀects in the female subsample
Outcome Control Oﬃcial brochure Tailored brochure Video: bribery Video: reiderstvo
mean Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v. Eﬀect se p-v.
How often do you think students use the following practices? (1=never... 5=systematically)
Use crib sheets at exams 3.99 -0.04 0.08 0.67 -0.07 0.08 0.34 -0.01 0.09 0.92 -0.10 0.08 0.22
Submit papers downloaded from the internet 3.45 0.01 0.10 0.90 0.03 0.09 0.74 0.17 0.10 0.08 -0.01 0.10 0.95
Buy papers 3.14 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.85 0.24 0.11 0.02
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the internet 3.72 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.21 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.54 0.16 0.09 0.09
Copy from other students during exams or tests 3.77 0.07 0.09 0.42 0.06 0.09 0.51 0.08 0.09 0.38 0.05 0.10 0.60
Deceive professors about study problems 3.06 -0.01 0.11 0.95 0.07 0.11 0.53 -0.05 0.11 0.65 0.12 0.11 0.28
Ask professors preferential treatment 2.39 -0.07 0.10 0.51 0.13 0.10 0.22 -0.01 0.11 0.89 0.10 0.11 0.37
When do you think these practices are acceptable? (1= deﬁnitely no... 5= deﬁnitely yes)
When a course is useless 2.64 0.18 0.12 0.12 -0.08 0.11 0.48 -0.01 0.11 0.95 0.08 0.12 0.52
When students work 2.95 0.09 0.11 0.40 0.03 0.11 0.76 0.09 0.11 0.43 -0.05 0.11 0.65
If it is hard to learn material 2.73 0.16 0.11 0.14 -0.02 0.11 0.84 0.09 0.11 0.41 -0.08 0.11 0.45
Always acceptable 2.04 0.09 0.09 0.34 -0.01 0.09 0.91 0.08 0.10 0.42 0.07 0.10 0.47
Never acceptable 2.92 -0.17 0.12 0.16 -0.12 0.12 0.31 0.02 0.13 0.90 0.04 0.13 0.76
What does corruption mean to you? (1= deﬁnitely no... 5= deﬁnitely yes)
Necessity 1.87 0.08 0.10 0.40 0.06 0.10 0.54 0.08 0.10 0.43 0.09 0.10 0.35
Means of income 2.78 0.10 0.12 0.42 0.01 0.12 0.92 0.11 0.13 0.36 0.14 0.12 0.28
Crime 4.14 -0.14 0.10 0.17 -0.13 0.10 0.17 0.06 0.10 0.53 -0.05 0.10 0.65
Means to solve problems 2.96 0.09 0.10 0.37 0.13 0.11 0.23 -0.07 0.12 0.53 -0.08 0.12 0.53
Compensation for low salaries 2.52 0.14 0.12 0.25 0.05 0.11 0.64 0.07 0.12 0.59 0.01 0.12 0.91
Evil 3.83 -0.08 0.12 0.53 0.02 0.11 0.87 -0.14 0.12 0.27 -0.02 0.13 0.86
In your view, how does corruption aﬀect...? (1=strictly negative... 5=fully positive)
Your career opportunities 2.30 0.02 0.10 0.85 -0.02 0.09 0.84 -0.02 0.10 0.86 -0.04 0.10 0.68
Your quality of life 2.33 0.06 0.10 0.55 -0.04 0.09 0.69 0.00 0.10 0.96 0.02 0.10 0.89
Your education 2.13 0.05 0.09 0.57 0.03 0.09 0.77 0.03 0.10 0.79 0.01 0.10 0.92
Your health 2.21 0.04 0.10 0.70 0.02 0.09 0.83 0.00 0.10 0.99 -0.09 0.10 0.37
Your safety 1.98 -0.03 0.09 0.74 0.01 0.09 0.90 -0.05 0.09 0.56 -0.05 0.09 0.59
Russian economy 1.51 0.00 0.07 0.95 -0.02 0.06 0.77 -0.02 0.07 0.81 0.05 0.08 0.54
Russian politics 1.58 -0.04 0.07 0.60 -0.03 0.06 0.64 -0.04 0.07 0.54 -0.05 0.08 0.55
Russian education 1.52 0.03 0.07 0.64 0.01 0.06 0.82 0.01 0.07 0.90 0.00 0.07 0.98
Russian health system 1.52 0.04 0.07 0.62 -0.01 0.07 0.94 0.01 0.07 0.90 -0.01 0.07 0.88
Russian police 1.41 0.04 0.07 0.61 -0.01 0.06 0.93 0.01 0.07 0.86 0.00 0.07 0.98
Can corruption be eradicated in Russia? 2.56 -0.12 0.09 0.21 -0.04 0.09 0.67 -0.17 0.10 0.09 -0.10 0.10 0.31
(1=deﬁnitely no... 5=deﬁnitely yes)
Take part in roundtable? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.86 0.00 0.02 0.96 -0.02 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.02 0.47
Take part in survey next year? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.11 -0.02 0.03 0.40 -0.01 0.03 0.67 -0.02 0.03 0.53 0.00 0.03 0.91
Notes: `Eﬀect' represents the diﬀerence between the mean outcome value in each treatment group and the control mean, `se' provides asymptotic standard
error robust to heteroskedasticity, and `p-v.' stands for p-value.
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Appendix 3
3.0.1 Proof of Theorem 1
E
[
Y · I{D = d} · S
Pr(D = d|M,X) · Pr(S = 1|D,M,X) ·
Pr(D = 1− d|M,X)
Pr(D = 1− d|X)
]
(3.1)
= E
X
[
E
M |X=x
[
E
[
Y · I{D = d} · S
Pr(D = d|M,X) · Pr(S = 1|D,M,X)
∣∣∣∣M = m,X = x] · Pr(D = 1− d|M,X)Pr(D = 1− d|X)
]]
= E
X
[
E
M |X=x
[
E
[
Y · S
Pr(S = 1|D,M,X)
∣∣∣∣D = d,M = m,X = x] · Pr(D = 1− d|M,X)Pr(D = 1− d|X)
]]
= E
X
[
E
M |X=x
[
E [Y |D = d,M = m,X = x, S = 1] · Pr(D = 1− d|M,X)
Pr(D = 1− d|X)
]]
= E
X
[
E
M |D=1−d,X=x
[E [Y |D = d,M = m,X = x, S = 1]]
]
= E
X
[
E
M |D=1−d,X=x
[E [Y |D = d,M = m,X = x]]
]
= E
X
[
E
M |D=1−d,X=x
[E [Y (d,m)|D = d,M = m,X = x]]
]
= E
X
[
E
M |D=1−d,X=x
[E [Y (d,m)|D = d,X = x]]
]
= E
X
[
E
M(1−d)|X=x
[E [Y (d,m)|D = 1− d,X = x]]
]
= E
X
[
E
M(1−d)|X=x
[E [Y (d,m)|D = 1− d,M(1− d) = m,X = x]]
]
= E
X
[
E
M(1−d)|X=x
[E [Y (d,m)|M(1− d) = m,X = x]]
]
= E
X
[
E
M(1−d)|X=x
[E [Y (d,M(1− d))|X = x]]
]
= E[Y (d,M(1− d))].
Note that E
A|B=b
[C] denotes the expectation of C taken over the distribution of A conditional on
B = b. The ﬁrst equality follows from the law of iterated expectations, the second and third from
basic probability theory, the fourth from Bayes' theorem, the ﬁfth from Assumption 3, the sixth
from the observational rule (implying for instance that Y given D = d and M = m is Y (d,m)),
the seventh from Assumption 2, the eighth from Assumption 1, the ninth from Assumption 2, the
tenth from Assumption 1, which implies that Y (d,m)⊥D|M(1 − d) = m,X = x, and the last
xi
from the law of iterated expectations.
E
[
Y · I{D = d} · S
Pr(D = d|X) · Pr(S = 1|D,M,X)
]
(3.2)
= E
X
[
E
[
Y · I{D = d} · S
Pr(D = d|X) · Pr(S = 1|D,M,X)
∣∣∣∣X = x]]
= E
X
[
E
[
Y · S
Pr(S = 1|D,M,X)
∣∣∣∣D = d,X = x]]
= E
X
[
E
M |D=d,X=x
[
E[Y · S|D = d,M = m,X = x]
Pr(S = 1|D,M,X)
∣∣∣∣D = d,X = x]]
= E
X
[
E
M |D=d,X=x
[E[Y |D = d,M = m,X = x, S = 1]|D = d,X = x]
]
= E
X
[
E
M |D=d,X=x
[E[Y |D = d,M = m,X = x]|D = d,X = x]
]
= E
X
[E [Y |D = d,X = x]]
= E
X
[E [Y (d,M(d))|D = d,X = x]]
= E
X
[E [Y (d,M(d))|X = x]] = E[Y (d,M(d))].
The ﬁrst, third, sixth, and ninth equalities follow from the law of iterated expectations, the
second and fourth from basic probability theory, the ﬁfth from Assumption 3, the seventh from
the observational rule, and the eighth from Assumption 1.
E
[
Y · I{D = d} · I{M = m} · S
Pr(D = d|X) · Pr(M = m|D,X) · Pr(S = 1|D,M,X)
]
(3.3)
= E
X
[
E
[
Y · I{D = d} · I{M = m} · S
Pr(D = d|X) · Pr(M = m|D,X) · Pr(S = 1|D,M,X)
∣∣∣∣X = x]]
= E
X
[E [Y |D = d,M = m,X = x, S = 1]]
= E
X
[E [Y |D = d,M = m,X = x]]
= E
X
[E [Y (d,m)|D = d,M = m,X = x]]
= E
X
[E [Y (d,m)|D = d,X = x]]
= E
X
[E [Y (d,m)|X = x]] = E[Y (d,m)]
The ﬁrst and seventh equalities follow from the law of iterated expectations, the second from basic
probability theory, the third from Assumption 3, the fourth from the observational rule, the ﬁfth
from Assumption 2, and the sixth from Assumption 1.
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3.0.2 Proof of Theorem 2
E
[
Y · I{D = d}
Pr(D = d|M,X, p(W )) ·
Pr(D = 1− d|M,X, p(W ))
Pr(D = 1− d|X, p(W ))
∣∣∣∣S = 1] (3.4)
= E
X,p(W )|S=1
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M |X=x,p(W )=p(w),S=1
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Y · I{D = d}
Pr(D = d|M,X, p(W ))
∣∣∣∣M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]
× Pr(D = 1− d|M,X, p(W )
Pr(D = 1− d|X, p(W ))
]]
= E
X,p(W )|S=1
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× Pr(D = 1− d|M,X, p(W ))
Pr(D = 1− d|X, p(W ))
]]
= E
X,p(W )|S=1
[
E
M |D=1−d,X=x,p(W )=p(w),S=1
[E [Y (d,m)|D = d,M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
]
= E
X,p(W )|S=1
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E
M |D=1−d,X=x,p(W )=p(w),S=1
[E [Y (d,m)|D = d,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
]
= E
X,p(W )|S=1
[
E
M(1−d)|X=x,p(W )=p(w),S=1
[E [Y (d,m)|D = 1− d,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
]
= E
X,p(W )|S=1
[
E
M(1−d)|X=x,p(W )=p(w),S=1
[E [Y (d,m)|D = 1− d,M(1− d) = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
]
= E
X,p(W )|S=1
[
E
M(1−d)|X=x,p(W )=p(w),S=1
[E [Y (d,m)|M(1− d) = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
]
= E
X,p(W )|S=1
[
E
M(1−d)|X=x,p(W )=p(w),S=1
[E [Y (d,M(1− d))|X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
]
= E[Y (d,M(1− d))|S = 1].
The ﬁrst equality follows from the law of iterated expectations, the second from basic probability theory,
the third from Bayes' theorem and the observational rule, the fourth from Assumptions 2 and 5 (which
imply Y (d,m)⊥M |D = d′, X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1), the ﬁfth from Assumptions 1 and 5 (which imply
{Y (d,m),M(1 − d)}⊥D|X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1), the sixth from Assumptions 2 and 5, the seventh
from Assumptions 1 and 5 (which imply Y (d,m)⊥D|M(1− d) = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1), and the
last from the law of iterated expectations.
E
[
Y · I{D = d}
Pr(D = d|X, p(W ))
∣∣∣∣S = 1] (3.5)
= E
X,p(W )|S=1
[
E
[
Y · I{D = d}
Pr(D = d|X, p(W ))
∣∣∣∣X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
= E
X,p(W )|S=1
[E [Y |D = d,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
= E
X,p(W )|S=1
[E [Y (d,M(d))|D = d,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
= E
X,p(W )|S=1
[E [Y (d,M(d))|X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]] = E[Y (d,M(d))|S = 1].
The ﬁrst and last equalities follow from the law of iterated expectations, the second from basic probability
theory, the third from the observational rule, and the fourth from Assumptions 1 and 5 (which imply
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Y (d,m)⊥D|X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1).
E
[
Y · I{D = d} · I{M = m}
Pr(D = d|X, p(W )) · Pr(M = m|D,X, p(W ))
∣∣∣∣S = 1] (3.6)
= E
X,p(W )|S=1
[
E
[
Y · I{D = d} · I{M = m}
Pr(D = d|X, p(W )) · Pr(M = m|D,X, p(W ))
∣∣∣∣X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1] ∣∣∣∣S = 1]
= E
X,p(W )|S=1
[
E [Y |D = d,M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]
∣∣∣∣S = 1]
= E
X,p(W )|S=1
[E [Y (d,m)|D = d,M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
= E
X,p(W )|S=1
[E [Y (d,m)|D = d,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
= E
X,p(W )|S=1
[E [Y (d,m)|X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]] = E[Y (d,m)|S = 1]
The ﬁrst and sixth equalities follow from the law of iterated expectations, the second from basic
probability theory, the third from the observational rule, the fourth from Assumptions 2 and 5 (which
imply Y (d,m)⊥M |D = d,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1), and the ﬁfth from Assumptions 1 and 5 (which
imply Y (d,m)⊥D|X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1).
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3.0.3 Proof of Theorem 3
E
[(
Y ·D
Pr(D = 1|M,X, p(W )) −
Y · (1−D)
1− Pr(D = 1|M,X, p(W ))
)
· Pr(D = d|M,X, p(W )) · S
Pr(D = d|X, p(W )) · p(W )
]
(3.7)
= E
X,p(W )
[
E
M |X=x,p(W )=p(w)
[
E
[
Y ·D · S
Pr(D = 1|M,X, p(W )) · p(W )
− Y · (1−D) · S
1− Pr(D = 1|M,X, p(W )) · p(W )
∣∣∣∣M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w)] · Pr(D = d|M,X, p(W ))Pr(D = d|X, p(W ))
]]
= E
X,p(W )
[
E
M |X=x,p(W )=p(w)
[
E
[
Y · S
p(W )
∣∣∣∣D = 1,M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w)]
− E
[
Y · S
p(W )
∣∣∣∣D = 0,M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w)] · Pr(D = d|M,X, p(W ))Pr(D = d|X, p(W ))
]]
= E
X,p(W )
[
E
M |X=x,p(W )=p(w)
[E[Y |D = 1,M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]
− E[Y |D = 0,M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1] · Pr(D = d|M,X, p(W ))
Pr(D = d|X, p(W ))
]]
= E
X,p(W )
[
E
M |D=d,X=x,p(W )=p(w)
[E[Y (1,m)|D = 1,M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]
− E[Y (0,m)|D = 0,M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]]
= E
X,p(W )
[
E
M |D=d,X=x,p(W )=p(w)
[E[Y (1,m)|D = 1, X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]
− E[Y (0,m)|D = 0, X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]]
= E
X,p(W )
[
E
M(d)|X=x,p(W )=p(w)
[E[Y (1,m)− Y (0,m)|X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
]
= E
X,p(W )
[
E
M(d)|X=x,p(W )=p(w)
[E[Y (1,m)− Y (0,m)|X = x, p(W ) = p(w)]]
]
= θ(d)
The ﬁrst and last equalities follow from the law of iterated expectations, the second from basic
probability theory, the third from basic probability theory and the fact that Pr(S = 1|D,M,X, p(W )) =
Pr(S = 1|D,M,X,Z) = p(W ) (as p(W ) is a deterministic function of Z conditional on D,M,X), the
fourth from Bayes' theorem and the observational rule, the ﬁfth from Assumptions 2 and 5 (which imply
Y (d,m)⊥M |D = d′, X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1), the sixth from Assumptions 1 and 5 (which imply
{Y (d,m),M(d′)}⊥D|X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1), and the seventh from Assumption 7 by acknowledging
that p(W ) = FV .
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E[
Y · I{D = d} · S
Pr(D = d|M,X, p(W )) · p(W ) ·
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Pr(D = 1|M,X, p(W ))
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(3.8)
= E
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Y · I{D = d} · S
Pr(D = d|M,X, p(W )) · p(W )
∣∣∣∣M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w)]
×
(
Pr(D = 1|M,X, p(W ))
Pr(D = 1|X, p(W )) −
1− Pr(D = 1|M,X, p(W ))
1− Pr(D = 1|X, p(W ))
)]]
= E
X,p(W )
[
E
M |X=x,p(W )=p(w)
[
E[Y |D = d,M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1] ·
(
Pr(D = 1|M,X, p(W ))
Pr(D = 1|X, p(W )) −
1− Pr(D = 1|M,X, p(W ))
1− Pr(D = 1|X, p(W ))
)]]
= E
X,p(W )
[
E
M |D=1,X=x,p(W )=p(w)
[E[Y (d,m)|D = d,M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
− E
M |D=0,X=x,p(W )=p(w)
[E[Y (d,m)|D = d,M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
]
= E
X,p(W )
[
E
M |D=1,X=x,p(W )=p(w)
[E[Y (d,m)|D = d,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
− E
M |D=0,X=x,p(W )=p(w)
[E[Y (d,m)|D = d,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
]
= E
X,p(W )
[
E
M(1)|X=x,p(W )=p(w)
[E[Y (d,m)|X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]− E
M(0)|X=x,p(W )=p(w)
[E[Y (d,m)|X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
]
= E
X,p(W )
[E[Y (d,M(1))− Y (d,M(0))|X = x, p(W ) = p(w)]] = δ(d)
The ﬁrst and last equalities follow from the law of iterated expectations, the second from basic probability theory and the fact that Pr(S =
1|D,M,X, p(W )) = Pr(S = 1|D,M,X,Z) = p(W ), the third from Bayes' theorem and the observational rule, the fourth from Assumptions 2 and
5 (which imply Y (d,m)⊥M |D = d′, X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1), the ﬁfth from Assumptions 1 and 5 (which imply {Y (d,m),M(d′)}⊥D|X =
x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1), and the sixth from Assumption 7 by acknowledging that p(W ) = FV .
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E[(
Y ·D
Pr(D = 1|X, p(W )) −
Y · (1−D)
1− Pr(D = 1|X, p(W ))
)
· I{M = m} · S
Pr(M = m|D,X, p(W )) · p(W )
]
(3.9)
= E
X,p(W )
[
E
[(
Y ·D
Pr(D = 1|X, p(W )) −
Y · (1−D)
1− Pr(D = 1|X, p(W ))
)
· I{M = m} · S
Pr(M = m|D,X, p(W )) · p(W )
∣∣∣∣X = x, p(W ) = p(w)]]
= E
X,p(W )
[E[Y |D = 1,M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]− E[Y |D = 0,M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
= E
X,p(W )
[E[Y (1,m)|D = 1,M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]− E[Y (0,m)|D = 0,M = m,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
= E
X,p(W )
[E[Y (1,m)|D = 1, X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]− E[Y (0,m)|D = 0, X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
= E
X,p(W )
[E[Y (1,m)− Y (0,m)|X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1]]
= E
X,p(W )
[E[Y (1,m)− Y (0,m)|X = x, p(W ) = p(w)]] = γ(m)
The ﬁrst and last equalities follow from the law of iterated expectations, the second from basic probability theory and the fact that Pr(S =
1|D,M,X, p(W )) = Pr(S = 1|D,M,X,Z) = p(W ), the third from the observational rule, the fourth from Assumptions 2 and 5 (which imply
Y (d,m)⊥M |D = d,X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1), the ﬁfth from Assumptions 1 and 5 (which imply Y (d,m)⊥D|X = x, p(W ) = p(w), S = 1), and
the sixth from Assumption 7 by acknowledging that p(W ) = FV .
x
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Appendix 4
Table A4.1: Summary statistics and mean diﬀerences by gender
Variables Male(G = 1) Female(G = 0) Diﬀerence p-value
Outcome Y (non-logged, refers to selected population with S = 1)
Hourly wage 19.370 14.164 5.206 0.000
Mediators X (refer to 1998 unless otherwise is stated)
Married 0.566 0.568 -0.002 0.882
Years married total since 1979 6.430 7.537 -1.107 0.000
Northeastern region 0.153 0.155 -0.002 0.857
North Central region 0.242 0.237 0.005 0.602
West region 0.206 0.195 0.011 0.244
South region (ref.) 0.399 0.414 -0.015 0.205
Years lived in current region since 1979 14.839 15.246 -0.407 0.000
Resides in SMSA 0.811 0.816 -0.005 0.584
Years lived in SMSA since 1979 13.488 14.201 -0.713 0.000
Less than high school (ref.) 0.129 0.101 0.028 0.000
High school graduate 0.459 0.416 0.043 0.000
Some college 0.208 0.271 -0.063 0.000
College or more 0.204 0.213 -0.009 0.413
First job before 1975 0.065 0.046 0.019 0.001
First job in 197679 0.115 0.128 -0.013 0.083
First job after 1979 (ref.) 0.821 0.825 -0.004 0.623
Numer of jobs ever had 10.555 9.239 1.316 0.000
Tenure with current employer (wks.) 276.056 212.662 63.394 0.000
Industry: Primary sector 0.227 0.078 0.149 0.000
Industry: Manufacturing (ref.) 0.140 0.053 0.087 0.000
Industry: Transport 0.115 0.048 0.067 0.000
Industry: Trade 0.134 0.142 -0.008 0.322
Industry: Finance 0.040 0.064 -0.024 0.000
Industry: Services 0.121 0.124 -0.003 0.768
Industry: Professional services 0.113 0.297 -0.184 0.000
Industry: Public administration 0.054 0.052 0.002 0.751
Years worked in current industry since 1982 3.555 2.622 0.933 0.000
Continued on next page
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Table A4.1  continued from previous page
Variables Male(G = 1) Female(G = 0) Diﬀerence p-value
Manager 0.234 0.258 -0.024 0.022
Technical occupation (ref.) 0.039 0.038 0.001 0.907
Occupation in sales 0.067 0.082 -0.015 0.021
Clerical occupation 0.056 0.212 -0.156 0.000
Occupation in service 0.102 0.163 -0.061 0.000
Farmer or laborer 0.276 0.042 0.234 0.000
Operator (machines, transport) 0.170 0.063 0.107 0.000
Years worked in this occupation since 1982 2.180 1.727 0.453 0.000
Employment status: employed 0.877 0.748 0.129 0.000
Number of years employed status since 1979 13.204 11.271 1.933 0.000
Employed full time 0.846 0.599 0.247 0.000
Share of full-time employment 1994-98 0.896 0.658 0.238 0.000
Total number of weeks worked since 1979 661.794 560.408 101.386 0.000
Total number of weeks unempl. since 1979 62.343 49.744 12.599 0.000
Total number of weeks out of LF since 1979 146.118 265.276 -119.158 0.000
Bad health prevents from working 0.045 0.055 -0.010 0.071
Years not working due to bad health s. 1979 0.326 0.557 -0.231 0.000
Pre-treatment covariates W
Hispanic (ref.) 0.193 0.186 0.007 0.488
Black 0.287 0.297 -0.010 0.413
White 0.520 0.517 0.003 0.840
Born in the U.S. 0.935 0.939 -0.004 0.544
No religion 0.045 0.034 0.011 0.031
Protestant 0.501 0.500 0.001 0.957
Catholic (ref.) 0.352 0.352 0.000 0.967
Other religion 0.096 0.112 -0.016 0.036
Mother born in U.S. 0.884 0.896 -0.012 0.102
Mother's educ. <high school (ref.) 0.376 0.421 -0.045 0.000
Mother's educ. high school graduate 0.393 0.369 0.024 0.048
Mother's educ. some college 0.094 0.091 0.003 0.616
Mother's educ. college/more 0.076 0.071 0.005 0.411
Father born in US 0.878 0.884 -0.006 0.410
Father's educ. <high school (ref.) 0.351 0.366 -0.015 0.201
Father's educ. high school graduate 0.291 0.297 -0.006 0.560
Continued on next page
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Table A4.1  continued from previous page
Variables Male(G = 1) Female(G = 0) Diﬀerence p-value
Father's educ. some college 0.087 0.076 0.011 0.105
Father's educ. college/more 0.131 0.117 0.014 0.085
Order of birth 3.195 3.259 -0.064 0.256
Age in 1979 17.501 17.611 -0.110 0.047
Selection indicator S
Worked 1,000 hrs or more past year 0.867 0.696 0.171 0.000
Instrumental variables Z
Number of children under 15 1.286 1.209 0.077 0.008
Number of children under 6 0.353 0.295 0.058 0.000
Mother worked at 14 0.543 0.539 0.004 0.718
N of obs. 3,162 3,496 . .
Figure A4.1: Distribution of the estimated Pr(G = 1|X) by treatment states in seleted
population
xx
Figure A4.2: Distribution of the estimated Pr(G = 1|W ) by treatment states in seleted
population
Figure A4.3: Distribution of the estimated Pr(G = 1|X,W ) by treatment states in seleted
population
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Figure A4.4: Distribution of the estimated Pr(G = 1|W ) by treatment states in total
population
Figure A4.5: Distribution of the estimated Pr(G = 1|X,W ) by treatment states in total
population
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Figure A4.6: Distribution of the estimated Pr(S = 1|G,X,W ) by selection states
Figure A4.7: Distribution of the estimated p(Q) = Pr(S = 1|G,X,W,Z) by selection
states
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Figure A4.8: Distribution of the estimated Pr(G = 1|W, p(Q)) by treatment states in total
population
Figure A4.9: Distribution of the estimated Pr(G = 1|X,W, p(Q)) by treatment states in
total population
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Table A4.2: Summary of the estimated treatment propensity scores in selected population
Min Mean Max Min Mean Max
Female (G=0) Male (G=1)
Pr(G = 1|X) 0.00166 0.34454 0.9819 0.01835 0.6943 0.99047
Pr(G = 1|W ) 0.30751 0.52389 0.8023 0.39349 0.53517 0.87171
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) 0.00133 0.34042 0.9816 0.01574 0.69795 0.99287
Table A4.3: Summary of the estimated treatment propensity scores in total population
Min Mean Max Min Mean Max
Female (G=0) Male (G=1)
Pr(G = 1|W ) 0.36159 0.47140 0.76295 0.37095 0.47881 0.80260
Pr(G = 1|X,W ) 0.00081 0.29707 0.97202 0.01322 0.67155 0.99619
Pr(G = 1|W, p(Q)) 0.10313 0.43167 0.80670 0.09923 0.52273 0.89403
Pr(G = 1|X,W, p(Q)) 3.22× 10−7 0.23804 0.99983 0.00065 0.73682 0.99999
Table A4.4: Summary of the estimated selection propensity scores in total population
Min Mean Max Min Mean Max
Did not work (S=0) Worked (S=1)
Pr(S = 1|G,X,W ) 0.00327 0.36952 0.99272 0.02076 0.89392 0.99911
Pr(S = 1|G,X,W,Z) 0.00315 0.36669 0.99386 0.02150 0.89473 0.99909
Table A4.5: Number of trimmed observations for each propensity score
Trimming condition obs. % tot.
Treatment propensity scores in selected population
Pr(G = 1|X)<0.01 28 0.5
Pr(G = 1|W )<0.01 0 0.0
Pr(G = 1|W )>0.99 0 0.0
Pr(G = 1|X,W )<0.01 28 0.5
Treatment and selection propensity scores in total population
Pr(G = 1|W )<0.01 0 0.0
Pr(G = 1|W )>0.99 0 0.0
Pr(G = 1|X,W )<0.01 61 0.9
Pr(S = 1|G,X,W )<0.01 29 0.4
Pr(S = 1|G,X,W,Z)<0.01 30 0.4
Pr(G = 1|W, p(Q))<0.01 0 0.0
Pr(G = 1|W, p(Q))>0.99 0 0.0
Pr(G = 1|X,W, p(Q))<0.01 554 8.3
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Table A4.6: Robustness check: no interactions in X
Total gap in log wages Explained (Indirect) Unexplained (Direct) Trimmed
est. s.e. p-val est. s.e. p-val % tot. est. s.e. p-val % tot. obs. %
Oaxaca-Bl. 0.299 0.019 0.000 0.084 0.020 0.000 28% 0.215 0.023 0.000 72% 0 0%
IPW no W 0.295 0.019 0.000 0.093 0.029 0.001 32% 0.201 0.030 0.000 68% 21 0%
IPW with W 0.265 0.017 0.000 0.074 0.028 0.009 28% 0.192 0.030 0.000 72% 22 0%
IPW MAR 0.375 0.034 0.000 0.175 0.033 0.000 46% 0.201 0.033 0.000 53% 44 1%
IPW IV 0.148 0.324 0.649 0.031 0.102 0.758 21% 0.116 0.328 0.723 79% 673 10%
Notes: Standard errors and p-values are estimated based on 999 bootstrap replications. The trimming
rule discards observations with propensity scores (speciﬁc to each estimator) below 0.01 or above 0.99.
Table A4.7: Mother worked at 14 as an additional IV, full set of X
Total gap in log wages Explained (Indirect) Unexplained (Direct) Trimmed
est. s.e. p-val est. s.e. p-val % tot. est. s.e. p-val % tot. obs. %
IPW IV 0.140 0.156 0.369 -0.005 0.080 0.948 -4% 0.145 0.175 0.408 104% 583 9%
Notes: Standard errors and p-values are estimated based on 999 bootstrap replications. The trimming
rule discards observations with Pr(G = 1|X = x,W = w, p(Q) = p(q)) < 0.01,
Pr(G = 1|W = w, p(Q) = p(q)) > 0.99, and p(q) < 0.01.
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